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I. Introduction 
According to Majone, it is the phenomena of greater economic integration and increased international 
competition that has resulted in a reduced role for the positive, interventionist State, and a corresponding 
increase in the role of the “regulatory State”. As part of this thesis, international competition is said to 
take place not only among producers of goods and services but also, increasingly, among regulatory 
regimes.2 Within the specific context of the European Union (“EU”), it is argued that the EU and the 
European Member States are “regulatory states” that have evolved in response to the demands of 
economic modernization. A very distinctive feature of the regulatory state in the EU, however, is that 
the general trend of deregulation over time – assuming that “markets” work effectively – coincides with 
the political will of greater European integration. This lends itself to the creation of regulatory agencies, 
irrespective of their apparent lack of “democratic” credentials.3 By contrast, an author like Jabko takes 
the view that the EU regulatory approach to sector-specific regulation is based on regulatory innovation, 
which often occurs in sectors with slow technological evolution and where increased economic 
efficiency cannot merely be achieved through incremental regulatory changes. Thus, according to this 
author, the achievement of the EU regulatory state is more the result of politics rather than economic 
modernization.4 
The liberalization of utility sectors around the world began in the late 1980s.5 With the transition from 
monopoly provision to competitive markets, the impetus for creating well resourced, skilled and 
independent regulatory agencies to supervise those markets increased quickly. Irrespective of whether 
the principle driver for an era of regulation was economics or politics, it became clear early on in the 
liberalization process across the world that there were many common analytical steps that nation states 
                                                      
 2 Majone G., “From the Positive to the Regulatory State: Causes and Consequences of Changes in the Mode 
of Governance”, Journal of Public Policy (1997), Vol. 17(2), at pp. 139-168. See also Laughlin M. & Scott 
C., “The Regulatory State” in Dunleavy et al. (eds), Developments in British Politics (1997), Basingstoke, 
Macmillan Press, where the authors argue that the increasing use of regulation as a formal instrument of 
government may arise because of the need to ‘steer’ the behaviour of a variety of actors – both public and 
private – who operate to some degree removed from the State. The United Kingdom is cited as a particular 
example of this phenomenon, largely in response to certain changes in the role and structure of government. 
See Yeung K., “The Regulatory State”, in Baldwin R., Cave M. & Lodge M., The Oxford Handbook of 
Regulation (2010), Oxford University Press, at pp. 64-83, which points to the need for applying caution when 
using the label “regulatory State” to any given jurisdiction without having first identified its salient features. 
In other words, Yeung takes the view that ‘it must be more apt to refer to multiple regulatory states, with 
their own distinctive characteristics and dynamics, rather than to speak of a single or uniform regulatory 
state.” (at p. 76.) 
 3 The classic US treatise of Waldo D., The Administrative State (1948), New York, Ronald Press Co., argues 
that scientific management and efficiency are not the core ideas which drive the government bureaucracy, 
but it is rather the idea of “service to the public”. Accordingly, Waldo believes that public administrative 
efficiency must be backed by a framework of consciously held democratic values, as they evolve over time. 
 4 Jabko N., “The Political Foundations of the European Regulatory State” in Jordana J. et al. (eds), The Politics 
of Regulation – Institutions and Regulatory Reforms for the Age of Globalisation (2004), Chetenham (UK), 
Edgar Pulishing. See also Yeung K., Securing Compliance (2004), Oxford, Hart Publishing, which examines 
the sociological and normative strands of influence on regulatory compliance, reflecting on the inevitable 
value judgements that are made in the determination of whether and to what extent economic regulation is 
warranted. 
 5 Refer to discussion in Yarrow G. & Jasinski P., Privatization: Critical Perspectives on the World Economy 
(1996), London, Routledge Press, which provides an analysis of the privatization phenomenon affecting State 
assets in key industries and network utilities across industrialised nations. 
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had to take to ensure that their regulatory agencies were ‘fit for purpose’, but also that national and 
regional/local traditions might dictate that different paths be taken in the specific design of those 
agencies. Moreover, within the EU, the emergence of clear overlaps and conflicts over time between 
substantive and institutional issues generated tensions which required that regulatory models be 
modified and improved incrementally. 
In 1989, at a critical point in the liberalization process in the EU, Hancher & Moran considered how 
different political contexts shape regulation, with many advanced capitalist countries being 
characterized by a high level of State intervention and the fact that large firms participate very actively 
in the regulatory process. In the view of the authors, economic regulation is largely a process of 
intermediation and bargaining between large undertakings which span the private and public domains 
of decision-making.6 This ‘intermediation’ function has further complicated the role of agencies in the 
regulatory state, as it has added layers of consultation, fact-finding and balancing of stakeholder 
interests to the decision-making process. While this trend has opened up the decision-making process 
to new levels of transparency, the parallel concern has developed that agencies should not be ‘captured’7 
by any of the key stakeholders involved in most regulatory policy debates. 
Ayres & Braithwaite argue that solutions to the problems of capture and corruption lie in the 
introduction of characteristics such as limits on discretion in decision-making, multiple-agency 
jurisdiction, and the rotation of personnel. Each of these characteristics inhibit the evolution of a spirit 
of cooperation between a regulator and the regulated market actors. In order to address the problem of 
regulatory capture, the authors have advanced the concept of “tripartism”, a regulatory policy which 
fosters the participation of public interest groups in the regulatory process through the same access to 
information as public agencies, participation in the bargaining process between public agencies and 
regulated firms, and the same locus standi as public agencies.8 
Taking into account various observations on the role of the ‘regulatory state’, the aim of this paper is to 
explore, inter alia: 
• the analytical bases upon which regulatory agencies are allocated sector-specific tasks in 
utility sectors; 
• the momentum that exists around the world for the increasingly hybrid performance of 
competition law (ex post) and regulatory (ex ante) functions; 
                                                      
 6 See Hancher L. & Moran M., “Organizing regulatory space”, in Hancher and Moran (eds.), Capitalism, 
Culture and Regulation (1989), Oxford Clarendon Press. 
 7 The concept of regulatory capture refers to a form of government failure that occurs when a regulatory agency, 
allegedly created to act in the public interest, instead advances the commercial or political concerns of special 
interest groups that are prominent in the industry or sector which it is charged to regulate. The origins of the 
theory of regulatory capture is usually associated with the writings of the economist George Stigler (see “The 
Theory of Economic Regulation” (1971) 2, The Bell Journal of Economics and Management Science, p. 3.). 
Following Stigler’s seminal article, Richard Posner further developed the concept. (See Posner R.A., 
“Theories of Economic Regulation” (1974) 5 The Bell Journal of Economics and Management Science, p. 
335). These initial works forged a path for a long line of academic literature exploring the interface between 
law, economics and political science.  
 8 See Ayres I. & Braithwaite J., Responsive Regulation – Transcending the Deregulation Debate (1992), 
Oxford, Oxford University Press, who argue that features of regulatory encounters often foster the evolution 
of cooperation but also encourage the evolution of capture and corruption. 
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• the incorporation of competition law goals and tools into the sphere of regulatory activity, 
accompanied by closer institutional cooperation between National Regulatory Agencies 
(NRAs) and National Competition Agencies (NCAs); 
• the tendency in some jurisdictions to collapse all regulatory functions into a single agency, 
including the performance of competition law functions; 
• the importance of ensuring that agencies operate in an independent manner; and 
• the increasing use of regional regulatory bodies in the EU in the reinforcement of 
harmonization and internal market policies. 
In addressing these issues, the paper is concerned with the policy choices and trends related to 
institutional design of competition law and regulatory enforcement. To this end, it focuses on the 
different architectures that seek to reconcile and bring together tools used to regulate the behaviour of 
undertakings ex ante and to sanction eventual abuses ex post. These architectures are becoming ever 
more sophisticated, as both the language and the goals of regulation and competition law reach new 
levels of convergence. 
While the focal point of the analysis will be on regulatory structures developed in the EU, references to 
other jurisdictions will be made wherever non-EU examples illustrate particular trends in the shaping 
of agency structures. What lies outside the scope of this paper, however, is a review of the processes of 
capacity-building, staffing and funding of such agencies.9 Similarly, the discussion is not intended to 
determine whether particular agency structure lends itself to better, or more effective, rule-making, but 
rather to exploring the strengths and weaknesses of the various approaches that have been adopted. 
II. Sector-specific regulation 
It is universally acknowledged that a critical aspect of public policy is for the regulatory state to be able 
to address market abuses or market failures through either competition rules (in the case of abuses) or 
through economic regulation (in the case of market failures). The regulatory architecture relied upon to 
achieve these twin objectives can vary between different jurisdictions, based on a range of factors such 
                                                      
 9 As regards the dedication of resources to regulatory functions, in the studies performed by Domah, Pollitt & 
Stern in 2002, and revisited in 2010 by Pollitt & Stern, the most important factor by far in justifying staff 
numbers – both by reference to total numbers and professional staff – is the number of customers in the 
market, followed by the number of regulated companies. Refer also to discussion in Cave M. & Stern J., 
Competition and Regulatory Policy and Institutional Design for Scotland, Research Paper No. 11/2013, May 
2013, the David Hume Institute, at p. 5. In Hanretty C., LaRouche P. & Reindl A.P., CERRE Study on 
“Independence, Accountability and Perceived Quality of National Regulatory Authorities”, 6 March 2012, 
the authors investigate how regulators from 5 EU Member States achieve high quality decision-making. See 
also Stern J., “The Evaluation of Regulatory Agencies” in Baldwin, Cave & Lodge, op. cit., at pp. 223-258, 
who examines the intrinsic difficulties involved in measuring agency performance. According to the author: 
“when it comes to evaluating the performance of regulatory agencies, the main difficulty lies in identifying 
the target of evaluation – be that a government policy or a regulatory regime designed to implement that 
policy. A further problem is that the counterfactual of no agency is far too much. The evaluator is not 
considering a marginal change; it involves having to consider what set of structural choices and decisions 
might have been taken by some alternative, hypothetical regulatory framework. As this is unworkable, the ex 
post evaluation focus turns to evaluating sets of decisions taken by the regulator, relative to other decisions 
that it might have taken. These decisions have to be big enough significantly to affect the consumer, efficiency 
and investment outcomes but not so large as to recast the sector. Finding enough such decisions can be 
difficult.” (at p. 251.) 
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as available budgets (and recurring sources of financing),10 the size of the overall economy and the 
particular sector at issue,11 different cultural and legal traditions regarding the exercise of executive 
power12 and the extent to which effective judicial review is available to curb State decision-making,13 
the extent to which stakeholders’ views can be accommodated without compromising an agency’s 
                                                      
 10 The classic forms of agency financing are derived from up-front licensing fees, annual renewal licensing fees, 
recurring charges for access to scarce resources, and charges based on a percentage of turnover which are 
dedicated to the performance by the regulatory agency of its key functions. Within the EU, however, there 
are explicit restrictions on the extent to which NRAs can finance their operations, thereby ensuring that 
financial charges imposed on regulated firms are not excessive and do not thereby unreasonably raise their 
costs of doing business. Refer, for example, to: in telecommunications, Directive 2002/20/EC of the European 
Parliament and of the Council of 7 March 2002 on the authorization of electronic communications networks 
and services (Authorisation Directive) and its successor, Directive (EU) 2018/1972 of the European 
Parliament and of the Council of 11 December 2018 establishing the European Electronic Communications 
Code (Recast), Article 16; and in energy, the Third Energy Package (Directive 2009/72/EC on electricity, 
Directive 2009/73/EC on natural gas, Regulation (EC) No. 713/2009 establishing an agency for the 
cooperation of energy regulators, Regulation (EC) No. 714/2009 on the conditions for access to the network 
for cross-border exchanges in electricity, and Regulation No. 715/2009 on the conditions for access to the 
natural gas transmission networks. In the railway sector, EU Directive 95/18 establishes a regulatory 
framework and guidelines by which EU Member States may grant licences for the operation of railways, with 
the licensing of an operator in one Member State being generally valid in other EU Member States. Refer to 
EU Directive 95/18, as clarified by EU Directive 2001/13. Thus, an agency should not be able to achieve 
‘windfall’ funding at the expense of the effective operation of the industry, as disproportionate costs in terms 
of licensing and operating fees would inevitably also raise disproportionately the costs faced by new entrants. 
 11 The attraction of being able to operate on a nation-wide basis provides an effective platform for new entrants 
in large national markets, and justifies their absorption of higher operating costs relative to a smaller economy. 
Similarly, certain sectors are less burdened with public service obligations and ongoing maintenance and 
infrastructure upgrade costs, which facilitates greater revenue-generating possibilities; in these 
circumstances, the appetite of operators to bear higher administrative (regulatory compliance) costs is 
arguably higher when the costs can be offset by higher profitability. 
 12 In Majone G., “The Rise of the Regulatory State in Europe”, Western European Politics (1994), Vol. 17, pp. 
77-101, the author proceeds on the assumption that regulation should be limited to correcting market failure 
and to promoting economic efficiency. However, Burton J., “Competitive Order or Ordered Competition? 
The UK Model of Utility Regulation in Theory and Practice”, Public Administration, Vol. 75(2), pp. 157-
188, in analyzing the institutional arrangements for UK utility regulation in the post-privatization period 
specifically with respect to the question of de facto independence from governmental/Ministerial influence, 
criticizes existing regulatory structures; this is because the regulatory system tends towards “ordered 
competition” rather than the achievement of open and effective competition (wherever feasible.) By contrast, 
Sunstein C., After the rights revolution: Reconceiving the regulatory state (1990), Boston, Harvard University 
Press, discusses a range of non-economic substantive goals that justify regulatory intervention. These include: 
public-interest redistribution of welfare; reduction in social subordination; the promotion of diversity of 
experience; the prevention of harm to future generations; the embodiment of collective desires and the 
shaping of endogenous preferences. In the United States, authors Osborne D. & Gaebler T., Reinventing 
Government: How the Entrepreneurial Spirit is Transforming the Public Sector (1992), Reading MA, 
Addison Wesley, at p. 25, consider that it is also necessary to bring “the culture of the marketplace” to public 
administration, with a focus on performance measurement, business sense and market orientation. The 
authors argue that problems such as excessive and ineffective bureaucracy do not arise from failures in 
politics, but from a lack of managerial leadership, executive decision-making and decentralization. 
 13 The legal standard of review has a significant collateral effect on the workings of a regulatory agency in terms 
of the implementation of transparency measures, the running of stakeholder consultations and the ability to 
substantiate decision-making, all of which have the effect of raising administrative costs for an agency and 
increasing compliance costs for industry stakeholders. 
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effectiveness,14 and the pool of skilled technocrats and external advisors capable of administering public 
policy.15 
At the heart of the regulatory State is the understanding that significant consumer and societal benefits 
can be driven by the liberalization of markets, which subjects them to the forces of competition. It is 
only at this point in time that we can speak of “competition” and the importance of developing 
operational standards for the application of economic regulation in a competitive environment.16 The 
functions of ex post (competition) and ex ante (regulation) intervention are inevitably performed in a 
free market environment by agencies which enjoy some form of independence from the State and clear 
independence from market operators in that economic environment. Each and every one of these 
agencies is subject to its very own set of checks and balances developed against the backdrop of the 
regulatory State’s political and economic goals. 
Traditional separation of regulatory powers 
The overwhelming number of OECD countries (including those of the EU) have institutional 
architectures which establish: (1) more than one specialist ex ante regulatory agency; and (2) an ex post 
competition enforcement agency that is distinct from those regulatory agencies.  
Among the specialist, sector-specific regulatory agencies, the institutional pattern that is most often 
relied upon is that of: 
i. a sectoral regulator or National Regulatory Authority (“NRA”) covering electronic 
communications (or telecommunications) matters, whose mandate often extends to postal 
services and, on occasion, to issues relating to broadcasting or “content” from various media 
sources more generally (although this latter type of authority is much more controversial, given 
the cultural dimension to any such form of regulatory intervention);17 and 
                                                      
 14 See Moran M., “The Rise of the Regulatory State in Britain”, Parliamentary Affairs, vol. 54(1), at pp. 19-34, 
who stresses the changed popular expectations and growing sensitivity to regulatory risks. Refer also to Ogus 
A., Regulation: Legal Form and Economic Theory (2004), Oxford, Hart Publishing, who considers arguments 
that are centered around private interest theory as a means of evaluating the economic efficiency of regulatory 
processes. The author contends that resources devoted to winning the regulation ‘game’ (i.e., lobbying), often 
result in economic waste and are therefore socially unproductive. In turn, Croley P., “Theory of regulation: 
incorporating the administrative process” (1998), Columbia Law Review, vol. 1, at pp. 56-65, argues that the 
assumption of ‘interest-group competition’ (for desired regulatory outcomes) fails to appreciate that some 
interests are systematically underrepresented and that regulatory outcomes are therefore biased towards the 
organized few vis a vis the undetecting many. 
 15 It is not uncommon for smaller agencies, especially those operating in jurisdictions with a less developed 
regulatory or competition law cultures, to outsource some of their more high profile, politically sensitive tasks 
to external consultants, who often operate on a project-by-project or on a broader retainer basis. This has the 
benefit of keeping down operating costs overall, while at the same time avoiding the usual vulnerability of 
local employees being captured, because the external experts are usually not domiciled in the jurisdiction in 
question. 
 16 Refer to Case T-87/05, EDP – Energias de Portugal SA v Commission [2005] E.C.R. II-3745 at para. 116, 
where the General Court held that the European Commission was not entitled to apply competition rules 
where a sector continued to be subject to a legal monopoly. 
 17 The treatment of broadcasting services raises particularly interesting jurisdictional questions, given the fact 
that it raises so many public interest policy issues, including plurality of the media concerns. Cultural 
sensitivities have meant that broadcasting is therefore treated as a “cultural exception” to WTO Rules, for 
example, while the 1997 Amsterdam Protocol to the European Treaties means that there is no role for EU 
policymaking which might affect the public service remit of national broadcasters within the EU. Not 
surprisingly, therefore, it is exceedingly difficult to have broadcasting regulation situated within the same 
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ii. a sectoral regulator covering energy issues (electricity and gas) which, on occasion, includes 
jurisdiction over other basic commodities or classic ‘utilities’ such as water and sewage. 
As Cave & Stern have pointed out,18 the principal rationale for drawing the distinction between these 
two main groups of sector-specific regulators is the fact that the telecommunications and postal sectors 
are characterised by the existence of a monopoly or bottleneck network element at the local customer 
service point (e.g., the so-called local loop), while there are real possibilities for competition at ‘core 
network’ level (especially in the case of telecommunications). By contrast, it is widely acknowledged 
that the electricity and gas (as well as water) sectors are all characterised by the existence of physically 
unavoidable central networks (often along with local distribution networks).  
There are, of course, other sector-specific regulators which deal with industries as diverse as 
transportation (civil aviation, railways, ports and roads), banking, insurance, payment systems, etc., 
which have their own idiosyncratic characteristics, which are driven by many other public policy 
considerations.19 For example, the commercial impact of new technologies has led to policymakers 
being put under pressure to expand the scope of traditional telecommunications sector regulation into 
areas that are more associated with specific types of content. In the case of Malta, for example, rather 
than resulting in the expansion of the telecommunication regulator’s mandate, this has resulted in the 
creation of a new regulatory agency - the Malta Digital Innovation Authority (“MDIA”) - with a view 
to recognising innovative technology arrangements brought about by the use of blockchain technology. 
The MDIA’s responsibilities include the grant, issuance, refusal, revocation, cancellation or suspension 
of authorisations regarding the provision of innovative technology arrangements. 20 Aside from its 
                                                      
agency as other regulatory powers. By contrast, the convergence of regulatory functions arguably occurs 
more readily in a country like China across the telecommunications, media and IT spaces because of the limits 
to free speech and pluralism concerns in a State-driven economy. Within the EU, a Member State such as 
France draws clear boundaries between the competence of a telecommunications regulator and its media 
regulator, whereas Italy combines both telecommunications and media regulation, even extending to content 
issues. Germany draws a bright line between the regulation of media issues, which are governed at the 
regional level of the Länder, and telecommunications sector issues, which are addressed at the federal level. 
By contrast, the United Kingdom’s OFCOM is responsible for the economic regulation of both 
telecommunications and broadcasting sectors, largely driven by the fact that cable TV and satellite operators 
have enjoyed a symbiotic relationship since their inception, with broadcasting content serving as a key 
wholesale input to their respective retail service bundles. In Belgium, that country’s unique pattern of cable 
TV infrastructure rollout has resulted in creeping regulatory powers being introduced into the media sector 
as a result of the regulation of cable networks under the scope of telecommunications regulation. 
 18 See Cave & Stern, op.cit., at pp. 3-4. 
 19 Regulation relating to industries such as banking, insurance and payments systems focus more on ensuring 
equal operating conditions and facilitating cooperation in order to minimize risk contagion across an industry 
where retail customer security is paramount. By contrast, while sectors such as railways and posts are 
characterized by the existence of historical incumbents, the scope of economic regulation directed to 
addressing market power is more limited, given the continued emphasis in those sectors of public service 
obligations and the need for economies of scale for certain operations relating to the provision of such public 
service. In the maritime and civil aviation sectors, the lack of any insurmountable fixed costs in the provision 
of services means that much of the emphasis of competition rules and sector-specific regulation has been 
directed towards the opening up of bottleneck or essential facilities in the form of airtime slots (civil aviation) 
and ports (maritime). In addition, the very particular security issues surrounding the civil aviation industry 
means that most jurisdictions impose limits on the ability of non-nationals to own a majority stake in a 
national airline. 
 20 Refer to the Malta Digital Innovation Authority Act 2018, which was enacted in July 2018. According to the 
Act, “innovative technology arrangements” include the software codes, computer protocols and other 
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monitoring and supervisory powers, the MDIA also has investigative and enforcement powers in 
relation to innovative technology arrangements provided in or from Malta. Regulatory decisions 
adopted by the MDIA are subject to appeal before an independent body, while the MDIA is also obliged 
to coordinate with other competent authorities whose competence might somehow extend to the same 
subject-matter. Although these other regulators are not the focus of this paper, many elements of 
institutional design discussed here are also applicable to them (especially those dealing with network 
industries with powers to regulate access and prices). 
In addition, there is a range of institutional options to achieve the formal allocation of powers between 
sector-specific regulators and competition authorities. A clear differentiating factor between sector-
specific regulation and competition law – at least in theory – is the widespread belief that the former 
can pursue a range of public policy goals that are able to shape an industry, whereas competition rules 
are there to apply rational economic theory across all commercial sectors with a view to maximising 
consumer welfare. 21  The debates within the competition law family turn largely on whether the 
optimization of consumer welfare is to be appraised in the short term or in the longer term, whether 
overwhelming emphasis is to be placed on price considerations, whether a broader total welfare 
evaluation is the preferred alternative standard to be applied, and whether the maintenance of 
competitive structures is more important than the protection of individual competitors.22 Only in one 
instance – that of the telecommunications industry in New Zealand – has the liberalization of a network 
sector occurred while presuming that competition policy would be capable of resolving all market 
failures and addressing abusive practices. That experiment in the late 1980s has, over time, given way, 
to the understanding that at least some form of effective targeted access regulation is required to 
constrain the incumbent operator.23 
Over time, many NCAs have also embraced the application of unfair trade practices rules, or even 
consumer protection rules, within their competence. For example, within the EU, inter alia, Member 
States such as Italy, Denmark, Malta, Finland, the United Kingdom, Ireland and The Netherlands 
provide clear examples of the fusion of competition law and consumer protection powers. In the United 
States, Article 5(1) of the Federal Trade Commission Act, which prohibits “unfair methods of 
competition in or affecting commerce” is often identified by commentators as a broad power of market 
regulation that “spans the boundary between competition law and regulators”.24  
                                                      
architectures used in the context of decentralised ledger technology, “smart” contracts and related 
applications. 
 21 That simple analytical split is compromised when one considers the amount of de facto industry re-structuring 
that takes place through the application of merger control rules, often with a view to reinforcing or introducing 
regulatory principles. See Alexiadis P. “Merger control in regulated sectors: a bridge too far?”, in Liber 
Amicorum (Vol. II) for Ian Forrester, Concurrences (2015), at pp. 3-56. 
 22 The traditional ‘Chicago’ school line of thinking (usually associated with authors such as Posner in the 1970s) 
is progressively giving way to an approach which attaches greater significance to non-price measures of 
welfare. For example, the “New Brandeis” movement – sometimes also referred to as “Hipster Antitrust”, 
places greater emphasis on the preservation of market structure and the competitive process itself; see, e.g., 
Khan L.M., “Amazon’s Antitrust Paradox” in Yale Law Journal (Vol. 126, No. 3) pp. 710-805. More 
generally, refer to Crane D.A., “Chicago, Post-Chicago, and Neo-Chicago” (2009), University of Chicago 
Law Review, pp. 1911-2009. 
 23 Refer to the Clear Communications case before the New Zealand Court and the Privacy Council. See also to 
Blanchard C., “Telecommunications Regulation in New Zealand: How Effective is ‘Light-Handed’ 
Regulation?”, Telecommunications Policy (1994) Vol. 18, 2nd edition. Refer also to Table 1 on New Zealand. 
 24 Refer to discussion in Dunne N., Competition Law and Economic Regulation – Making and Managing 
Markets (2015), Cambridge University Press, Chapter 5, at pp. 304-314. In this regard, refer also to Fels A., 
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The specific market defect that might need to be remedied, the particular legal standard adopted for 
intervention, the legitimate objectives that can be pursued by the agency, and the remedies that might 
be available to that agency, are all highly relevant considerations in determining whether any particular 
agency is best positioned to take action. 
Also, the different tool kits available to NCAs and NRAs in order for them to address different market 
defects tend to influence which agency is best suited to address the particular issue in question. On one 
hand, NCAs’ ex post actions are usually based on the imposition of sanctions (e.g. fines for 
infringements) and structural remedies (e.g. divestitures, compulsory licensing of IP), with a more 
limited recourse to specific behavioural obligations. The assumption is that the remedy will be sufficient 
to (re)establish competition and to avoid continuous oversight. On the other hand, NRAs’ ex ante 
actions rely on a broader tool kit of behavioural control, including access obligations, rate regulation, 
technical obligations, quality controls, etc. Indeed, as a general matter, the regulatory tools available to 
NRAs usually assume that a natural monopoly or a highly concentrated market will constitute the basic 
market structure, thereby requiring detailed obligations and continuous oversight.25  
Despite any specific allocation of powers between NRAs and NCAs, decisions taken under ex ante and 
ex post regimes are not taken in isolation, but are often taken in consultation between the various 
agencies responsible for the administration of these disciplines. That process of consultation can take 
various forms. Thus, Brazil implements a system where, in relevant cases, consultation occurs between 
the NCA and the NRA with a view to enforcing competition rules in the telecommunications sector.26 
In Germany, BNetzA is obliged to consult more generally with the Bundeskartellamt when formulating 
regulatory remedies and when considering the implications on competition of spectrum allocations. 
Italy has also worked hard since 2013 to forge greater cooperation between its respective NRA and 
NCA agencies. In Poland, the NCA is either consulted or obliged to provide an opinion on questions 
arising under telecommunications regulation. Significant cooperation between the NRA and the NCA 
also takes place in Turkey, with the NRA being obliged to seek the NCA’s opinion with respect to 
                                                      
“Should Competition Authorities Perform a Consumer Protection Role?” in Liber Amicorum (Vol. 1) for 
Frédéric Jenny, Standing Up for Convergence and Relevance in Antitrust, Concurrences, at pp. 243-254, Fels 
considers the relevance of issues of institutional design where the responsibilities for both competition and 
consumer policy lie within a single agency. He considers the pros and cons of such shared responsibility, 
exploring the inherent limits to the possibilities for integration (especially given the very different nature of 
the tasks involved in implementing consumer policy and competition policy). The author concludes that 
conflicting pressures can be addressed through a range of different approaches, but what will be required in 
each case is that: (i) the NCA has in-house access to the skills involved in the formulation of consumer policy, 
while inter alia, having the scope to intervene in consumer policy decisions that have material competition 
implications; and (ii) an entity within the government provides “whole of government” oversight of consumer 
protection in a manner that is mindful of competition concerns. 
25   OECD compares the different approaches and remedies used by NCAs and NRAs along similar lines: “(…) 
sector-specific regulators are often charged with attenuating the effects of market power, whereas 
competition agencies basically focus on reducing such power; (…) sector-specific regulators typically impose 
and monitor various behavioural conditions whereas competition agencies are more likely to opt for 
structural remedies; (…) sector-specific regulators typically intervene more frequently and require a 
continual flow of information from regulated entities, while competition offices rely more on complaints and 
gather information only when necessary in connection with possible enforcement action”. (OECD, 
Relationship between Regulators and Competition Authorities, Policy Roundtables, 1998, pp. 8-9, 
http://www.oecd.org/regreform/sectors/1920556.pdf). 
26   See for example, the decision in which the NCA (CADE) dismissing an investigation about certain Zero 
Rating practices, after receiving an opinion from ANATEL which took the view that the conduct was not 
anti-competitive and was actually efficient. See Administrative Inquiry 08700.004314/2016-71, Defendants: 
Claro S.A., TIM Celular S.A., Oi Móvel S.A. and Telefonica Brasil S.A, dismissed on 08.31.2017. 
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certain key issues. Significant cooperation also occurs in the United States between the NRA for 
telecommunications matters (the FCC) and one of the two NCAs (the FTC). The complexities of 
cooperation take a slightly different twist in jurisdictions such as New Zealand and South Korea, where 
regulatory traditions are modified by the actual or potential use of structural or functional separation 
remedies. 
In the recently adopted rules set forth in the 4th Railway Package, the level of cooperation anticipated 
between agencies in the railway sector is expressly prescribed in some detail. Thus, Article 56 (3) of 
SERA27 specifies that railway sector NRAs are obliged to “cooperate closely” with the national safety 
authority (as understood within the meaning of Directive 2008/57/EC on the interoperability of the rail 
system within the EU) and the “licensing authority” (within the meaning accorded to that term by 
SERA). It is also specified that, at European level and with the help of the European Commission, 
NRAs in the rail sector shall exchange information about their work and decision-making principles 
and practices with the aim of developing a common approach in order to avoid conflicting decisions. 
Exceptions to the general rule 
The majority of European Union (“EU”) Member States endorses the form of institutional sector-
specific regulatory architecture centred around the fundamental telecommunications/energy split, with 
notable exceptions being: the United Kingdom, which has a separate regulator for water;28 Greece, 
which has an electronic communications regulator that also has sector-specific competition powers; and 
Spain, Germany, the Netherlands and Estonia, that have consolidated most of their relevant regulatory 
functions under one roof (as have countries such as Australia and Jamaica outside the EU). Small EU 
Member States such as Luxembourg and Malta also combine their telecommunications and energy 
functions within the same regulatory body. By contrast, in a small non-EU sovereign State such as 
Botswana, the regulator expressly assumes the responsibility for broadcasting regulation, but declines 
responsibility for electricity and water regulation, based on those sectors’ different network 
characteristics. 
In Germany, the regulatory agency which had responsibility for the regulation of the 
Telecommunications and Postal Sectors (RegTP) was founded in 1998. In 2005, it was conferred 
additional competences in relation to the energy and rail sectors, being re-named as the 
Bundesnetzagentur (BNetzA, Federal Network Agency). Its internal organization was modelled after 
the German Competition Authority. Nonetheless, there has been criticism about its performance, largely 
because the BNetzA is subordinate to the Federal Ministry for the Economy & Energy. Concerns that 
have been expressed about the independence of the Authority do not relate to the daily decision-making 
powers of the Authority, but rather to its more general independence in developing a policy strategy, as 
the Minister has the power to instruct BNetzA.29 Despite the proposal of the Monopolkommission (the 
advisory body to the Federal Ministry for the economy and energy) that BNetzA should be conferred 
with additional effective powers for controlling the rail sector (in particular setting the fees charged to 
                                                      
 27 Namely, Directive 2012/34/EU of 21 November 2012 establishing a single European railway area (“SERA”). 
 28 Indeed, given the fact that the United Kingdom has introduced a much greater level of liberalization in the 
water sector than most of its EU Member State counterparts, it has deemed it appropriate to introduce a sui 
generis form of merger review by the CMA for that sector (while not departing altogether from the prevailing 
system of ‘concurrency of powers’ regime under the Water Act 2014, which came into effect in December 
2015). See, for example, Pennon Group plc./Bournemouth Water (2015) and Severn Trent/United Utilities 
(2016). 
 29 See Attendorn T. & Geppert M. in Beck’scher TKG-Kommentar [2013] 4th ed, TKG §116 para 18. 
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users of the tracks),30 and BNetzA’s own arguments in 2011 that its powers be extended to cover the 
water sector,31 its accumulated powers from 2005 have remained unaffected. In parallel, no debate has 
taken place as to the possible addition to BNetzA of competition law powers, as Germany’s 
Bundeskartellamt has a long history of independence from all other forms of government involvement. 
Despite calls for the greater accumulation of regulatory powers to include rail and water, there seems 
to be residual concern in some circles that the traditional level of influence and direction of the German 
government in the policies pursued by BNetzA has been carried over into its new structure.32 In other 
words, an accumulation of regulatory powers does not appear to have quashed the idea that BNetzA is 
any more independent today than it was when its functions were more fragmented. 
Outside the traditional telecommunications and energy regulatory paradigms, the treatment of the 
transport sector is subject to significant variations. Thus, airline regulators are only slightly more 
common than railway regulators, with regulatory responsibilities being usually associated with the 
existence of broad policy mandates rather than on targeted regulatory obligations designed to facilitate 
a better functioning market. The adoption of the 4th Railway Package in December 2018, however, will 
bring rail regulators into greater public prominence. Indeed, railway sector agencies are vested with 
powers which contain strong competition policy elements. Thus, it is specified in Article 56 (9) of 
SERA, that an EU Member State NRA in the rail sector,“[w]ithout prejudice to the power of the 
national competition authorities for securing competition in the rail services markets, shall, where 
appropriate, decide on its own initiative on appropriate measures to correct discrimination against 
applicants, market distortion and any other undesirable developments in these markets”. In light of the 
breadth of this provision, it is reasonable to conclude that some concurrency of competition powers 
exists uniquely in the railway sector at the EU level. Given the fact that rail liberalization is still at a 
relatively early stage of its development, however, only time will tell if NRAs avail themselves of these 
sweeping competition-style powers in the railway sector. 
Dealing with scarce resources 
More limited departures from the traditional competition law/sector-specific regulatory architecture 
split are not uncommon. For example, the UK’s Competition and Markets Authority (“CMA”) has the 
authority to conduct appeals from regulatory decisions. The US Federal Trade Commission and the 
Department of Justice have particular powers in relation to telecommunications sector transactions, 
while the former has limited regulatory-style powers that can be exercised in the sector along with the 
NRA, the Federal Communications Commission (FCC). The reasons for such partial extensions of 
competence are many and varied, including the need for greater objectivity in decision-making, greater 
efficiency and technical knowledge, and more effective oversight. 
                                                      
 30 See https://www.zeit.de/mobilitaet/2015-07/deutsche-bahn-wettbewerb-schienenverkehr-monopol; 
https://www.monopolkommission.de/images/PDF/SG/presse_s74.pdf. 
 31 See https://www.zeit.de/wirtschaft/2011-09/wasser-preise-bundesnetzagentur. 
 32 For example, the FAZ (Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung, https://www.faz.net/aktuell/wirtschaft/20-jahre-
bundesnetzagentur-gemischte-zwischenbilanz-15610372.html?service=printPreview) writes that the 
Government seeks to shield historical incumbents, in particular in the postal sector, from the impact of 
competition and that the BNetzA is not doing enough to resist such pressure, but is a “mere agent fulfilling 
the central planning of the State in the energy sector”. It has also been widely acknowledged that the margin 
squeeze action brought by the European Commission against Deutsche Telekom in the electronic 
communications sector was just as much driven by an ineffectual application of cost calculations by sector-
specific regulator BNetzA as it was by the foreclosing pricing practices of the defendant. In this regard, see 
the discussion in O’Donoghue R. & Padilla J., The Law and Economics of Article 102 TFEU (2013) (2nd ed.), 
pp. 415-422. 
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The responsibility for the administration of scarce resources is also an area where distinctly different 
approaches are taken. For example, whereas a number of EU and non-EU jurisdictions confer 
responsibility for the allocation and evaluation of spectrum to their NRAs, a large number still continue 
to regulate the availability of spectrum through their responsible Ministries. 33 This split reflects a 
fundamental difference in approach. On the one hand, sovereign States which confer exclusive powers 
in relation to spectrum management on their NRAs tend to view spectrum as a relevant input in the 
competitive process, and hence something that should be regulated by the NRA responsible for overall 
economic regulation in the sector.34 Moreover, the large amounts of revenue generated by the sale of 
radiofrequencies also provides the basis upon which an NRA often funds its operations, and hence 
sustains its decision-making independence. By contrast, many sovereign States believe (not 
unjustifiably) that spectrum is a valuable national asset.35 As such, the financial benefits derived from 
that asset should inure to the State more generally, which also creates an institutional dynamic that 
foresees the State as the appropriate vehicle to monitor all aspects of its allocation, use and valuation.36 
Both positions are not without merit.  
Where the resources in question are very localised (e.g., access to pipes, ducts, sewers, permits 
necessary to dig up roads and lay cabling, and so forth), regulatory powers often reside at the local level. 
Although EU rules establish a common legal framework for how resources are to be managed and 
valued, it is difficult for NRAs or even national governments to enforce EU liberalisation and 
harmonisation goals at such a local level, especially where there is an adverse impact on local revenue-
raising possibilities.37 
                                                      
 33 Table 1 provides an overview of the key jurisdictional competences enjoyed by regulatory agencies with 
responsibility for the telecommunications sector in some of the major jurisdictions around the world. A 
growing number of regulatory agencies around the world are responsible for spectrum management issues, 
including nations as diverse as the United States, Australia, Brazil, Hong Kong, India, Japan, Mexico, Turkey, 
South Africa and South Korea. Within the EU, many Member States designate the regulation of spectrum 
issues to their respective NRAs, including Germany, Belgium, Italy and Poland. Even where spectrum 
management issues rest in general in the hands of an NRA, special derogations often exist for spectrum used 
for broadcasting and for socially-critical or security-critical services (such as those utilized by the armed 
forces or public broadcasters); the control of spectrum allocation and its release and economic valuation for 
such specialist uses continues to be held tightly by most governments. 
 34 The extension of an NRA’s competence into the field of spectrum allocation and valuation arguably makes it 
easier to justify regulatory intervention in relation to access to content issues where content is a common 
wholesale input that is valued by many competitors operating in a ‘converged’ telecommunications/ 
broadcasting environment (e.g., OFCOM in the United Kingdom); see Section 316 of the UK’s 
Communications Act 2003, Chapter 21. Given the extent to which access to content obligations would be 
seen to be interfering with intellectual property rights, such access obligations would in general be considered 
to be disproportionate in most jurisdictions. 
 35 In the airline sector, slots serve as an essential input into the airline business. Regulation 93/95, (as amended) 
regulates the distribution of slots of congested “Level 3” congested airports. In addition, an independent 
agency (e.g., LOHOR in France, Air Coordination Limited in the United Kingdom) manages the allocation 
of slots. It is often the case that a material percentage of available slots are made available to new entrants. In 
the railway sector, a special regulatory framework exists for those bodies which control and regulate the 
allocation of railway lines to operators and the charges to be imposed for the use of those lines; refer to EU 
Directive 2001/14, replacing EU Directive 95/19. 
 36 Directive (EU) 2018/1972 of the European Parliament and of the Council, Recitals 133 and 136 (OJ L 321 
of 11 December 2018). 
 37 For example, in the context of electronic communications legislation, it is provided that an NRA should 
“define rules for apportioning the costs of the facility or property sharing, to ensure that there is an 
appropriate reward of risk for the undertakings concerned.” See Directive (EU) 2018/1972 of the European 
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Next generation regulation 
A recently issued report in the United Kingdom has promoted the idea of creating a new regulatory 
agency architecture which cuts across traditional utility sector regulation. This new multi-sectoral 
agency would consist of the creation of an “Essential Service Consumer Regulator”, while a second 
multi-sector agency would be responsible for a more traditional source of regulatory intervention – in 
the form of an Infrastructure Services Regulator.38 
The driver for this bifurcated regulatory model is said to stem from the perceived need to put consumers 
at the heart of markets which, rather than being vertical sector-specific silos, are being increasingly 
brought together by the twin phenomena of digitalisation and connectivity, thereby leading to increasing 
convergence. Such convergence is further boosted by the data-driven economy, as the collection, 
processing and management of data is opening up new possibilities in terms of managing supply and 
meeting demand. Indeed, as suppliers come to understand consumer needs, preferences and patterns at 
unprecedented levels, new types of personalized offers and bundles are being designed. This, in turn, 
results in new types of suppliers, intermediaries and aggregators being able to enter the market.  
As a result of this fast-moving process, certain traditional individual products become “invisible”, 
becoming embedded in a broader range of products or services that are more desirable to consumers. In 
such an environment, it is argued that the focus of regulation will need to move from product regulation 
to one which regulates more integrated services (e.g., telecommunications and energy sector operators 
are gathering increasing amounts of data from users, in order to offer other integrated services, which 
often allows them to compete in adjacent markets). Moreover, identifying consumer harm in such 
circumstances will become an increasingly complex task, as consumers’ meaningful choices will need 
to be assessed in a multi-product world, which will also mean that they will increasingly focus on 
service value rather than merely on product cost (which is the focal point of today’s regulators). 
According to this line of argument, if these functions are not merged, consumers will either not be able 
to benefit from bundled services or will have to ‘unpick’ these complexities themselves, which would 
increase consumer harm.39 
Under the proposed bifurcated regime, the Essential Service Consumer Regulator would merge the 
consumer parts of the existing regulatory functions into one “consumer” regulator for essential services. 
In doing so, it would inter alia need to: 
• Triage consumer vulnerability appropriately and merge consumer vulnerability responsibilities 
across all essential services. 
• Merge the consumer advocacy role to reflect the new regulator’s remit. 
• Adopt new consumer protection principles and identify next generation consumer risks. 
• Develop a common essential services Ombudsman regime.  
• Develop a ‘complexity’ labelling system. 
                                                      
Parliament and of the Council of 11 December 2018 establishing the European Electronic Communications 
Code (Recast). 
 38 Refer to Sandys L., Hardy J., Rhodes A. & Green R., “Redesigning Regulation” (December 2018), Grantham 
Briefing Paper. 
 39 Sandys et al., op. cit., at p. 23. 
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• Develop new standards by which to weigh and measure the new values developed in the regulation 
of essential services.40 
To complement this major shift in emphasis towards consumer-focused regulation, a rationalisation 
would occur of economically regulated monopolies, with the development of a new infrastructure 
agency that regulates the fixed assets of all those infrastructure utility providers with market power. 
According to the authors of the report, there are emerging business models which indicate that cross-
utility asset management and upgrades offer cost reductions and synergies. 
These proposals present an interesting potential direction for regulation to take in the United Kingdom 
and other developed economies. Subsuming all consumer-facing regulation under one roof offers some 
clear benefits, especially given the encroachment of consumer protection policy across all liberalised 
sectors. As proposed, however, the new bifurcated regulatory responsibilities do not seem to envisage 
how the existing concurrency of powers with competition law will operate. Possibly, the new 
Infrastructure Services Regulator, as the agency responsible for the regulation of access to bottlenecks, 
would be the agency with the largest interface with the competition authorities. The new regulatory 
model might arguably provide a blueprint for action in smaller nations keen to cut costs, promote 
efficiency and to develop scale, although one should presume that a prerequisite for the application of 
such a model will be a relatively high degree of broadband penetration,41 given the relative importance 
attached by the report to the widespread availability of ‘converged’ services. 
That process of distinguishing consumer-facing regulation from platform/network regulation may, 
however, not be a straightforward exercise from a legal point of view, and will undoubtedly require 
changes in primary legislation at the Member State level. Decisions by policymakers to regulate across 
a particular value chain, which might combine various sectors, might depend on the approach taken 
(individually and collectively) to a number of factors, including whether: 
• the level of complexity in the relationships across sectors, which might mean that there are likely 
to be less obvious ‘economies of scope’ in an agency expanding its powers across cross-sectoral 
value chains; 
• the benefits of achieving universally ‘correct’ decisions by adopting consistent policies across 
sectors is possibly offset by the risk of arriving at a uniformly ‘wrong’ decisions on key issues (e.g., 
access costs) where there is no possibility of re-calibrating a particular approach; 
• there are benefits in protecting vulnerable customers across all retail levels, as opposed to 
generating excessive intrusion of regulation at the retail level, where competition should in theory 
be most effective; and 
• any ‘split’ along vertical or horizontal lines between regulatory functions results in material cost 
savings for regulatory agencies.42 
At the time of writing, it is not clear whether proposals presented in the report considered above will be 
implemented, nor how they will address some of the challenges identified above. Nevertheless, such a 
proposal captures a number of trends in recasting the regulatory debate given the existence of a new 
                                                      
 40 Ibid. 
 41 The proposed institutional model might be capable of implementation alongside the existing EU legal 
framework for electronic communications, including under the recently adopted European Electronic 
Communications Code of December 2018. 
 42 As developed by Cave M., LLM Lecture, Kings College, January 2019. 
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wave of convergence. Another possible tendency at the present juncture is the merging of ex ante and 
ex post functions into a single agency, as discussed immediately below. 
III. The merging of ex ante and ex post functions: 
variations in institutional design 
Given the “horizontal” nature of competition rules (i.e., operating across all economic sectors) and the 
generally held view that sectoral expertise is required to address sector-specific regulatory issues, the 
conventional wisdom over the years has been that it is preferable for ex post and ex ante disciplines to 
be strictly separated and administered by separate agencies. However, more recently, there has been an 
increase in appetite among policymakers to bring together the worlds of antitrust and regulation, or at 
least to create hybrid agencies which can administer both disciplines, along with consumer protection 
powers. This has been inspired by, inter alia: the introduction of ‘regulatory antitrust’ measures into 
competition policy,43 the increasing need of NRAs to adopt more flexible approaches towards the 
remedying of market failures, the perceived need for specialist sectoral expertise when applying 
competition rules, and the increasing realization that theories of harm in the world of antitrust are 
difficult to adapt to address structural market failures in many network industries. 
Accordingly, it is increasingly seen as a viable option to have the architecture of sector-specific 
authorities that enjoy ex ante powers as part of the broader remit usually associated with an NCA.44 
According to some commentators, the empowerment of a particular agency with both competition law 
and regulatory authority would in theory be able to avoid poor policy choices as a result of regulatory 
                                                      
 43 See Alexiadis P., “Understanding How Regulatory Standards Influence Competition Law Standards of 
Review”, Journal of European Competition Law & Practice (2019) Oxford Journal of Competition Law 
(forthcoming). See also Ibáñez-Colomo P., “EU Competition Law in the Regulated Network Industries”, LSE 
Law Society & Economy, Working Papers, 08/2016. This concept of ‘regulatory antitrust’ in the hands of 
NCAs has been seen as necessary to fill the gaps in regulatory regimes exploited by dominant firms or the 
failings of under-resourced or ineffective NRAs. By the same token, many of the provisions contained in the 
Third Energy Package are directed towards the improvement of competitive conditions in energy markets, 
rather than addressing a particular market failure, while others consist of derogations from competition 
principles in order to pursue other public policy objectives. See various discussions in Alexiadis P., 
“Balancing the Application of ex post and ex ante disciplines in electronic communications markets: square 
pegs in round holes?”, in Rights and Remedies in a Liberalised and Competitive Internal Market, March 
2012, Buttigieg (ed.). See also Cave M. & Crowther P., “Co-ordinating regulation and competition law – ex 
ante and ex post”, in The Pros and Cons of Antitrust in Deregulated Markets (2004), Swedish Competition 
Authority publication; cf. Monti G., “Managing the Intersection of Utilities Regulation and EC Competition 
Law, Competition Law Review (July 2008), Vol. 4, Issue 2, at pp. 123-145; cf. Ibáñez Colomo P., “On the 
Application of Competition Law as Regulation: Elements for a Theory”, Yearbook of European Law (2010), 
Vol. 29 (Eeckhout & Tridimas, eds.) 
 44  This consolidation of ex ante sector-specific powers and traditional antitrust ex post powers in NCAs was 
dubbed by Oliveira & Pereira Neto as ‘antitrust regulation’. Although not discussed here in detail, another 
extreme model of consolidation of all ex ante and ex post functions into a single agency would be to attribute 
ex post competition law powers in regulated sectors to NRAs to the exclusion of the NCA over that sector 
altogether, through an ‘antitrust exemption’, i.e., such an approach should go far beyond the ‘concurrency of 
power’ approach used in the United Kingdom. For a discussion of these alternative institutional designs, refer 
to Oliveira T. & Pereira Neto C.M., ‘Regulation and Competition Policy: Towards an Optimal Institutional 
Configuration in the Brazilian Telecommunications Industry - Second Annual Latin American Competition 
and Trade Round Table’ (1999), 25 Brooklyn Journal of International Law 311, pp. 316-321. 
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and competition agencies’ power struggles.45 In the words of Decker & Gray,46 the enhancement of the 
“functional substitutability” of the various agencies as “market supervisory tools” is increased where 
the respective competition and regulatory functions are merged. This cross-fertilisation of expertise is 
seen in some quarters as being more cost efficient and capable of leading to higher quality decision-
making. Moreover, a mixed set of competences in principle facilitates the transition (at least in theory) 
to a unitary system of competition law operating in isolation, with sector-specific regulation having 
been rendered redundant over time.47 However, as noted by Dunne, “the blurring of the lines between 
antitrust and regulation at an institutional level may increase opportunities for capture, and thus 
diminish the independence and objectivity of decision-making, particularly in the competition law 
context.”48 
Jurisdictions exhibiting a combination of competition powers with the powers of at least one NRA 
include nations such as Australia, Estonia, New Zealand, the Netherlands and Spain. By contrast, 
jurisdictions with a clear separation of powers include the United States, Canada, Japan, the large 
majority of EU Member States and Brazil. A third ‘hybrid’ category is reflected in the powers of 
regulators such as those in Greece, Ireland and the United Kingdom, which exercise various concurrent 
or selective ex ante and ex post powers (refer to Table 1).  
The ‘federal’ structure within the EU is reflected in the fact that most decision-making is taken at the 
national level by NRAs under most sector-specific initiatives.49 The policy objectives for various sector-
specific issues are set at local level where particular characteristics of the industry call for specific 
actions (e.g., water and certain aspects of energy), while competition policy is, by contrast, set centrally. 
Indeed, the bulk of activity in competition matters occurs at national level, given that the European 
Commission is not in a position to investigate all potential infringements due to a lack of resources (see 
discussion below in Section VI).  
Australia’s institutional framework takes into account its federal political structure, by including federal 
electricity generation within the remit of the Australian Competition & Consumer Commission, the 
ACCC, while leaving the regulation of distribution or retail supply to the individual States affected. By 
contrast, as regards telecommunications regulation, the ACCC shares responsibilities with the 
Australian Communications & Media Authority (with the latter also being responsible for the regulation 
of radio spectrum and broadcasting).  
                                                      
 45 Refer to Dunne, op. cit., at p. 266. 
 46 See Decker C. & Gray H., “Antitrust and Arbitration in Regulated Sectors” (2011), Competition Law 
International, p. 7. 
 47 The somewhat naïve view that regulation could be rendered completely redundant over time was initially 
pioneered by the Littlechild Report (1983), Department of Industry, “Regulation of British 
Telecommunication’ Probability Report to the Secretary of State”. 
 48 See Dunne, ibid.; cf., Cave & Stern, op. cit., who express the view that: “Our preference is for separation 
between competition and regulatory agencies, based largely on concern about regulatory opportunism and 
about the resulting suppression of multiple viewpoints.” (at p. 9). 
 49 The implementation of certain types of EU-origin regulation can also occur more directly under certain 
specific regimes such as REMIT (Regulation (EU) No 1227/2011 on wholesale energy market integrity and 
transparency (OJ L 326/1 of 8 December 2011). Under the umbrella of the REMIT scheme, the Commission 
is empowered to set certain regulatory parameters with effect for the whole EU Single Market, while the 
Agency for the Cooperation of Energy Regulators (ACER) is responsible for the monitoring of European 
wholesale energy markets and ensuring that NCAs carry out their tasks under REMIT in a “coordinated and 
consistent way”. 
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Pros and Cons 
Commentators have identified a number of positive factors which support the view that ex ante and ex 
post powers should be combined, including:50 
i. limits on the ability of a firm to engage in regulatory “forum shopping” by having its issues 
adjudicated by the forum most likely to judge its case favourably; 
ii. the lowering of costs for the government, and hence the taxpayer, which include “bureaucratic 
transaction costs” related to the “complexity of inter-institutional operating routines” required 
by the process of cooperation among different agencies;51 
iii. the use of sector-specific expertise can be harnessed by the ex post regulator to arrive at better 
informed results;  
iv. it avoids unnecessary rivalry between agencies as to which is best placed to deal with any 
particular issue, and prevents unnecessary competition for the public purse, especially when 
prompted by populist sentiments; and 
v. it minimizes the risk of conflicting decisions between different agencies and the resulting legal 
uncertainty that this produces. 
By contrast, some commentators have also identified the positive factors that can be associated with the 
maintenance of separate sources of supervision that would otherwise be lost if regulatory and 
competition powers converged into the same institutional hands,52 including:  
i. By combining all powers in a single Authority, that institution has the power to choose its 
easiest instrument through which to pursue intervention, rather than that which is most 
appropriate. This would arguably lead to an inherent tendency to promote more onerous ex 
ante interventions and remedies, instead of the better targeting these regulations and eventually 
replacing them by ex post controls53 (which is what should in theory occur if markets are 
operating effectively). Thus, a converged regulator would not only have an enhanced armoury 
of remedies with which to intervene, but might also be tempted to opt for the weapon that is the 
most damaging, regardless of whether it is absolutely necessary.  
ii. It is harder in principle for a market operator to “capture” multiple institutions, including an 
agency (i.e., the NCA) with broad cross-sectoral powers and no deeper responsibility for any 
specific industry, as opposed to a single large institution that will have more identity with the 
deeply regulated industries under its mandate (although the counter-argument is that it may be 
                                                      
 50 For example, refer to Cave & Stern, op. cit., at pp. 8-9; cf. discussion in Dunne, op. cit., at chapter 5. 
 51  The concept of “bureaucratic transaction costs” is inspired by the work of Ronald Coase & Oliver Williamson 
on the theory of the firm and markets. For a more detailed discussion of this concept and its role in designing 
optimal institutional configurations between NCAs and NRAs, refer to Oliveira & Pereira Neto, op. cit., at p. 
322. 
 52 For example, see Trillas F., The Institutional Architectural Regulation and Competition – Spain’s 2012 
Reform (April 2013), IESE Business School Working Paper No. WP-1067-E, SSRN: 
https://ssrn.com/abstract=2353526 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2353526; cf. Laffont J. & Martimort D., 
“Separation of regulators against collusive behaviour” (1999), RAND Journal of Economics, at pp. 257-258. 
 53 For example, certain NRAs have foreseen expressly the eventual disappearance of ex ante regulation (i.e., 
through the use of ‘sunset clauses’ in a jurisdiction such as The Netherlands, prior to the fusion of all 
regulatory powers in one entity in that Member State). 
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harder to capture one very large and integrated, financially secure entity which has multiple 
sectoral agendas running in parallel). 
iii. There is a risk of certain ‘Cinderella’ sectors being created because intervention is limited 
across all sectors, which means that over-stretched regulators (particularly in smaller 
jurisdictions) have to identify specific sectoral targets that need to be prioritised at the expense 
of others. 
iv. Competition between regulators allows for greater transparency and a better flow of ideas, so 
that errors in public policy-making can be identified more easily and be more likely to be 
corrected (either in real time at or in the future). This resembles the checks and balances 
available within sectoral agencies, embedding a self-correction mechanism in the institutional 
architecture. 
v. Specialist sector-specific policies can get “lost” in a more broadly-based agency. For example, 
certain types of “build or buy” regulatory strategies work most effectively in certain sectors at 
particular stages of industry development, whereas an agency with accumulated powers would 
find it exceedingly difficult to do anything other than adopt a relatively uniform policy position 
across sectors, for fear of being accused of acting inconsistently or arbitrarily.54 
vi. Issues regarding the scope of powers of search and seizure, confidentiality of submitted 
information and the legitimate use of company data can create enforcement problems, as each 
jurisdiction does not necessarily adopt the same approach to such matters across both its NCA 
and NRA.55 
                                                      
 54 When an NRA mandates a wholesale access obligation in a given industry, it must be mindful of the 
investment signals it is giving to new entrants as to whether they should be encouraged to build their own 
infrastructure, or remain dependent indefinitely on access to the infrastructure of the historical incumbent 
operator. The NRA’s dilemma is exemplified in the different decisions taken by the CMC in Spain both 
before and after its accumulation of powers with respect to promoting operator incentives to deploy 
telecommunications networks in certain regions of Spain while they seek access in other regions of Spain (as 
opposed to adopting a unitary policy). This shift in policy orientation has also not coincided with policy shifts 
at EU level as regards “build or buy” decisions by operators. By way of example, note the potential shift in 
emphasis between the recently adopted European Electronic Communications Code at EU level and the 
current EU Regulatory Framework for electronic communications networks and services when it comes to 
the treatment of investors in upgraded infrastructures: see Alexiadis P. and Shortall T., “European 
Commission signals strong policy shift under the European Electronic Communications Code (EECC)”, 
Utilities Law Review (2019) Vol. 22 Issue 3. As regards the regulatory incentives provided to new entrants in 
order that they deploy networks (rather than merely providing services), refer to Cave M., “Encouraging 
infrastructure competition via the ladder of investment”, Telecommunications Policy (2006), Vol. 30, Issues 
3-4 (April-May), pp. 223-237. 
 55 Because antitrust (competition law) investigations have a quasi-criminal element attached to them in many 
jurisdictions, it follows that the legal systems of most jurisdictions tend to establish much higher standards in 
support of the rights of defence where such investigations take place. Accordingly, in a multi-purpose agency, 
the rights of defence might be compromised if information legitimately obtained for one discrete purpose is 
used for another. The rights of defence, for example, are much more rigorously upheld in the context of 
antitrust investigations than many other forms of investigations or fact-finding by agencies. In those situations 
where the standards adopted for the rights of the defence are very different depending on the specific 
circumstances in which they are exercised, it will therefore be necessary to establish information barriers to 
ensure that information gathered for one distinctive purpose is not used for another. Even within the field of 
competition law enforcement, information gathered under a Sector Inquiry, for example, cannot be used 
directly to support a separate competition law investigation under Articles 101-102 TFEU, although the 
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vii. Separate institutional structures allow for specialization, thereby benefiting from sectoral 
expertise within the respective NRAs and from more general cross-sectoral welfare enhancing 
policies practised by NCAs. 
The intensity of the pros and cons identified above may vary in different institutional environments. 
Indeed, institutions are not created in a political or institutional void, as they are heavily dependent on 
the socioeconomic context in which they operate, the history of regulation and the human and material 
resources available in each jurisdiction. For example, countries with a strong history of horizontal 
competition enforcement, and highly trained officials, may reap the benefits of the separate accumulated 
experience in this area. These factors may in turn lead to some ‘path dependency’ regarding the 
particular institutional design chosen,56 whereby different weights are attributed to the positive and 
negative factors associated with the types of joint or separate supervisory agencies indicated above. 
Conflicting policy goals 
The fusion of ex ante and ex post powers is an emerging trend which is gaining support in a number of 
jurisdictions, whether for sound analytical reasons or simply as a cost-saving measure. In bringing 
together ex ante and ex post disciplines, however, thought has been given to whether or not the 
regulatory mindset of a particular jurisdiction sits comfortably with a competition law regime which 
tends to prize short-term consumer welfare above other public policy priorities. 
Some smaller jurisdictions do not emphasise their pursuit of competition policy at the expense of other 
policy goals. For example, a number of smaller Eastern European EU Member States such as the Czech 
Republic and Latvia (but also an EU Member State such as Ireland) have tended to support, either 
directly or indirectly, the growth of local infrastructure players through a variety of means, as opposed 
to service providers who do not invest in infrastructure.57 Thus, while the importance of achieving 
competitive markets tends to be a focal point for most governments, it is not uncommon that policy 
remits designed to deliver consumer welfare often give way in network (infrastructure) industries to the 
need for “balance” between the interests of the consumer and those of the industry, or at least to 
condition the pursuit of consumer welfare by reference to the financial constraints imposed upon the 
infrastructure owner or to the investment priorities that they must satisfy. In this way, an uneasy balance 
often exists between the need to prop up a “national champion” and measures designed to foster an open 
market. Many regulatory regimes therefore become more concerned about preserving industry 
structures to deliver consumer welfare are not necessarily likely to opt for a ‘pure’ competition model.58 
                                                      
broader-based UK procedures governing “market enquiries” expressly envisage the use of information 
gathered in such an investigation for use in a competition law infringement action (see later discussion). 
56   For further analysis of the concept of path dependency in institutional development, see discussion in North 
D.C. & Ors., Institutions, Institutional Change and Economic Performance (Cambridge University Press, 
1990) http://ebookcentral.proquest.com/lib/kcl/detail.action?docID=1103733 accessed 1 March 2019. 
 57 See Cave & Stern, op. cit., at p. 2. 
 58 For example, policy decisions to promote infrastructure deployment or services-based competition, or the use 
of particular cost modelling methodologies or cost accounting standards, can have a critical impact on the 
decisions of new entrants to invest, and hence upon the ultimate structure of an industry. By the same token, 
many network sectors present themselves as irresistible targets to certain NRAs, which see their function as 
in part performing an indirect role as a “tax collector”. For example, an NRA has the potential to extract 
significant levies from energy sector market actors to support renewable energy initiatives, while NRAs in 
the telecommunications sector have on many occasions not been able to overcome driving up spectrum 
pricing for respective 3G, 4G and 5G spectrum auctions in a number of key EU Member States, either through 
the pursuit of a revenue maximization goal or inadvertently through the application of a particular auction 
mechanism.  In the United States, the recent merger review by the DOJ of the Sprint / T-Mobile mobile 
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At the EU level, some tension is building between merger review under competition rules and ex ante 
controls over foreign direct investment (‘FDI’). Indeed, the European institutions adopted in February 
2018 a legal framework for the screening of foreign direct investments (“FDIs”) on grounds of public 
policy and public security. Currently, over half of the current 28 EU Member States have some form of 
FDI screening mechanism on public policy/security grounds, while major EU trading partners such as 
the United States, Japan, Canada and Australia have had in place FDI regimes for long periods of time. 
The proposed Regulation is not designed to harmonise such regimes but, rather, to enhance cooperation 
on such issues between Member States themselves and between Member States and the European 
Commission, while at the same time allowing Member States sufficient scope for intervention according 
to their own public policy priorities. That scope is reflected in the range of issues in relation to which 
they can intervene on the basis of an FDI rationale, namely: likely effects on critical infrastructure, 
critical technologies, the supply of critical inputs, access to sensitive information, freedom and 
pluralism of the media, and the extent to which an investor is controlled (directly or indirectly) by a 
foreign State. 
An additional policy tension within the EU stems from the fact that, whereas EU Member States are 
obliged to implement EU competition law standards found in Articles 101 and 102 TFEU, they also 
have some leeway in adopting their parallel domestic competition law standards which often contain 
unique substantive and procedural elements. For example, broad consumer protection powers are 
available in a number of EU Member State jurisdictions, while procedural elements such as the United 
Kingdom’s “market investigation” mechanism mean that the United Kingdom’s CMA has much more 
sweeping investigatory powers than those available under the European Commission’s analogous 
“Sectoral Inquiry” mandate.59 
Another debate that has gained traction over the years is whether sector-specific regulators should 
exercise ex post competition-style intervention powers or remedies rather than the more prescriptive 
style of ex ante regulatory intervention. Conversely, it is just as clear that a number of regulatory 
                                                      
telecommunications merger in the wake of a divestiture package and 5-G rollout commitments by the parties 
post-merger has been met with the support for the deal expressed by the sector-specific regulator, the FCC: 
see report in USA Today, 20 May 2019; cf. Forbes, 20 May 2019. This support is understood to reflect the 
industrial policy direction that much of the mobile industry in the United States would like to see adopted in 
order to foster new 5G investments, which might not necessarily find favour with the strict interpretation of 
antitrust review conducted by the DOJ. 
 59 Both Sector Inquiries under EU Law and Market Investigations under UK Law reflect a hybridised form of 
ex ante/ex post intervention. Under EU competition rules, Sector Inquiries are investigations that the 
European Commission carries out in particular sectors of the economy or in relation to certain types of 
agreements across various sectors where it believes that a market failure is occurring, possibly exacerbated 
by a breach of competition rules. The Commission exercises its discretion to intervene under the power 
conferred upon it by Article 17 of Regulation 1/2003 by drawing upon evidence of: limited cross-border trade; 
a lack of new entry; price rigidity; and other circumstances indicating restrictions or distortions of 
competition. Sector Inquiries have thus far been instigated predominantly in sectors characterized by utility 
or network elements or by relatively high levels of regulation (e.g., local loops, leased lines, roaming, 3G 
services, e-commerce, energy, pharmaceuticals, financial services). By contrast, under Section 134(2) of the 
United Kingdom’s Enterprise Act 2002, the CMA is required to decide whether: “any feature or combination 
of features of each relevant market prevents, restricts or distorts competition in connection with the supply 
or acquisition of any goods or services in the United Kingdom or a part of the United Kingdom”. If that 
proves to be the case, this constitutes an adverse effect on competition which, if found to exist, obliges the 
CMA to decide whether or not to take action in its own right or to recommend to other bodies (i.e., NRAs) to 
take action to remedy, mitigate or prevent such an adverse effect on competition or any resulting effect on 
consumers. 
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paradigms affecting certain commercial practices have slipped relatively unnoticed into competition 
law practice over the years.60 
The driving force behind the fusion of ex ante and ex post powers in both its institutional and substantive 
dimensions is the commonly held view that sector-specific regulators will, through their intimate 
knowledge of the workings of a given sector, be able to provide “added value” to the decision-making 
of competition regulators. It is arguable, however, that this apparent “gain” is offset, first, by the 
knowledge deficit created by the loss of antitrust expertise that usually resides in a specialist competition 
agency and second, by the higher likelihood of “capture” of a sectoral regulator.  
There is also a somewhat misplaced understanding that concurrent competition powers are necessary 
in order to foster a level of sustainable competition, whose continued existence will ultimately render 
redundant the need to exercise regulatory powers. However, as has been pointed out elsewhere, the 
reality underlying liberalized markets in many infrastructure-based sectors (especially network 
industries) is that they are inevitably characterised by elements of natural monopoly or complex 
oligopoly;61 this means that some residual use of regulatory powers in these sectors will probably need 
to be sustained indefinitely, irrespective of whether there is broad consensus that effective competition 
powers offer a “better” system of intervention in markets (and irrespective of whether ex ante rules need 
to be better refined or targeted.) This means that market failures may occur which have little likelihood 
of being addressed by traditional competition rules (which focus on market abuse and agreements to 
restrict competition).  
Competing competences 
The question remains as to how competing competition and regulatory agencies are to determine which 
of them should assert their jurisdiction over the same subject-matter, either in the alternative or 
cumulatively.62 In the context of the United Kingdom’s “concurrency of powers” model (see below), 
formal rules determine how ex ante and ex post powers are to be exercised by multiple agencies, 
                                                      
 60 In addition, the increasing use of settlements under Article 9 of Regulation 1/2003 also presents NCAs with 
the possibility of obtaining quasi-regulatory solutions, given that cooperation with the European Commission 
might often tend to result in far-reaching commitments from the party(ies) to an investigation which arguably 
would exceed what would otherwise be imposed by the Commission under an infringement decision adopted 
under Article 7 of Regulation 1/2003. The Commission has some flexibility in obtaining such optimal 
commitments through the Article 9 settlement route, given that the principle of proportionality to which the 
Commission is bound under Article 7 decisions is not the same in the context of Article 9 commitments. See 
Alrosa Case, Case No. 3951 – Swedish Interconnectors, Judgment of 14 April 2010 available at 
http://ec.europa.eu/competition/antitrust/cases/dec_docs/39351/39351_1211_8.pdf. By contrast, one 
particular author takes the view that Article 9 commitments can also give rise to sub-optimal results, given 
that undertakings may be acting strategically when submitting them: see Dunne N., “Commitment Decisions 
in EU Competition Law”, Journal of Competition Law & Economics (2014), Vol. 10, Issue 2, at pp. 399-421. 
Refer also to the more general discussion on ‘regulatory antitrust’, op. cit., and Alexiadis P., “Understanding 
How Regulatory Standards Influence Competition Law Standards of Review”, op. cit. The use of 
commitments to obtain quasi-regulatory solutions is also growing in other jurisdictions, such as Brazil, where 
the NCA has imposed changes to the business practices of dominant firms in markets as diverse as electronic 
payments, e-bookings, telecommunications and stock exchanges.  
 61 As noted by Dunne, op. cit., at p. 272: “[the shift from] effective regulation to competition becomes self-
defeating for the self-interested regulator. More practically, the persistence of natural monopoly in certain 
segments of utilities markets means that it is difficult for even the most selfless of regulators to dispense 
entirely with the need for regulation.” 
 62 As regards the growing tendency around the world to integrate ex ante and ex post functions, refer to 
www.gwclc.com/world-competition-database.html. 
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although this particular agency model presumes the existence of a mature and integrated political system 
to avoid unnecessary friction in reporting competing competences.63 
Within the EU, the primacy of competition law above and beyond sector-specific regulation is clear, as 
is reflected in a series of Commission Decisions involving margin squeezing practices in the 
telecommunications sector, as endorsed by the European Courts.64 By contrast, the US approach has 
consistently been to endorse the primacy of sector-specific regulation above antitrust rules, with the 
issue having been clarified in a series of Judgments delivered across the US court hierarchy.65 
The resolution to this ex post vs ex ante dilemma exemplifies the importance of different legislative 
traditions, given that both the US and EU approaches are based on sound policy principles consistent 
with their institutional backgrounds. Thus, in the United States, the doctrine of “primary jurisdiction” 
established in Ricci66 in 1973 had the US Supreme Court holding that antitrust proceedings should be 
stayed pending the outcome of a parallel investigation by the relevant sector-specific regulator, based 
on the working assumption that the latter had the more appropriate powers to sanction the alleged 
violation. The principle in Ricci has been adopted in the financial services sector by the Credit Suisse 
Case67 and in the telecommunications sector by the cases of Trinko and Linkline. 
The rationale for the US antitrust regime deferring to the regulatory framework stems from the 
understanding that sector-specific regulation is likely to “cover the field” in terms of subject-matter, 
thereby leaving little or no scope for the application of antitrust rules. By contrast, the approach 
undertaken in the EU has been that competition rules override regulation unless it can be demonstrated 
that the alleged infringer had no opportunity to exercise any discretionary behaviour in light of the broad 
sweep of regulation. The rationale behind this approach in the EU is driven by, among other matters, 
the primacy accorded to competition rules in the EU legal order68 and the clear legislative indicators 
                                                      
 63 The UK’s Competition and Markets Authority (CMA) has been publishing annual concurrency reports 
since 2014, in accordance with its statutory obligation to assess the operation of the concurrency 
arrangements which came into effect in the UK on 1April 2014. Refer to the latest Annual Report on 
Concurrency, published on 10 April 2019. In the most recent example of how the concurrency of powers 
regime operates in the United Kingdom, the energy sector regulator, OFGEM, found that two energy 
suppliers and an energy software and consultancy service, had infringed Chapter I of the UK’s Competition 
Act 1998.The parties were fined collectively £870,000. According to OFGEM, the parties had entered into 
an anti-competitive agreement spanning January to September 2016 which prevented the suppliers from 
actively targeting one another’s customers through face-to-face sales. To facilitate this agreement, the 
suppliers shared commercially sensitive information in the form of customer meter point details. The 
energy software and consultancy service facilitated this arrangement by designing, implementing and 
maintaining software systems that allowed customer meter point details to be shared, and the recruitment of 
each of the suppliers’ customers to be blocked. Refer to OFGEM Press Release of 30 May 2019.  
 64 Refer to Case C-280/08P, Deutsche Telekom v. European Commission [2010] E.C.R. I-9555; cf. Case 52/09, 
Konkurrensverket v. TeliaSonera [2011], E.C.R. I-527; cf. Case C-295/12P, Telefónica SA v. Commission, 
ECLI:EU:C:2014:2069; cf. Case 851/14, Slovak Telekom a.s. v. European Commission, 
ECLI:EU:T:2018:929. 
 65 Refer to US Supreme Court Judgement in Verizon Communications v. Law Offices of Curtis v. Trinko LLP, 
540 US.398 (2004) and in Pacific Bell Telephone Co. v. linkLine Communications, Inc., 555 US 438 (2009). 
 66 Ricci v. Chicago Mercantile Exchange et al., 409 US 289 (1973). 
 67 See Credit Suisse Securities (USA) LLC v. Billing, 551 US 264 (2007), where the US Supreme Court held 
that securities markets are exempt from the scope of US antitrust laws. 
 68 For example, competition rules occupy a higher place in the EU legal hierarchy (i.e., primary law in the form 
of constitutional level normative standards contained at Treaty level) than secondary level normative rules 
found in Directives, the principal legal basis for the regulation of industrial sectors. 
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that competition law and regulation are to play a complementary role, rather than the application of one 
discipline to the exclusion of the other.  
Other jurisdictions also follow closely one of these two approaches. For example, in India, a similar 
approach to that put forward in Ricci has been taken recently by the Indian High Court when awarding 
the stay of an antitrust action until the impact of an action brought under the regulatory regime on the 
same subject-matter had been resolved.69 By contrast, Brazil is more aligned to the EU approach, with 
broad authority being conferred upon the NCA even in regulated sectors,70 with the general proposition 
being that competition law applies unless regulation completely eliminates the discretion of the firms 
to select the relevant competitive strategy under scrutiny.71 In the banking sector, where there was some 
controversy over whether CADE (the Brazilian NCA) or the Brazilian Central Bank would retain 
competition law powers, a Memorandum of Understandings between the two authorities clarified the 
existence of a regime of concurrent jurisdiction.72 
Hybrid options 
Beyond the incorporation of an antitrust regime and a sector-specific regulatory regime into an 
integrated system of intervention, there remains a range of options available to policymakers around 
the world as to how to deploy some form of hybrid ex ante/ex post institutional structure. These hybrid 
models may lean towards two different directions. On the one hand, they might be structured in a way 
that both NRAs and NCAs have concurrent jurisdiction to apply the same types of competition law 
tools (e.g., ex post sanctions for anti-competitive behaviour or merger control). On the other hand, the 
regulatory regime might be structured in a more complementary way, where NRAs may simply refer 
cases to NCAs in regulated sectors, or may take up some specific roles in these investigations, in 
cooperation with the NCA, while leaving the final decision regarding competition law enforcement to 
the NCA.73 
For example, the United Kingdom deploys a “concurrency” regime with respect to regulated network 
(ex-monopoly) sectors, whereby competition law can be enforced by sector-specific regulators within 
their sectoral remits, in parallel with the competition powers exercised by the specialist United Kingdom 
Competition Authority, the CMA. Under this regime, a highly consensual procedure is in place that is 
designed to ensure that the appropriate agency is seized of competition law jurisdiction in any particular 
investigation. This consensual model is most likely to succeed in a country with a highly mature and 
integrated system of power sharing. It also reflects the belief that regulation would one day become 
obsolete as regulated markets develop their own sustainable market dynamics. It also requires that 
sector-specific regulators actively promote competitive outcomes in their sectors. Given the way in 
which the scope of competition interventions has expanded over the years, the strategic decision of the 
United Kingdom to retain the concurrency model has been criticised in some quarters as lacking a strong 
                                                      
 69 Refer to Competition Commission of India v. Bharti Airtel Limited & Ors., (2018) Delhi High Court, 
Judgment of 12 September 2018. 
 70  Refer to Law 12.529/11, Article 31. 
 71  One of the early precedents adopting this approach was the case of BH Trans, which dismissed the allegation 
against providers of municipal bus transportation because their actions were strictly conditioned by 
regulation, which allowed them no scope to adopt different conduct. See CADE, Administrative Procedure 
No. 08000.002605/1997-52, (BHTRANS Case). 
 72  Refer to ‘Memorandum of Understanding Between CADE and the Brazilian Central Bank’ 
http://www.cade.gov.br/noticias/banco-central-e-cade-assinam-memorando-de-
entendimentos/memorando_cade_bc.pdf. 
 73  These two general types of hybrid models are labeled ‘Concurrent Jurisdiction’ and ‘Complementary 
Jurisdiction’ in Oliveira & Pereira Neto, op. cit., at 318-319. 
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analytical foundation, especially given that sector-specific regulators in the UK have consistently aired 
their views that they would prefer having exclusive regulatory powers rather than nominal competition 
powers afforded to them under the concurrency model.74  
The concurrency model pioneered in the United Kingdom has found some support in a number of 
jurisdictions linked historically to the British Commonwealth. In Hong Kong and Singapore, for 
example, the NCA and the NRA exercise concurrent powers to enforce competition rules in the 
telecommunications and broadcasting sectors, although the NRA takes the role of the lead agency. 
Concurrent powers in the telecommunications sector are also exercised by South Africa’s ICASA. 
Similarly, concurrent enforcement powers in the telecommunications sector exist in India, although a 
recent Indian High Court Judgment suggests that competition rules should defer to sector-specific 
regulation. Japan and South Korea provide an interesting non-Commonwealth examples of 
concurrency, with certain sector-specific competition powers capable of being exercised by the NRA 
in each case. By contrast, in Brazil, the telecommunications regulator used to have some specific powers 
to enforce competition rules in the sector, which were removed after the competition law reforms of 
2011 came into force, thereby establishing a clearer system of complementary jurisdiction between 
CADE (NCA) and ANATEL (NRA).  
What has changed over the years in the United Kingdom, however, is that the usual deference practised 
by the previous competition regulator in the United Kingdom, the OFT (the Office of Fair Trading), 
towards sector-specific regulators, has given way to the current CMA approach, according to which it 
is that agency which is more comfortable exercising general competition powers across a number of 
regulated sectors. Perhaps this trend signals a response to the fact that, for over a decade, sector/specific 
regulators in the United Kingdom had engaged in practices consistent with the under-enforcement of 
competition rules within their spheres of competence. This was reflected in the perception that NRAs 
had been reluctant to prosecute competition claims outright (preferring to arrive at negotiated 
settlements) and had preferred to conduct in-house reviews of problematic market outcomes rather than 
referring them to the CMA under the “market investigation” reference procedure afforded under the 
legislation. The official response of the United Kingdom government since 2013 has been, somewhat 
surprisingly, to maintain the concurrency regime while at the same time pushing NRAs into a more pro-
active antitrust enforcement role. 
A classic hybrid enforcement agency model, which has many of the hallmarks of a ‘super-regulator’ 
(see discussion in Section IV below), can be found in Australia. The current Australian enforcement 
model is one that reflects the findings of the landmark Hilmer Report of 1993,75 which advocated the 
combination of competition and regulatory powers with respect to network sectors in the hands of one 
agency, the ACCC. These regulatory functions now extend to the telecommunications, energy, transport 
and postal sectors. The rationale for this fusion of functions at the federal level was, according to one 
commentator, prompted by an approach which placed the pursuit of efficiency at the heart of the 
Australian economy.76 The ACCC’s powers not only apply traditional competition rules to these sectors 
but also extend to telecommunications-specific regulatory provisions (including a specific access 
regime), while excluding technical issues of regulation. The ACCC’s powers in relation to the energy 
sector are more complex, as it shares powers with a variety of agencies, including the Australian Energy 
Regulator (AER), an independent statutory body that is located within the ACCC itself. In this way, the 
ACCC’s powers in relation to the energy sector include competition law, consumer protection and 
                                                      
 74 Refer to Dunne, op. cit., at pp. 267-272. 
 75 Hilmer Report, Independent Committee of Inquiry into Competition Policy, National Competition Policy 
(1993), Australian Government Printing Service. 
 76 See Dunne, op. cit., at pp. 272-275. 
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regulated access in specified network sectors, while other types of regulatory issues fall outside the 
ACCC’s remit.77  
Mexico presents yet another interesting hybrid model, similar to that being used in Greece since the 
liberalization of the telecommunications sector in that EU Member State. Mexico recently introduced a 
new bifurcated regime by which a specialist telecommunications sector regulator (IFT) also exercises 
competition rules in that sector, thereby excluding the authority of the general NCA (COFECE) in the 
regulated sector. This regime differs from that which prevails in Australia, in which a general NCA has 
absorbed regulatory powers, while Mexico provides an example of a sector-specific regulator that has 
absorbed exclusive competition powers over that regulated sector. The general NCA (COFECE) 
remains responsible for the enforcement of competition rules in all other sectors of the economy. The 
same approach is adopted by Peru, where the NRA (OSIPTEL), applies competition law to the 
telecommunications sector, thereby excluding the authority of the general NCA (Indecopi).  
In a world of increasing liberalization of regulated sectors and the reasonable convergence of goals and 
remedies as between regulation and competition policy, hybrid models will necessarily lead to more 
intense institutional dialogue between NCAs and NRAs. Where there is concurrent jurisdiction, one 
important element of this dialogue is the consensual allocation of competition law jurisdiction, as in the 
case of CMA and sector-specific regulators in the United Kingdom (described above). However, 
another important aspect of this dialogue refers to signals sent by competition authorities to NRAs 
regarding the need to improve the regulatory framework. Within the EU, after relevant competition law 
enforcement occurred in the electronic payments sector, an important round of regulations was enacted, 
including caps in interchange fees in 2015.78 These concerns were also felt in the United Kingdom, 
where the new Payments System Regulator (PSR) was created in 2015.79  
In Brazil, the evolution of regulation of leased lines also provides an interesting example. After a series 
of cases where the NCA (CADE) found the largest telecommunications incumbents to be abusing their 
dominant position in the offer of leased lines to competitors,80 the NRA (ANATEL) decided to regulate 
these offers. 81 In a subsequent decision, the NCA pointed out that the regulation was excessively 
restrictive,82 because it forbade any price differentiation, thereby limiting the ability of incumbents to 
compete. Following this decision, the NRA enacted a new regulation allowing more flexibility in 
incumbents’ leased line offers.83 Thus, it was the interaction between competition law enforcement and 
regulation that was effectively responsible for the evolution of the sector-specific regulatory framework.  
These examples illustrate that hybrid institutional systems in liberalized markets are likely to generate 
reciprocal interaction between ex post enforcement by NCAs and ex ante regulation by NRAs. Indeed, 
NCA decisions may identify market failures that need to be addressed by regulation. By the same token, 
NRAs’ regulatory decisions may contribute to the expansion of competition and the extension of 
                                                      
 77 Subsequent to the Hilmer Report, Australia conducted another major review of its trade practices (antitrust) 
rules. See 2015 Competition Policy Review (“Harper Review”); available at 
http://competitionpolicyreview.gov.au/final-report/. 
 78  Regulation (EU) 2015/751 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 29 April 2015 (‘on interchange 
fees for card based payment transactions’), Articles 3-5. 
 79  See ‘on interchange fees for card based payment transactions’, Financial Services (Banking Reform) Act 
2013, Chapter 33, Part 5. 
 80  The first Brazilian case in the series was Administrative Procedure No. 53500.05570/2002 (Telefońica Case). 
 81  See Resolutions No. 402/2005 and No. 437/2005. 
 82  CADE’s Chairman Decision No. 175/2006. 
 83  ANATEL Resolution No. 590/2012. 
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competition law theories of harm in a given regulated sector (as in the case of liberalization in 
telecommunications and energy markets), thereby inviting further action to be taken by NCAs. One can 
already see how the interplay between ex ante and ex post disciplines is something which will inevitably 
mould most jurisdictions’ approaches towards addressing perceived market failures in digital platform 
environments. 
Conclusions 
As discussed above, there is a wide range of institutional arrangements which can manage the 
relationship between ex ante and ex post regulatory functions. These institutional arrangements can be 
structured across a spectrum of possibilities, depending on how much authority is concentrated in NCAs 
or NRAs respectively.84 
At one extreme of the spectrum, where the exercise of any powers by a sector-specific NRA are frowned 
upon, there have been very few attempts to extinguish sector-specific ex ante powers in their entirety 
in favour of exclusive competition law enforcement. The New Zealand experience with ‘full 
deregulation’ in the late 1980s was probably the closest attempt to achieving this extreme position, but 
it was eventually rolled back, with the recognition of the continued need for targeted ex ante regulation 
in some markets.  
Within the same extreme of the governance architecture spectrum, that excludes any powers from 
NRAs, lies the situation where the NCA takes the lead across the full range of ex ante regulatory powers, 
while at the same time being responsible for implementing competition law over the whole economy 
(e.g., Australia, Spain and the Netherlands). 
There are also a number of hybrid models which are given effect in the form of at least two broad 
alternative models (although subject to many variations). For example, some institutional 
configurations are structured as ‘complementary jurisdictions’, whereby they attribute exclusive ex ante 
regulatory authority to an NRA and exclusive competition law authority to an NCA (e.g., most EU 
Member States, Brazil). Others adopt a “concurrent jurisdiction” model, whereby both NRA and NCA 
exercise competition law powers in relation to regulated sectors, even though the mandates of NRAs 
are usually broader than the mere implementation of competition rules in the relevant regulated sector 
(e.g., United Kingdom, South Africa, Hong Kong). 
There are also institutional frameworks that allocate all competition law powers over a particular 
industry to the relevant NRA, thereby excluding any authority of the NCA over the relevant regulated 
sectors (e.g., Mexico, Peru and Greece). In these countries, there is an effective integration of 
competition law enforcement in the NRA’s remit regarding a specific sector of the economy. 
Finally, in the extreme of case of concentrated regulatory powers in NRAs, certain models frame ex 
ante regulation so broadly as to eliminate the need any role for ex post enforcement of competition law. 
This approach has been adopted in the US in some circumstances, based on the principle established in 
Ricci, and has been extended expressly in the case-law to some regulated industries. This scenario is 
dramatically opposed to the ‘full deregulation’ model that was originally pioneered in New Zealand.  
The Figure bellow illustrates the different models discussed above, across a spectrum that spans the 
exclusive jurisdiction of NCAs absent ex ante regulation, on the one hand, to the exclusive jurisdiction 
of NRAs with no competition law enforcement powers, on the other. 
                                                      
84   A systematic approach to the allocation of functions between NCAs and NRAs is provided in Oliveira & 
Pereira Neto, op. cit., at p. 320. 
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It is important to note that all these regimes present their own variations and, as in any typology, there 
may be institutional configurations that fall between the regimes identified above. For example, the 
U.S. regime has some features of concurrent jurisdiction, with the FTC and FCC overseeing mergers in 
telecommunications; the Hong Kong regime of concurrent jurisdiction clearly appoints the NRA as the 
lead authority in competition investigations in the telecommunications sector, coming closer to the 
model of a concentration of powers in the hands of the NRA (as in the case of Mexico, Peru and Greece). 
Nevertheless, the organization of these regimes along this spectrum of possibilities is helpful in 
understanding the different alternatives available in the institutional design of an agency. 
As has also been mentioned above, there has been an escalation in the debate in recent years around the 
benefits of merging ex ante regulatory powers into NCAs which have competition law powers in 
relation to the entire economy, thereby creating ‘super regulators’. This is discussed immediately below. 
IV. The creation of “super regulators” 
As explained above, the understanding that there are positive outcomes flowing from competition 
between agencies has long been understood, as is the desire of policymakers to encourage such inter-
agency competition85 while achieving the benefits of specialization. As long ago as 1932, Justice 
Brandeis commented that the decentralised State system in the United States should provide the States 
with room to experiment, especially for changing social and economic needs, thus leading to 
                                                      
 85 Refer, for example, to Engel C., “Legal Experiences of Competition Among Institutions”, in Gerken & Lüder 
(eds.), Competition Among Institutions (1995), London, Macmillan Press, pp. 89-118; cf. Haines F. & Gurney 
D., “The Shadow of the Law: Contemporary Approaches to Regulation and the Problem of Regulatory 
Conflict” (2003), 25 Law and Policy, at p. 353. Refer also to Townley C., A Framework for European 
Competition Law: A Co-ordinated Diversity (2018), Hart Publishing, Oxford Chapter 5 – Regulatory 
Competition. See also Kovacic W.E., “Downsizing Antitrust: Is it Time to End Dual Federal Enforcement?” 
(1996), 41 Antitrust Bulletin 505, at pp. 532-535, where the author explains that, while the DoJ and the FTC 
compete to some degree in terms of effectiveness, competing competences might raise costs in terms of inter-
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innovation.86 The scope and strength of these competitive pressures are capable of affecting the manner 
in which the agencies enforce their respective powers in any given case.  
As a consequence, the policy choice of bringing together all regulatory functions under one roof is a 
controversial one. While the World Bank advocated such an institutional architecture in the 1990s for 
smaller countries, this advice had generally gone unheeded until the onset of the financial crisis in 2007, 
which provided a strong financial rationale (i.e., cost-cutting) for the consolidation of all ex ante and ex 
post competences under one agency roof. 
Of the major jurisdictions around the world that were willing to experiment with the idea that all key 
regulatory structures would all be administered by the same agency, Australia has been a front-runner.87 
As noted earlier in Section III, the concentration of regulatory functions and competition law powers in 
Australia’s ACCC finds its genesis in the much-heralded Hilmer Report of 1993.88 
The Hilmer Report’s rationale for creating a ‘super-regulator’ included factors such as: 
• the desirability of developing a perspective on economic regulation which takes into account the 
whole economy;  
• the need to avoid the regulatory capture of individual sector-specific regulators that are likely to 
have strong industry links; and  
• the cost savings that would be likely to flow from the combinations of numerous administrative 
functions within a single integrated agency.89 
While the ACCC’s novel institutional structure has been credited in certain quarters with its success, 
and while the overlap between its various functions has been attributed by the ACCC to the overlaps 
which exist between the two disciplines, there are others that have questioned whether the ACCC’s 
structure is delivering material results which are any better than those that would be delivered by a more 
fragmented regulatory structure.90 There is also a widespread feeling that the ACCC, given that its 
regulatory focus is fundamentally driven by network access, is often overly deferential to network 
operators. 
A comprehensive report, issued in 2015 by Australia’s Competition Policy Review Panel, suggested 
that a spin-off occur of the “access and pricing functions” of the ACCC to a separate “Access Pricing 
Regulator” (APR), given that “although synergies between competition and consumer functions are 
strong, synergies between competition enforcement and access and pricing regulation are weaker”  .91 
Based on this analysis, the Panel proposed a spin-off of the economic regulatory activity of the ACCC, 
while at the same time retaining APR as a cross-sector regulator (with powers over the 
telecommunications, electricity, gas and water sectors). Decisions of the APR would in turn be subject 
to review by the Australian Competition Tribunal, the same body that reviews the ACCC’s decisions. 
Considering the leading role of Australia in the unification of its respective competition law 
enforcement and regulatory authorities, the analysis and recommendations of this Report – as yet not 
                                                      
 86 New State Ice Co. v. Liebmann, 285 US 262 (1932), at pp. 310.311. 
 87 Refer to discussion above in Section III. 
 88 Hilmer Report, op. cit. 
 89 See Hilmer Report, op. cit., at p. 327. 
 90 See discussion in Dunne, op. cit., at pp. 272-275. 
 91  Competition Policy Review: Final Report (Commonwealth of Australia 2015), p. 470 
http://competitionpolicyreview.gov.au/files/2015/03/Competition-policy-review-report_online.pdf. 
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implemented – may be highly influential in any future institutional restructuring that is considered in 
other countries. Then again, the observation that there is more in common between antitrust 
enforcement and consumer protection, on the one hand, rather than antitrust enforcement and access 
pricing, on the other, may strike many policymakers as somewhat inconsistent.92 
Within the EU, the fusion of all regulatory and competition law functions has proceeded in Spain and 
The Netherlands, and in a smaller jurisdiction such as Estonia. 
In Spain, competition and regulatory functions were combined comprehensively in 2013 in the form of 
the CNMC. The economic rationale that underpins the structural design of the CNMC is said to be the 
systematic defence and promotion of economic efficiency in the Spanish economy as a means of 
increasing consumer welfare.93 According to the Preamble to Law No. 3/2013, the CNMC reform was 
aimed at fulfilling three main principles: 
• respect for the rule of law and the value of institutional reliability; 
• the ability to reap the benefits of economies of scale; and 
• greater adaptation of the regulatory bodies to technological change.94  
 
In support of the merging of its regulatory and competition law functions, it has been argued that the 
CNMC’s efficiency has supposedly increased insofar as it: 
• Created synergies through the coordination between sectoral units inside the CNMC, which 
give rise to more antitrust investigations across a range of regulated sectors. 
• Coherence in policy and regulatory actions as between regulated sectors. 
According to the OECD, 95  coordination between the different directorates within the CNMC 
(competition, telecommunications, energy, postal and transport services) allows the agency to adopt 
more informed decisions on competition and regulatory issues.96 Moreover, its larger size and greater 
diversification of activities arguably constitute a solid safeguard for its independence. In the words of 
the OECD: “[f]our years after its inception, the CNMC is reaping the fruits of this institutional 
framework.” Since the expression of that view, however, some have called into question the 
independence - and indeed, the legality - of the re-constituted CNMC.97  
                                                      
 92 In the EU, for example, a more symbiotic relationship exists between the mandating of access under 
competition rules and access prices under regulation, as the traditional cost modelling standards developed in 
an ex ante context have found their way over time into competition law jurisprudence under Article 102 
TFEU when identifying whether or not a dominant undertaking is acting reasonably in terms of its access 
pricing, and whether or not a complainant is acting as an “as efficient” competitor when compared to the 
dominant undertaking. Refer to Telefońica Judgment, op. cit. 
 93 See OECD Report https://one.oecd.org/document/DAF/COMP/AR(2018)15/en/pdf . 
 94 Refer also to Xifre R., “Competition and Regulation Reforms in Spain in 2013: The CNMC – an international 
perspective” (2013), IESE Business School Working Paper No. WP-1108-E, p. 12. 
 95 See OECD Report https://one.oecd.org/document/DAF/COMP/AR(2018)15/en/pdf.  
 96 Although one must query whether coordination is effective in practice in such a ‘Byzantine’ structure 
involving so many separate functional chambers. 
 97 Refer to Judgment of the European Court of Justice in Case C-424/15, Ormatxea Garai and Lorenzo 
Almendos, Judgment of 19.10.2016 (ECLI:EU:C:2016:780), in response to a request for a Preliminary Ruling 
regarding the Royal Decrees in Spain which brought to an end the terms of office of two senior Spanish 
officials (Member of the Board and President, respectively) of Spain’s sector-specific regulator (the CMT), 
when creating the new super-regulator (the CNMC). 
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Further to the OECD’s recommendations in relation to small nations, a classic example of the fusion of 
regulatory and competition law functions with a view to saving administrative costs and building scale 
can be seen in the agency structure adopted in Estonia in 2008.98 At that time, the Technical Regulatory 
Authority (“TRA”) was formed, the design of which was intended to implement national economic 
policy in the railway, electronic communications and energy sectors. The TRA operates under the 
Ministry of Economic Affairs & Communications. As of 1 January 2018, the TRA merged with the 
Estonian Consumer Protection Board, forming the TTJA. At the time of its formation, the residual 
concern expressed about the TRA, and by implication its successor TTJA, was that it is susceptible to 
government direction, which adversely impacts upon its decision-making independence. 
Estonian legislators have sought to address such concerns by ensuring inter alia that: 
• an effective system of appeals to the courts is in place (on average, 5-6 appeals are lodged per year); 
• decisions of the TTJA cannot be revoked or changed by the Government or a Minister; 
• there is independence in the agency’s spending, even though financing occurs through the State 
budget; and 
• the Director-General is subject to clear rules regarding the duration and security of their tenure. 
In the Netherlands, a “super-regulator” known as the ACM became operational in April 2013, which 
combined all the functions of the previously independent NCA and two other independent regulatory 
agencies. The activities of the ACM now cover the telecommunications, postal, energy, and transport 
sectors, along with a full range of consumer protection functions. The avowed aim in creating the ACM 
was to have a smaller combined agency that was better adapted to the demands of internationalization, 
technical developments dynamic markets and market trends. Its ability to better satisfy these goals was 
said to lie in the fact that it would be more flexible and was in a position to reallocate resources more 
effectively. As such, its aim was to put itself in a position to improve effectiveness, efficiency and the 
quality of market regulation in the Netherlands.  
However, it is also hard to escape the conclusion that the creation of a super-regulator – a policy option 
that had been earlier rejected by the Dutch government as a result of debates that had occurred in the 
period 2004-2007 – was not prompted by immediate budgetary concerns. Simultaneously, the combined 
agency was to be equipped with all the investigative and enforcement powers enjoyed by its three 
separate predecessors.99 During the legislative process, the combined ACM had been the subject of two 
particular residual concerns, namely: the potential “use and abuse” of information and data that has 
been gathered on the basis of different legal powers for ex post and ex ante; and the level of 
independence of the agency from the Dutch Ministry of Economic Affairs, Agriculture and 
Innovation.100 
                                                      
 98 The previous institutional framework, consisting of 10-20 personnel for each agency, was arguably inefficient 
in terms of scale, it being understood that at least 50 personnel are required to generate critical mass in 
decision-making. By the same token, it is acknowledged that the previously pivotal roles played by agency 
heads in sectoral decision-making have now given way to the Director-General of the combined NRA being 
little more than an “administrator”. 
 99 Refer to the discussions in Schäfers T. & Houdijk J., “The Netherlands’ New Authority for Consumers and 
Markets: Towards a problem-Based Approach”, World Competition, 35 No.4 (2012), pp. 659-670. See also 
the discussion in van der Vijver T., “Competition Law reform in the Netherlands: The establishment of ‘super 
regulator’ ACM”, Concurrences, No.1-2014, at pp. 248-253. 
 100 See Schäfers and Houdijk, op. cit., at p. 669. 
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According to its first Chairman of the Board, the synergies achieved by the ACM in bring together 
competition and regulatory experts has been successful from both a financial point of view (having 
achieved the Dutch government’s aims in reducing budgets) and from a substantive perspective (with 
positive outcomes in terms of the robustness of solutions and in the optimal use of the nominally 
independent office of the Chief Economist across all sectors).101 In order to ensure that information 
received by the competition chamber of the ACM from another specialist regulatory chamber of the 
NCA is not misused within the broader organisation, safeguards have been apparently introduced that 
such information is not used beyond the competition law competences of the ACM. Moreover, practical 
experience suggests that an integrated regulator such as the ACM is better placed to administer 
behavioural remedies, which is an important consideration when one takes into account the fact that 
sector-specific experience lends itself to the crafting of such remedies and their monitoring. 102 
Interestingly, the new ACM has, since its creation, adopted a number of decisions which have also taken 
into account a range of cultural and social issues which go well beyond the traditional economic welfare 
remit usually associated with the application of competition rules alone.  
After two years of operation, the OECD passed a very favourable verdict on the workings of the ACM, 
concluding that an external evaluation of its operations supported the effectiveness of ACM’s oversight 
strategy in terms of consumer efficiency and success before appeal courts, and in terms of efficiencies 
generated from cost savings. According to the OECD, gains from the ACM’s oversight have thus far 
comfortably surpassed the costs borne to generate such gains.103 
Conclusions 
While the jury may still be out on whether the ‘super regulator’ model provides the most effective 
solution for each jurisdiction to achieve the most effective goals of the regulatory State, it clearly 
appears to have produced some positive outcomes in terms of coherent decision-making in an economy 
the size of, and a political culture characteristic of, the Netherlands. Smaller nations will no doubt 
increasingly entertain the creation of a ‘super regulator’, if only because of the cost savings it appears 
to produce and the greater likelihood of limited resources being more effectively deployed, measured 
in large part by the number of qualified personnel available to address a full range of sector-specific 
issues.  
However, the fusion of all ex ante and ex post functions in one regulatory body does not appear to 
necessarily render it more likely to be able to combat government “interference” in its policy 
orientations. If anything, a more cross-disciplinary approach has a tendency to have the combined 
agency take a more holistic view of its policy options, which may veer towards resembling the policy 
direction preferred by the government. Whether the creation of a super-regulator displays more of the 
pros than the cons listed in Section III above when deployed in larger, more sophisticated jurisdictions, 
is more problematic. While there are some signs that such a model produces a number of positive 
outcomes, the experiences thus far have not been met with universal approval. In fact, the most recent 
proposal for spinning off relevant regulatory powers of the ACCC suggest that a cautious approach be 
adopted where large jurisdictions seek to join the ‘super regulator’ bandwagon. What is less in doubt is 
the appetite of policy makers to be willing to explore more hybrid forms of competition and regulatory 
functions, irrespective of whether they fall short of a comprehensive accumulation of powers – 
                                                      
 101 Interview with Fonteijn C., Chairman of the Board, Netherlands Authority for Consumers and Markets”, The 
Antitrust Source, www.antitrust source.com, June 2014, at p. 1. 
 102 Interview with Chris Fonteijn, op. cit., at p .6. 
 103 OECD, Annual Report on Competition Policy Developments in The Netherlands (2015), Report of 29-30 
November 2016, DAF/COMP/AR(2016) 34, at p. 3. 
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including the possibility of creating a segregated regulatory agency with authority across sectors, as 
proposed by the Australian Review Panel. 
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ternet, Cable and Satellite 
TV, mobile and fixed 
telephony). 
  
Law 27.078/2014, as 
modified by Decree 
267/2015 (Law 
Argentina Digital) 
Law No. 27442, of 2018 
(Law for Protection of 
Competition), Article 17 
Originally, CNDC (Argentinian NCA) used to have broad powers over regulated 
sectors. The institutional relationships it had with the sectoral agencies was 
considered to be particularly intense in the telecoms sector. On 15 May 2018, 
Law No. 27.442 entered into force and modified numerous aspects in Argentinian 
competition law, including its institutional structure. Accordingly, Article 17 of 
the Law establishes that, in the merger review of transactions in regulated sectors, 
the NCA will request a non-binding opinion from the NRA (ENACOM). The 
NRA does not have specific competition enforcement powers in merger review 
or investigations in conduct . However, the authorization for the transfer of 











Part XIB, XIC of the 
Competition and 
Consumer Act 2010 





and Service Standards) 
Act 1999, ss 149, 151, 
156 
A ‘converged’ regulator in TMT space (excluding postal and competition 
powers), with activities spanning 4 levels of the converged value chain ((i) 
applications / content; (2) devices; (3) transport; (4) infrastructure). ACMA is 
required to take into account the impact of its actions on competition. Role of 
ACCC (Competition Authority) with exclusive competition power for access and 
pricing issues. Significant regulatory developments foreseen as a result of the 
adoption of the Telecommunications Legislation Amendment (Competition & 
Consumer) Bill 2017, designed to lower the regulatory burden on the telecoms 
and broadcasting sectors (including increased emphasis on self-regulation but 
greater powers in relation to issues such as interactive gambling). 








































































•Broadcasting & Media 
  
Para 6a of the BGBl. I 
Nr. 83/2001 (last 
amended by BGBl. I Nr. 
115/2017) 
The NCA consults with Komm Austria on all matters affecting its sector of 










Law of 13 June 2005 
(telecoms); Law of 15 
May 2007 (media); Law 
of 21 March 1999 
(postal) 
Unique position as the media regulator in the Brussels-Capital Region. Creeping 
regulatory powers into the media space through the regulation of cable networks 





(including fixed and 
mobile telephony, 
Internet access, spectrum, 




Law Nº 9472, of 1997 
(General Law for 
Telecommunications), 
Article 19, XIX. 
Law N° 9472/97 establishes the regulatory agency for the telecoms sector, 
including its competences, and addresses general principles (such as free 
competition between operators, consumers' free choice and data protection, etc.). 
It also embraces rules on consumer rights and quality standards. Originally, the 
General Telecommunications Law conferred antitrust authority on ANATEL, 
carving out the specific powers of CADE (the Brazilian NCA), in Article 19, 
XIX, of the Telecommunications Act. Until 2012, ANATEL was responsible for 
antitrust investigations and for issuing opinions on mergers in the 
telecommunications sector, while the CADE was responsible for the final 
decisions on these matters. After 2012, when the new Competition Law N° 
12.529/11 came into force, CADE consolidated all general powers on 
competition law enforcement. CADE still consults ANATEL on relevant 
competition matters in the sector and ANATEL retains the power to evaluate 
mergers (e.g., transfer of licences and spectrum authorizations) and some anti-
competitive conduct (e.g., illegal cross-subsidies) from a regulatory perspective. 







































































(Internet access, mobile 
and fixed telecom 
services)  
•broadcasting services 
(radio and television 




(S.C. 1993, c. 38) 
Broadcasting Act (S.C. 
1991, c. 11) 
Competition Act (R.S.C., 
1985, c. C-34) 
Interface Agreement 
between CRTC and 
Competition Bureau 
(1999) 
The Competition Bureau (Canadian NCA) and the CRTC (Canadian NRA) 
entered an “Interface Agreement” in 1999 specifying those areas where one body 
or the other has jurisdiction and those areas where jurisdiction is shared. Subjects 
where CTRC and the Bureau both have authority include merger review, whereas 
interconnection issues are dealt with only by the CTRC, while traditional anti-
competitive practices, such as conspiracies to fix prices (which is a criminal 
offense in Canada), being dealt by the Bureau. 
Regarding merger review, under the Telecommunications Act, CRTC has 
specific responsibility for ensuring compliance with foreign ownership and 
control limitations and may include other regulatory issues arising as a result of 
the transaction - prior approval, per se, is not required. In its turn, the Bureau has 
authority to review all mergers and those which exceed proscribed economic 
thresholds must be formally pre-notified to the organization. 
Under the Broadcasting Act, prior approval of the CRTC is required for changes 
of control or ownership of licensed undertakings. Whereas the Bureau's 
examination of mergers relates exclusively to competitive effects, the CRTC’s 
consideration involves a broader set of objectives under the Act. 









































































•Television (with CNTV) 
  
Decree Nº 1.762/1977 
(role of SUBTEL) 
Law N° 18.168/1982 
(LGT) 
Law N° 19.724/ 2001 
Law N° 19.733/2001 
(Press Law), as modified 
by Law N° 20.361/2009 
(article 38) 
Subtel is competent to dictate fundamental technical plans (e.g., use of spectrum), 
technical standards (e.g., technical standards that regulate the use of the band 700 
MHZ-4G services), and to interpret technical regulations. With respect to 
television, Subtel’s authority is limited to technical aspects, while the CNTV 
regulates content and grants both broadcasting and cable licences. Neither Subtel 
nor CNTV have competition law powers.  
Competition law is enforced by two separate two bodies, which have the 
respective powers of: a prosecutor (Fiscalía Nacional Económica FNE) and a 
tribunal (Tribunal de Defensa de la Libre Competencia, TDLC). All transferences 
of control of communications companies under the public concession regime 
must be submitted to FNE, regardless of turnover thresholds, which represents 
an expansion of the general merger review system in this sector. The most recent 
regulatory changes have been driven by decisions of the NCA (i.e., the regulation 
of IP telephony, number portability, differentiation of the off-net/on-net rates, 








•Production of electronic 




Regulations of the 
People's Republic of 
China (Arts. 4, 12, 42 
and 72) 
A ‘converged’ regulator in the TMT space (but no competition powers). 
Ministry of Industry and Information Technology (MIIT) only has limited 
powers over competition issues – including (a) factoring market competitions 
into consideration when issuing licences to telecoms companies; (b) supervising 
unfair competition in telecoms industry; (c) imposing fines for unfair 
competition. The primary competition powers remain in the hands of anti-
monopoly enforcement institutions. In March 2018, China announced that it 
would combine the duties of its three existing competition agencies into a 
centralised Competition Authority. 











































































Law No. 1340, of 2009 
(Law for Protection of 
Competition), Article 6, 
first paragraph 
Telecommunications regulation, originally part of the regulatory regime 
established by Law No. 142 of 1994, was substantially overhauled by the 
enactment of Law No. 1341 of 2009. Also from 2009, the Colombian 
Competition Law (Law No. 1340) establishes, in Article 6, first paragraph, that 
the Colombian NCA (SIC) shall exercise the exclusive power for investigating, 
sanctioning and taking other administrative decisions related to infringements to 
the legislation for the protection of competition. The Competition Law expressly 








Art. L5-8 and Art. L36-6 




The NCA needs to consult with ARCEP before taking ex post action in its sectoral 
responsibilities. ARCEP needs to consult with the CSA (Audiovisual Regulator) 





•Postal (since 1998) 
•Electricity & Gas (since 
2005) 
•Rail (since 2006) 
•Spectrum Allocation 
  Paras. 123, 123a of TKG 
Exclusion of broadcasting, which falls within the exclusive competence of the 
Länder. Detailed consultation procedure with NCA regarding regulatory 
remedies (including functional separation) and in relation to spectrum allocation; 







L. 4070/2012 (as 
amended) 
L. 4053/2012 
Exercise of sector-specific competition powers. Cooperation with NCA. 
Exclusion of broadcasting and content from remit. Includes consumer protection 
remit in responsible sectors. Data security issues addressed by a separate body. 
Cybersecurity and data protection issues are addressed by other regulatory 
bodies. 







































































(Internet access, mobile 






•MOU between the 
Competition Commission 
and the Communications 
Authority (effective 14 
December 2015) 
•Competition Ordinance 
(Cap. 619) (Section 159) 
The Communications Authority (CA) has concurrent jurisdiction with the 
Competition Commission to enforce the Competition Ordinance (“CO”) in 
relation to undertakings operating in the telecoms and broadcasting sectors, 
including merger and acquisition activities involving carrier licensees. 
For cases involving the telecoms or broadcasting sectors falling within 
concurrent jurisdiction powers, the CA will ordinarily take the role as the lead 
authority, assuming responsibility to exercise the relevant powers and functions 








Section 60, 62 of 
Competition Act 2002 
Sections 11-13 of 
Telecoms Regulatory 
Authority of India Act 
1997 
Telecoms Tariff (Sixty 
Third Amendment) 
Order 2018 
The Competition Authority (CCI) generally has concurrent enforcement powers 
with sector regulators such as TRAI, unless there is an apparent conflict of 
jurisdiction, where the CCI prevails. The CCI’s pre-eminence in the telecoms 
sector was cast into doubt by the Bombay High Court in 2017. The CCI has 
appealed to the Supreme Court on whether it has exclusive jurisdiction over the 
telecoms sector. TRAI intervened in the proceedings, seeking a declaration that 
TRAI has exclusive jurisdiction. The High Court held that antitrust actions 
should be stayed until the results of regulatory action are clear. 
TRAI is capable of making recommendations, inter alia, about (i) the need for 
market entry by new service providers; and (ii) competition and efficiency in the 
operation of telecoms services. It has broad competition powers relating to the 
telecoms sector, primarily with respect to unilateral conduct and unfair 
competition practices. TRAI has the power to commence competition 
investigations on its own motion, but its powers do not include “dawn raid” 
inspections. 
TRAI adopted an Ordinance in February 2018, restricting telecoms operators 
with a market share of 30% or above from price discrimination and predatory 
pricing with respect to end users. 







































































•Broadcasting & content  
•Spectrum management 
(other than for radio & 
TV) 
•Postal (as from 2011) 
  
Law 249/1997 
See also Article 21, 
paragraphs 13-20 of Law 
Decree No. 201 of 2011 
Refer to 2016 
Cooperation Protocol 
between AGCOM and 
the NCA 
Competition between ex ante and ex post disciplines for jurisdiction has given 
way to consecutive increases in cooperation in 2013 in relation to unfair trade 
practices, to the 2016 Cooperation Protocol and to added cooperation with the 














The Telecommunications Business Act provides for sector-specific competition 
powers, including the prohibition of specific conduct by telecoms carriers with a 
dominant position, while the Japan Fair Trade Commission independently has 
powers in relation to such issues also. 








































































fixed and mobile 
telephony, Internet 
access, cable TV, 
satellite) 
•Broadcasting (including 
free-to-air TV and 
AM/FM radio)  
•Television and content 
•Spectrum allocation 
•Certain OTT services 
•User/audience rights 
•Cross-ownership 
relating to news outlets 
✓ ✓ N/A 
In June 2013, a Constitutional reform entered into force, the main features of 
which were: (1) the creation of two independent competition authorities: the 
Federal Institute of Telecommunications (“IFT”), in charge of the 
telecommunications and broadcasting sectors, and the 
Federal Economic Competition Commission (“COFECE”), in charge of all other 
sectors; (2) the creation of District and Circuit Courts specialized in 
telecommunications, broadcasting and competition law matters; and (3) the 
imposition of a whole chapter of asymmetric measures that can be imposed on 
an identified incumbent by the IFT. 
The current legal framework invests the IFT with regulatory and competition law 
powers, including: (i) the regulation and supervision of all aspects of 
telecommunications and broadcasting services and networks; (ii) the issuing of 
regulations and technical standards related to telecommunications and 
broadcasting; (iii) investigating anti-competitive behaviour (cartel activity, abuse 
of dominance and illegal concentrations); (iv) merger control; and (v) regulation 
and guarantee of access to essential facilities; among others. By contrast, 




– – ✓ ✓ 
Establishment Act of 
Netherlands Authority 
for Consumers & 
Markets 2014; see also 
ACM Procedure for the 
inspection of digital data 
Includes consumer protection power. Operates as a fully independent integrated 
regulatory & competition law body. 












































































Commerce Act 1986 (as 
amended) 
In the late 1980s, the telecoms sector was privatised and deregulated, relying 
principally on competition law through the 1990s to restrain the exercise of 
market power by Telecom – the formerly State-owned provider of fixed line 
telecommunications services. From 2001 onwards, the sector has been gradually 
re-regulated, and in 2011 Telecom was de-merged into separate wholesale 
(Chorus) and retail (Spark) businesses. 
The current framework requires Chorus to operate exclusively as a wholesale 
provider, and directs the Commission to determine the prices and terms on which 
Chorus is required to supply specified wholesale access services, backhaul and 
co-location services to retail service providers, based on a TSLRIC model. 
The Government is revising the regulatory framework, in part motivated by the 
transition from copper to fibre fixed-line services. The current proposal directs 
the Commission to determine a revenue cap for Chorus’ fibre access services, 
with specified ‘anchor services’ remaining subject to individual price caps (with 





services offered to the 
public in exchange for a 
fee, including: 
- public final 
communications services 
(e.g. fixed and mobile 
telephony, telegraph, 
pager services); 
- cable television 
services; 
- satellite services;  
- value-added services 
✓ ✓ 
Law No. 27336 
(published on August 5, 
2000), Article 26 
(Telecommunications 
Law) 
The legal framework foresees extensive powers conferred onto OSIPTEL 
(Peruvian NRA), including the important role of promoting competition in the 
telecoms sector. Besides its regulatory responsibilities, OSIPTEL is responsible 
for the application of the Peruvian Competition law (Legislative Decree No. 
1034) to telecoms services, thereby excluding the authority of Indecopi (Peruvian 
NCA) in this sector. OSIPTEL has its own set of procedural rules in the 
application of competition law. Indecopi is responsible for the enforcement of 
competition rules in all other markets, except for telecoms. 



































































(e.g., voice-mail, Internet, 








Articles 16, 25c, 116, 
118a, 118d, 122 and 
1221 of the Act of 16 
July 2004 – 
Telecommunications 
Law 
Highly interactive cooperation mechanism with the Polish NCA. 
In cases enumerated in the Telecommunications Act, the NCA is either consulted 
or obliged to give an opinion. Areas of cooperation include market definition, 











Sections 8 and 11 of the 
Telecoms Competition 
Code (last updated in 
January 2018)  
The IMDA must consider competition concerns (e.g., high entry barriers 
preventing efficient competitors to enter the market) to determine whether it is in 
the public interest to order separation remedies against a telecoms provider. 
IMDA has specific competition enforcement powers to counter the abuse of 
dominance in telecoms markets. The IMDA can now enforce competition law 
against dominant operators which have not yet been formally classified as a 
“Dominant Licensee” for (ex ante) regulatory purposes, aligning the Telecoms 
Competition Code to the general competition law framework of the NCA under 
the Competition Act. 









































































•Postal (since 2005) 
•Spectrum management 
✓  
MOU No. 1747 between 
the NCA and ICASA 
(2002) 
Concurrent powers with the NCA.  
To the extent that a merger requires notification to both ICASA and the NCA, 
both regulators will perform independent investigations of the proposed 
transaction (but may interact with each other during the process). To the extent 
that the regulators arrive at different decisions, the MOU provides for a process 
to resolve this. 
To the extent that a merger requires notification to only one of the regulators, that 
regulator will make an independent determination (but may have regard to the 
input of the other regulator). 
Insofar as complaints are concerned, a similar process is followed (and ICASA 














Article 18, Section 6 and 
Article 54 of the 
Telecommunication 
Business Act (“TBA”); 
Article 85-2, Sections 3 
and 6 of the Broadcasting 
Act 
Concurrent powers with the NCA. However, where a telecommunication 
business operator or broadcasting business operator is subject to a corrective 
measure or an administrative fine under the TBA or the Broadcasting Act, it shall 
not be subject to similar measure under the Monopoly Regulation and Fair Trade 
Act on the same grounds. 
KCC is in charge of ex post regulation on telecom or broadcasting business 
operators, while MSIT is in charge of ex ante regulation including the granting 
of telecoms and broadcasting business licenses and of promoting telecoms and 
broadcasting businesses. 










































































•Transport (rail, aviation) 
✓ ✓ 
Act 3/2013 creating the 
National Markets and 
Competition 
Commission, 
supplemented by Royal 
Decree 657/2013. 
See also Competition Act 
15/2007, and General 
Telecommunications Act 
32/2003, Law 9/2014 on 
Telecommunications. 
The CNMC is a unique “super regulator”, joining together 8 independent 
authorities, including the NCA. The CNMC divides itself primarily in two 
chambers: regulatory and competition chambers. The CNMC has private dispute 
resolution powers over electronic communications matters.  
The legality of the “super regulator” was disputed by former members of the 
Telecoms NRA, being referred to the CJEU (C-424/15). Although its legality was 
upheld. In early 2017, the Spanish Government announced that the CNMC is 
likely to be separated into two independent regulators. A White Paper and public 













Regulatory Reform Act 
2013 
MOU between CMA and 
OFCOM dated 2 
February 2016 
(Concurrency of 
competition powers with 
CMA) 
The UK Competition Network (UKCN), chaired by the CMA, facilitates 
communication and cooperation between sector-specific regulators (including 
OFCOM) and the specialist competition body, the CMA.  
Despite the “concurrency of powers” regime, the CMA has legal power to take 
over a competition case from OFCOM even if OFCOM is already investigating 
the case. 























































































Communications Act No. 
5809 (2008) 





Postal Services Act No. 
6475 (2013) 
Law No. 5651 on 
Regulation of 
Publications on the 
Internet and Suppression 
of Crimes Committed by 
Means of such 
Publications 
The BTK is authorised to issue regulations to create and protect competition and 
to eliminate the practices which obstruct disrupt or limit competition. It has the 
power to investigate alleged competition law violations in the electronic 
communications sector, to impose sanctions (including fines) and to seek the 
opinion of the NCA.  
The BTK and the NCA have signed two Cooperation Protocols, one in 2011 
which covers electronic communications services and an expanded protocol in 
2015 which also covers postal services, under which the NCA is required to ask 
for the BTK’s advisory opinion and refer to the BTK’s regulations on the relevant 
matter (if any), before taking decisions on electronic communications sector and 
postal services (including, preliminary investigations, in-depth investigations and 
mergers and acquisitions). The BTK can also seek the NCA’s advisory opinion 
on competition-related issues in the sector but it not required to do so other than 
with respect to market analyses that are conducted by the BTK.  








































































•Broad authority to 
regulate “interstate and 
foreign commerce in 
communication by wire 




television, radio, cable, 
satellite, spectrum, 
broadband internet access 
service) 
✓  
FCC-FTC 2017 MOU 
(Online Consumer 
Protection) 
FCC-FTC 2015 MOU 
(Consumer Protection) 
FCC-FTC 2003 MOU 
(Telemarketing 
Enforcement) 
MOUs between the FCC 




concerning areas of 
concurrent or 
overlapping jurisdiction.  
The FCC is authorized to interpret statutory terms, including those governing the 
scope of its regulatory authority/jurisdiction, subject to judicial review under 
Chevron and the Administrative Procedures Act (APA). Its interpretations of 
various statutory terms has changed over time; e.g., the FCC’s 2017 “Restoring 
Internet Freedom” Order re-classified broadband Internet as an “information 
service” rather than as a “telecommunications service” subject to common carrier 
obligations (including “Net Neutrality” principles), reversing its 2015 “Order.” 
In addition to the powers expressly enumerated in the Communications Act, 
Federal Courts have recognized that the FCC possesses “ancillary authority” 
under Section 4(i) of the Communications Act to “perform any and all acts, make 
such rules and regulations, and issue such orders, not inconsistent with this Act, 
as may be necessary in the execution of its functions.” 47 U.S.C. § 154(i). The 
outer bounds of that authority has been subject to substantial litigation (the FCC 
is required to tie its actions it to an express grant of statutory authority). See, e.g., 
EchoStar Satellite L.L.C. v. FCC, 704 F.3d 992, 1000 (D.C. Cir. 2013).  
The FCC possesses regulatory and enforcement authority over the areas of 
competition (i.e., in the sense of public interest powers), consumer protection, 
and licensing and authorizations in the communications sector. 47 U.S.C. 
§§ 214(a), 310. This authority is provided under the Communications Act and is 
separate to, and distinct from, Section 7 of the Clayton Act that governs antitrust 
review by the DOJ and FTC. 
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V. Ensuring the independence of regulators 
Independence from government or industry influence for an institution responsible for administering 
sector-specific regulation or competition rules is critical to the effective implementation of both ex ante 
and ex post disciplines. Concerns about independence in this context are very different when 
considering conflicts of interest in the broadcasting sector, where the public policy response to 
propaganda in the period leading to WWII led to the insistence that broadcasts be independent of 
external interests (the so-called “Staasferre” concept). The academic literature consistently takes the 
view that the key rationale for agency independence is that it provides a sound basis to guarantee 
consistent and impartial decision-making in technically complex cases, driven by the opinions of 
experts in the field and consistent with fundamental principles regarding “effective, efficient and fair 
decision making”.104 This is particularly important in the context of sector-specific regulation, given 
that it is primarily asymmetric in nature, imposing regulatory obligations on those entities with market 
power or some proxy of market power. In such an environment, it is vital that the institution responsible 
for the imposition of such obligations (especially where wholesale access-related or retail price control 
obligations are imposed) is free from bias in interpreting and applying complex economic data and in 
making delicate policy trade-offs when formulating such measures. 
In the ex ante field, concerns about regulatory “capture” are therefore at their highest precisely because 
the degree of independence of the agency might be compromised either because its members are drawn 
from the ranks of the historical incumbent operator subject to regulation105 (or expect to join one of the 
operators in the regulated sector after leaving the agency) 106 or because they are unlikely to apply 
economic regulation independently of political influence (usually directed at supporting the historical 
incumbent). These concerns are heightened in institutional contexts where State-owned enterprises are 
competing with private providers, which is still common in many countries around the world. In these 
cases, because the State maintains a material economic interest in a specific provider, the lack of 
independence can also lead to the “capture” of the regulator by the government itself in favor of the 
State-owned enterprise.107 
The imperative for a competition regulator to act in such an independent fashion is just as strong – if 
not even stronger – but is less likely to require detailed rules to ensure independence given that the risk 
of “capture” across a broad range of sectors is more difficult to orchestrate, and the fact that the 
                                                      
 104 See Tridimas T., “Community Agencies, Competition Law and ESCB Initiatives on Securities Clearing and 
Settlement” (2009), 28 Yearbook of European Law, Oxford University Press, at pp. 216-307. See also 
Lavrijssen S. & Ottow A.T., Independent Supervisory Authorities: a Fragile Concept” (2012), 39 Legal Issues 
of Economic Integration 419, at pp. 419-445. See also Hancher L., Larouche P. & Lavrijssen S., “Principles 
of good market governance” (2003) 4, Journal of Network Industries, pp. 353-389. 
 105 Thus, the commonality of experience between the regulator and the regulated firms will often mean that they 
see things through a common frame of reference, which does not necessarily lend itself to impartial, objective 
or non-discriminatory treatment in a liberalized environment. 
106  Given that members of the regulatory agencies tend to be highly specialized, if and when they leave that 
agency, they are likely to continue to work in that regulated sector. This also contributes to the maintenance 
an identity and a potential alignment of views that may ultimately undermine their impartiality.  
107  For a discussion of the risks of this particular type of capture, see Pereira Neto C.M., Lancieri F.M. & Adami 
M.P., “O Diálogo Institucional das Agências Reguladoras com os Poderes Executivo, Legislativo e 
Judiciário: Uma Proposta de Sistematização” (Institutional Dialogue of the Regulatory Agencies with the 
Executive, Legislative and Judicial Powers: A Proposal for Systematization), in Sundfeld & Rosilho. (Org.). 
Direito da Regulação e Políticas Públicas. (2014), p. 149. 
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industrial policy directions of government may vary greatly across all of the sectors of the economy 
(especially in larger economies, which are not overly dependent on a handful of ‘flagship’ companies). 
An in extremis example of EU law where Member State authorities are not considered to be in a position 
to exercise independence in the application of competition rules is State aid law, where the European 
Commission has exclusive competence.108  
Hallmarks of independence 
As has been noted in an OECD survey on competition policy, “greater independence was the factor 
most frequently identified as likely to lead to a better promotion of competition law objectives”.109 To 
this end, the OECD has concluded that there is a broad consensus among OECD member countries that 
the independence of NCAs constitutes “best practice” for all competition regimes.110 
In order to secure independence of NRAs and NCAs, it is usual for legal systems to establish certain 
measures that could insulate the agency from pressures and undue influence directed by private parties 
and the central government.111 Some of the common institutional features to guarantee the independence 
of NCAs and NRAs are: (i) fixed and stable mandates for senior officials; (ii) administrative autonomy 
and absence of hierarchical controls from central government; and (iii) financial and budgetary 
autonomy.112  
                                                      
 108 Given that the essence of State aid law found in Articles 107-108 TFEU is the prohibition of State funding of 
firms which is likely to distort competition, the founders of the Treaty considered it to be unrealistic that a 
Member State could act independently in the review of its own State aids schemes. In this regard, it comes as 
somewhat of a surprise to have the European Union negotiating with third nations to include some form of 
State aid review mechanism as the basis upon which they are to enjoy favorable negotiating conditions with 
the EU (e.g., China and post-Brexit United Kingdom). These third countries are poorly equipped to vet the 
compatibility of decisions to grant State aid, given that the entity conferring the aid in question is the very 
entity which confers powers of review on the relevant national agency. 
 109 Principles for the Independence of Competition Authorities, Alves S., Capiau J. & Sinclair A., April 2015, p 
15, available at 
file:///C:/Users/21784/Downloads/CLI_11_1_April_2015_Alves_Capiau_Sinclair%20(8).pdf; See also 
OECD, Global Forum on Competition, ‘The Objectives of Competition Law and Policy: Note by the 
Secretariat’ (2003) Session 1, Doc No CCNM/GF/COMP(2003), available at 
http://www.oecd.org/daf/competition/prosecutionandlawenforcement/34375749.pdf  
 110 See Alves S., Capiau J. & Sinclair A., April 2015, ibid; See Alemani E. et al, ‘New Indicators of Competition 
Law and Policy in 2013 for OECD and non-OECD Countries’ (2013) OECD Economics Department Working 
Papers, No 1104, available at 
http://www.oecd.org/officialdocuments/publicdisplaydocumentpdf/?cote=ECO/WKP(2013)96&docLangua
ge=En. 
111 “De jure independence refers to the grounding of a regulator’s independence in law and is necessary to 
formally protect regulator’s structural independence against undue influence. It can be expressed for 
example by provisions on budgetary independence, the conditions and process for the appointment and 
dismissal of the members or head of the regulatory agency, as well as whether the executive withholds powers 
to set tariffs or prices and review or approve contract terms with the regulated entities.” (OECD, Regulatory 
Policy Outlook 2018, p. 113, available at https://doi.org/10.1787/9789264303072-en). 
112  The OECD provides a more detailed list: “(…) the most frequently used dimensions of regulatory 
independence are: (i) budget independence; (ii) conditions for dismissal of the head of the regulatory agency; 
(iii) appointment of members/head of the regulatory agency by parliament or the legislature; (iv) 
accountability and reporting to executive, legislature, or representatives from regulated industry; (v) power 
to set tariffs or price-setting by the executive; and (vi) power to review or approve contract terms between 
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The heads of the agencies and members of the Board assume an important leadership role in those 
agencies and are specially exposed to pressure from private and public sources. In order to insulate 
these individuals from external pressures and to guarantee their independence, national and 
supranational legislation tends to be particularly concerned with the appointment process and the 
stability of tenure for senior officials. As regards the appointment process, this usually follows a 
transparent procedure, often including checks and balances between the Executive and Legislative 
branches (e.g., it is not uncommon to find an appointment by the President and an approval by the 
Parliament taking place). In addition, these individuals are usually appointed for a fixed term and cannot 
be removed before the end of their mandate, other than in exceptional circumstances. This stability 
confers greater freedom to implement decisions that may contradict the interests of private parties or 
political actors. 
At the organizational level, independence requires some degree of administrative autonomy from 
central government. This usually translates into the need for a separate staff that responds only to the 
leadership of the agency. Most importantly, it means that an agency is not under the hierarchical control 
of the central government and its Ministers and is not required to follow directions. Finally, this 
autonomy usually requires limitations on the ability of the central government to overrule an agency’s 
decisions. Even where such an ability exists, it must be treated as being exceptional and needs to be 
exercised in a transparent manner.  
Some level of financial and budgetary autonomy is also critical in order to ensure independence. Where 
the central government controls the budget and the allocation of resources to the agency, it may also 
direct its priorities and ultimately affect its capacity to take decisions that may oppose certain political 
interests. Thus, having some relatively stable source of revenues that does not depend on the central 
government’s appropriation, as well as freedom to allocate these resources to priorities established 
within the legal mandate of the agency, also contribute to the guarantee of the independence of the 
agency from the political process.113 
Independence in an EU context 
The axiom that a regulator must be able to act independently of political influence is reinforced in the 
EU context, where it is necessary that an NRA or and NCA must also be acting in the defined interests 
of the integration goals of the EU, rather than in the national self-interest.114 This policy imperative for 
independence is not surprising in the institutional landscape of the EU, particularly given that the 
European Commission is itself subject to an express obligation of independence. Thus, Article 17(3) 
TEU establishes that: “[in] carrying out its responsibilities, the Commission shall be completely 
independent”, and that “members of the Commission shall neither seek nor take instructions from any 
Government or other institution, body, office or entity. They shall refrain from any action incompatible 
with their duties or the performance of their tasks”. Moreover, the EU Member States are themselves 
                                                      
regulated entities or market actors.” OECD, Being an Independent Regulator, The Governance of Regulators, 
2016, p. 42, DOI: https://dx.doi.org/10.1787/9789264255401-en. 
113  The OECD explains the particular aspect of agency independence related to its financial security: 
“Appropriate funding is essential to determine the extent to which the regulator can carry out its mandate 
and act independently. Moreover, the way in which funding needs are determined, funds are decided and the 
extent to which the regulator can manage these funds autonomously could be more relevant than the source 
of funding.” OECD, Creating a Culture of Independence: Practical Guidance against Undue Influence, The 
Governance of Regulators, 2017, pp. 23-33, available at http://www.oecd.org/gov/creating-a-culture-of-
independence-9789264274198-en.htm. 
 114 See, for example, Recital 34 in the Framework Directive for electronic communications and Directive 
2009/72 EC Article 35 for the energy sector. 
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bound to respect the independence of members of the Commission, and are obliged to not to seek “ to 
influence them in the performance of their tasks” (Article 245 TFEU). The public policy imperative that 
regulators be immune from political influence is less profound in jurisdictions outside the EU because 
of the understanding that the pursuit of purely national interests is not necessarily incompatible with the 
goal that regulatory measures be applied objectively and in a non-discriminatory fashion. Within the 
EU, by contrast, the policy of not supporting ‘national champions’ or ‘national only’ solutions has long 
been a cherished goal of EU competition law enforcement. 
At the very least, the importance of achieving a separation of powers is assumed to be a cornerstone of 
an effective independent sector-specific regulator. However, even achieving this goal is not a 
straightforward exercise when small countries are involved. Where these small countries have “tight-
knit local political, legal, commercial and economic elites”,115 they can often struggle to achieve a 
genuine separation of powers between the government, regulatory agencies and the senior managements 
of regulated network operators. This malaise is most often identifiable in the developing world (e.g., 
historically on issues in countries such as Botswana and Jamaica), although it has also proven to be an 
issue with many of the ex-CEE countries of the EU that obtained EU membership in 2004.  
Where NRAs and NCAs are funded directly through their respective national governments, there are of 
course limits to the extent to which they can be considered to be completely autonomous of those 
governments. Nevertheless, there are certain important characteristics which are designed to ensure that 
in both its operational decision-making and in its legal decision-making, there is a significant degree of 
independence of action available for those agencies. As a general rule, individual sector-specific NRAs 
are financed through their own resources wherever possible, especially where licensing fees or annual 
administrative fees are involved. At times where an NRA has jurisdiction over the allocation and/or 
valuation of scarce resources such as spectrum, it might find itself relatively flush with funds (a situation 
which few other government bodies will be able to enjoy).116 This places the NRA in the enviable 
position of being able to exercise its relative independence from the interference of central government. 
By contrast, the accumulation of powers into one agency will have the inevitable effect of also bringing 
together funding capabilities into central government which, by definition, is capable of having an 
adverse effect on an agency’s independence. 
Within the EU, the notion of the truly “independent” regulatory institution has evolved over time, but 
has been driven since the 1990s by the model of independent regulators developed in the UK in the late 
1980s and embraced by many member nations of the British Commonwealth. Based on that early British 
model, the high-water mark of insistence on regulatory independence can now be found in the EU, 
where legislation sets forth very explicit conditions that need to be followed at Member State level to 
ensure that NRA and NCA independence can be ensured.117 This is particularly important at a time 
                                                      
 115 See Cave & Stern, op.cit., at p. 3. 
 116 For example, a health service, education system or pensions office will always be relatively cash strapped, 
and will need to be funded through central budgets. By the same token, some regionally organized police 
forces complement their basic centrally funded budgets through the direct use of penalty payments generated 
locally – e.g., parking fines and speeding fines, at times resulting in a ‘windfall’ cash surplus for those bodies. 
 117 In this regard, the availability of an independent review of decision-making by courts operating at arm’s 
length from the agency and also independently of the governments, operates as an invaluable corrective 
mechanism to the (potentially abusive) power of an agency. As noted by Wils W.P.J., “Independence of 
Competition Authorities: The Example of the EU and its Member States”, forthcoming in World Competition, 
Vol. 42, Issue 2, June 2019, “it is generally accepted that independence should go hand in hand with 
accountability. As independence means absence of controls, and accountability means controls, the crucial 
issue is to determine which types of controls are inappropriate and which are appropriate to ensure that 
competition authorities fulfil their task”. (at p. 10 and supporting footnote 30) Accordingly, Recital 22 of the 
ECN+ Directive provides that the “operational independence of national administrative competition 
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when EU legislation increasingly promotes the use of more flexible, discretionary powers by NRAs to 
implement evolving policy.118 If this discretion is exercised in the shadow of populist movements at 
national level, there is a heightened risk that consistent, harmonized EU policymaking may be blown 
off course. 
In a Request for a Preliminary Ruling to the Court of Justice from the Tribunal Supremo in Spain,119 the 
ex-President and a Board Member of Spain’s CMT (the sector-specific regulator for 
telecommunications) claimed that their respective dismissals under certain Royal Decrees were illegal, 
as they had been removed without recourse to any disciplinary proceedings or any reasons being cited 
for such dismissals. The dismissals had occurred on the eve of Spain’s creation of the CNMC, Spain’s 
‘super-regulator’. The Court stated that, although Member States enjoy institutional autonomy with 
regard to the organization and structuring of their NRA within the meaning of Article 2(g) of the 
Framework Directive 2009/140/EC, that autonomy may only be exercised in accordance with the 
objectives and obligations laid down in that Directive. Moreover, where a Member State moves from a 
sector-specific agency to a multi-sectoral agency, the latter body needs to satisfy the organizational and 
operational requirements to which the Directives subject NRAs. Such an accumulation of powers can 
occur, provided that the new agency satisfies the requirements of competence, independence, 
impartiality and transparency laid down in the Framework Directive for electronic communications, 
and an effective right of appeal is available against its decisions to a body independent of the parties 
involved. While the European Court of Justice considered that it was a matter for the national courts to 
decide whether the CNMC had satisfied those requirements, its own initial assessment was that the 
CNMC was likely to have satisfied those requirements when taking action in its role as an NRA. The 
fact that the CNMC had its own assets which were independent of those of the general Spanish 
administrative authorities, as well as sufficient autonomy and legal capacity necessary to manage its 
resources, were key aspects of its independence. As regards the Government’s dismissal of those two 
senior CMT officials prior to the end of their term of office in parallel with the creation of the CNMC, 
such dismissals would only be problematic in the absence of any rules guaranteeing that such dismissals 
do not jeopardise the independence and impartiality of those members. 
As highlighted in the discussion above, ensuring the independence of NRAs and NCAs is a complex 
matter. Implementing a legal framework capable of guaranteeing formal independence, coupled with 
the role of independent courts enforcing these rules, are essential steps in this direction. However, 
experience demonstrates that even these formal guarantees may be insufficient to establish an 
effectively independent agency, as the real policy space of the agency (and its ‘actual’ independence) 
will depend on several other factors, including: 
• how established the rule of law is in a particular country; 
                                                      
authorities should not preclude either judicial review or parliamentary supervision in accordance with 
national law. Accountability requirements should also contribute to ensuring the credibility and legitimacy 
of the actions of national administrative competition authorities”. 
 118 In an attempt to find a bright line between “policy-making” (legitimately residing with government), on the 
one hand, and “implementation” (the domain of the agency), on the other, authors Hanretty C., Larouche P. 
& Reindl A.P., “Independence, accountability and perceived quality of regulators – a CERRE Study (2012), 
explain that: “general policy rules issued by the [M]inister can, for example, stipulate that the energy 
regulators must contribute to the promotion of the European environmental and climate targets, an adequate 
level of network investments and the security of supply. However, the regulatory authority has the 
responsibility to decide on the methods through which these goals must be achieved, such as the choice for a 
specific tariff method and the design of regulatory methods to be used for the realization of these goals.” (at 
p. 14) 
 119 Case C-424/15, Ormaetxea Garai and Lorenzo Almendros, op. cit. 
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• the existence of players in the policy space where the agency operates who can exercise veto 
rights; 
• the political importance of the sector in which the agency exercices its powers; and 
• the relationships with other institutions from the Executive, Legislative and Judicial branches.120 
Thus, when analyzing independence, focus only on the static view of formal guarantees might lead to 
a rather naive and limited analysis of the regulatory environment and, more importantly, to a false 
perception of independence. A more dynamic analysis must be focused on the quality of the 
independence, which is dependent on the actual relationship among all institutions that can affect, 
whether directly or indirectly, the regulatory process.121 
While we examine below the key elements deemed necessary to ensure independence in relation to both 
competition law and sector-specific policy in the respective electronic communications and energy 
sectors, an overview of European competition practice under Article 106 TFEU also provides an insight 
into the critical concerns about the lack of independence of a decision-making body. 
Guiding principles regarding conflicts of interest established under Article 106 TFEU 
At the heart of the desire to ensure independence in decision-making is the idea that regulators need to 
be structured in such a way as to avoid conflicts of interests. The administrative practice of the 
Commission under Article 106(1) TFEU122 provides some insight into the sort of public policy mischief 
which a conflict of interest can generate. Article 106 is a quasi-regulatory tool that is used by the 
Commission to achieve liberalisation or to curb the excesses of State intervention through measures 
directed towards Member States but ultimately affecting market actors. 
                                                      
120  For an interesting discussion of the distinction between formal and actual independence, see Hanretty C. and 
Koop C., "Shall the Law Set Them Free? The Formal and Actual Independence of Regulatory Agencies" 
(2013) 7 Regulation & Governance, 195. The OECD also refers to this distinction, when it comments that: 
“…this formal independence needs to be accompanied by de facto independence in the regulator’s day to 
day work, which is more difficult to map out.” (OECD, Regulatory Policy Outlook 2018, p. 113, available at 
https://doi.org/10.1787/9789264303072-en). See also Pereira Neto, Lancieri and Adami, op. cit., at pp. 149-
185. 
121  For an analysis of this dynamic process that influences ‘actual’ independence, as well as examples drawn 
from the Brazilian experience, see Pereira Neto, Lancieri & Adami, op. cit., at pp. 149-185. To illustrate the 
point, it is worth mentioning one particular example. The Brazilian General Law of Telecommunications 
establishes formal guarantees of independence to ANATEL (the Brazilian NRA), including stability of senior 
officials, administrative autonomy, and relative financial independence. However, despite these guarantees, 
in 2004, after intense disputes between ANATEL and the Ministry of Communications regarding the 
implementation of a rate readjustment, the President of the agency resigned, allowing the President of Brazil 
to appoint a new head of the agency prior to the end of their mandate. This case demonstrates certain practical 
limits on the actual independence of ANATEL. For a discussion of pressure to induce resignation as a means 
of exercising Presidential control over independent regulatory agencies, see Prado M.M., ‘Assessing the 
theory of presidential dominance: empirical evidence of the relationship between the executive branch and 
regulatory agencies in Brazil’, in Rose-Ackerman S., Lindseth L. & Emerson B., Comparative Administrative 
Law: Second Edition (Edward Elgar Publishing 2017), pp. 185-186. 
 122 Article 106(1) TFEU specifies as follows: “In the case of public undertakings and undertakings to which 
Member States grant special or exclusive rights, Member States shall neither enact nor maintain in force 
any measure contrary to the rules contained in the Treaties, in particular to those rules provided for in 
Article 18 and Articles 101 to 109.” 
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Thus, in MOTOE, 123 ELPA was responsible for organising and marketing motorcycling events in 
Greece, which included the right under local law to co-decide upon authorisation requests for the 
organisation of motorcycling events by independent service providers. ELPA was found to have had a 
conflict of interest by reason of its dual role in satisfying regulatory objectives while also pursuing 
commercial activities. The Greek law led to a conflict of interest because ELPA had an economic 
interest in limiting the access of other providers/competitors to the market to its own advantage, while 
having been conferred the legal means by which potentially to prevent other service providers from 
entering the Greek market. This potential abuse of dominance was also reinforced by the mere fact that, 
unlike its competitors, ELPA was not subject to any restrictions, obligations or controls in relation to 
the grant or refusal of its consent regarding the authorisation of motorcycling events.  
Similarly, the allocation by the Belgian State to a public operator of the national telecommunications 
network (RTT) of the exclusive right to supply and approve equipment for network connections was 
found to be contrary to the terms of Article 106 TFEU, as it placed the public operator at a competitive 
advantage vis a vis its competitors.124 Unlike the situations in MOTOE and RTT, however, in the Albany 
Case,125 the existence of judicial scrutiny in the decisions of a sectoral pension fund meant that the 
pension fund was in practice not in a position to act arbitrarily or in a discriminatory manner.  
The Article 106 case-law on conflicts of interest even encapsulates conflicts of interest which occur 
where an undertaking with special or exclusive rights has a conflict of interest as between different 
commercial activities. In both the ERT and Solvano Raso Cases,126 the beneficiaries of certain exclusive 
rights granted by the Greek and Italian governments respectively had conferred upon them an advantage 
under national law when dealing with certain products in relation to which they competed against third 
parties, thereby providing them with the opportunity to distort otherwise equal conditions of 
competition (usually by favouring their own products).127 
Adopting these broad principles, the administration of competition rules and the various Directives 
covering the liberalisation of the electronic communications and energy sectors provide for a series of 
minimum standards that need to be satisfied by Member States regarding the financial and functional 
independence of NRAs, and the personal independence of their senior personnel.128 
                                                      
 123 Case C-49/07, Motosykletistiki Omospondia Ellados NPID (MOTOE) v. Elliniki Dimosio, 
ECLI:EU:C:2008:376. 
 124 Case C-18/88, RTT v. GB-Inno-BM, ECLI:EU:C:1991:474. 
 125 Case C-67/96, Albany International BV v. Stichting, ECLI:EU:C:1999:430. 
 126 See Case C-260/89, ERT & Ors v. DEP & Ors, ECLI:EU:C:1991:254 and Case C-163/96, criminal 
proceedings against Silvano Roso & Ors, ECLI:EU:C:1998:54. 
 127 While it is doubtful that a Member State’s NCA could ignore such national rules, the European Commission 
was able to act under Article 106(1) TFEU. 
 128 The adoption of appropriate safeguard measures to prevent an agency being prone to a conflict of interest is 
also reflected in measures taken against the regulated firm itself, at least where it enjoys a privileged position 
across the value chain or where it is vertically integrated. Thus, in the electronic communications sector, 
conflicts of interest arising in the dealings of a regulated firm with its downstream competitors is addressed 
primarily through the use of access remedies imposed at wholesale level. By contrast, the same effect is 
achieved in the energy sector through the use of structural unbundling remedies which differentiate clearly 
between the transmission and distribution arms of an energy provider. The presumption that a conflict of 
interest will exist in the vertically integrated railway sector also leads to the need for an unbundling of 
infrastructure and transport services, which is complemented by the appointment of an infrastructure 
manager, the need for separate accounts, specific requirements where rail-related services are also involved, 
and the independence of the body responsible for allocation of train paths and the charging for the use of 
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1. EU Competition Law  
As noted above, the OECD recommends the maintenance of the independence of NCAs as a key aspect 
of their effectiveness. Nowhere is the relative importance of this independence promoted more overtly 
than in the European Union. Even a jurisdiction such as the United States, which prides itself on the 
importance of objectivity and impartiality in decision-making, does not go to the lengths pursued by 
the European Commission to ensure independence in NCA decision-making. This is largely because 
the heads of US authorities are openly political appointees, whereas it is the avowed aim of a centrist-
liberal body such as the European Commission to act independently of national interests; it  therefore 
seems only reasonable to assume that the roles of NCAs within the EU should be expected to satisfy 
similar criteria. 
At EU level, the essential elements necessary to establish the independence of NCA decision-making 
within the EU can be found Council Regulation 1/2003,129 the procedural legislation which sets forth 
the modus operandi of the Commission and national EU Member State NCAs when applying EU 
competition rules. Neither Regulation 1/2003 nor its predecessor Regulation 17 130  contained any 
detailed prescription regarding the need for independence of NCAs vis a vis their Member State 
governments. Thus, while, Article 35 of Regulation 1/2003 states that “[…] Member States should 
designate and empower authorities to apply Articles [101] and [102] of the [TFEU] as public enforcers. 
[…]”, it provides no substantive guidance regarding the level of empowerment that a Member State 
should provide to its NCA. 
Even as regards the European Commission itself, the longstanding criticism levelled at that institution 
for decades has been that it is not in a position to act as a truly independent antitrust enforcer because 
it holds the cumulative powers of an investigator, prosecutor and enforcer.  The Commission has sought, 
over time, to address these criticisms through a series of its own internal restructuring initiatives aimed 
at rendering its own workings more transparent and thus more robust, both in terms of form and 
substance.131 
                                                      
infrastructure. In the railway sector, unbundling principles are complemented by the existence of behavioural 
remedies in the form of access obligations, which need to satisfy a number of principles in terms of 
transparency, costing, non-discrimination, and so forth (as is the case of the electronic communications 
sector). See, in particular, Articles 4, 13, 27, 29, 31, 32, 35, 36, 56 and 61 of SERA. See also Articles 46, 47, 
50-54 of SERA as regards capacity allocation principles. Thus, Article 7(1) of Directive 2012/34 provides 
that, in order to ensure the independence of the infrastructure manager vis a vis the rail undertakings which 
operate the trains, Member States must ensure that “essential functions” or an infrastructure manager may 
only be entrusted to bodies or firms “that do not themselves provide any rail transport services.” 
 129 Council Regulation (EC) No. 1/2003 of 16 December 2002 on the implementation of rules on competition 
laid down in Articles 81 and 82 of the Treaty, OJ L1, 4 January 2003. 
 130 EEC Council Regulation No. 17/62, OJ O.13, 21 February 1962. 
 131 Thus, over time, aside from the traditional role played by the European Commission’s Legal Service (a 
separate part of the Commission which assesses the legality of Commission actions), the role of the Hearing 
Officer has been expanded to correct certain procedural excesses surrounding the rights of the defence; this 
supervisory role has been complemented by the increasing interest of the European Ombudsman when 
investigating the fairness and principle of sound administration that should typify competition law 
investigations. In addition, complex competition decisions are subject to a process of internal review by a 
cross-section of the Commission’s Services, while the input of the office of the ‘Chief Economist’ subjects 
to economic scrutiny the positions taken by DG Competition’s case teams.  Moreover, Member State NCAs 
are consulted in more problematic cases through their participation on an Advisory Committee with which 
the Commission’s DG Competition consults. 
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With the influx of ten (10) new Member States in 2004,132 however, the momentum to specify working 
rules to ensure NCA independence increased significantly. This resulted in a series of warnings issued 
by the European Commission to various Accession Member States, which foreshadowed infringement 
actions being brought against a number of those Member States.133 The aftermath of these actions has, 
in turn, led to a significant ramping up of legal prerequisites for NCAs to ensure their independence in 
the implementation of the next generation of the EU competition law procedures, which can be found 
in the recently adopted ECN+ Directive.134 
The ECN+ Directive 
In proposing the ECN+ Directive, the European Commission was particularly concerned that “a 
genuine risk of influence by other state bodies exists where state-owned companies or activities by state 
bodies are subject of an investigation by the NCA or where its enforcement action would interfere with 
other public interests”.135 As noted by Wils, the specific risks posed by State-owned undertakings which 
need to be addressed by respect for the principle of equal treatment is something which depends very 
much upon the assurance that NCAs maintain their independence from their national governments and 
broader political considerations.136 
Although the European Commission did not consider it necessary to pursue infringement actions for a 
number of years against individual Member States for the lack of independence of their NRAs, the 
European Court of Justice had the opportunity on a number of occasions to review the breadth of Article 
35 of Regulation 1/2003. For example, in VEBIC, the Court ruled that national legal provisions that 
prevent an NCA from defending its own decision in judicial proceedings fell foul of the independence 
obligation contained in Article 35, which is designed to ensure the effective application of Articles 101 
                                                      
 132 Namely, Cyprus, Czech Republic, Estonia, Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, Malta, Poland, Slovakia and 
Slovenia, which became EU Member States on 1 May 2004. 
 133 As is reflected in the list of telecommunications sector infringement actions taken against EU Member States, 
contained in Table 2. Note that comparable actions against Member States for failure to ensure the 
independence of their respective energy NRAs has not occurred to the same extent as in the 
telecommunications sector. This is arguably due to the twin pressures of: (1) network unbundling obligations 
in the energy sector, which minimizes the role which NRAs can play in the crafting of asymmetric regulatory 
obligations; and (2) the relative importance of NRAs working collectively to address cross-border energy 
glows and interconnector issues, which inevitably transcend narrow national decisions that would be taken 
unilaterally. The only substantive infringement actions in the energy sector have been brought against 
Germany (Infringement N°: 201422858; Case C-718/18 Commission v. Germany) and Spain (Infringement 
N°: 20142186).  With respect to Germany, the grounds of challenge related to the failure of the NRA to enjoy 
full discretion in the setting of tariffs, and with respect to its competence to set fines of up to 10% of annual 
turnover. Other actions relate primarily to the faulty transposition of EU legislation into national law. 
 134 Directive EU 2019/1 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 11 December 2018 to empower the 
competition authorities of Member States to be more effective enforcers to ensure the proper functioning of 
the internal market, OJ L.11, 14 January 2019. For a wide-ranging discussion of the relevance of 
independence under the ECN+ Directive, refer to the discussion in Wils, op. cit. 
 135 See Commission Staff Working Document, “Impact Assessment accompanying the Proposal for a Directive 
of the European Parliament and of the Council to empower the competition authorities if the Member States 
to be more effective enforcers and to ensure the proper functioning of the internal market”, SWD (2017) 114 
of 22 March 2017, Part 1/2, at p.26. 
 136 Refer to Wils, op. cit., at p.16. 
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and 102 TFEU. 137 Moreover, in Schenker,138 the Court concluded that, in order for there to be an 
effective application of Articles 101 and 102 TFEU, such an application needed to be uniform between 
Member States. 
Accordingly, the ECN+ Directive has now gone on to specify in several provisions that NCAs must be 
independent by reference to a number of specific criteria. In particular, it introduces guarantees aimed 
at insulating the staff and management of NCAs from external influences, including political pressure, 
when enforcing EU competition rules. More specifically, Article 4 of the ECN+ Directive establishes 
that Member State must ensure that: 
a) the staff and the members of the decision-making body of the NCA can perform their duties 
and exercise their powers for the application of Articles 101 and 102 TFEU independently from 
political and other external influence; 
b) the staff and the members of the NCA neither seek nor take any instructions from any 
government or other public or private entity when carrying out their duties and exercising their 
powers for the application of Articles 101 and 102 TFEU; 
c) the staff and the members of the NCA refrain from any action which is incompatible with the 
performance of their duties and exercise of their powers for the application of Articles 101 and 
102 TFEU; 
d) the members of the NCA may be dismissed only if they no longer fulfil the conditions required 
for the performance of their duties or have been guilty of serious misconduct under national 
law;139 and 
e) NCAs have the power to set their priorities for carrying out tasks for the application of Articles 
101 and 102 TFEU, as defined in Article 5(2) of the ECN+ Directive. To the extent that NCAs 
are obliged to consider complaints which are formally filed, this shall include the power of 
those authorities to reject such complaints on the grounds that they do not consider them to be 
a priority. This obligation is without prejudice to the power of NCAs to reject complaints on 
other grounds defined by national law. 
Through these provisions, the ECN+ Directive thus reinforces significantly the requirement of 
independence for NCAs, while establishing clearer objective criteria designed to satisfy these 
requirements. As such, it is an important addition to the institutional framework of European 
competition law.  
Public policy override 
The practical implication of the provisions of the ECN+ Directive is that NCAs are provided with a 
different degree of leeway when implementing competition rules which are of a uniquely domestic hue 
(i.e., not EU competition rules). This situation should be contrasted with the situation that exists in a 
                                                      
 137 Case C-439/08, ECLI:EU:C:2010:739 (at paras 56-64). 
 138 Case C-681/11, ECLI:EU:C:2013:404 (at paras 36, 46 and 49). 
 139 The grounds for dismissal should be laid down in advance in national law. Dismissals cannot occur for reasons 
related to the proper performance of their duties and exercise of their powers in the application of Articles 
101 and 102 TFEU, as defined in Article 5(2). See also, in this regard, Case C-288/12, Commission v. 
Hungary [2014] ECLI:EU:C:2014:237, at para. 53, where the Court of Justice ruled that Member States need 
to respect the length of a mandate for directors of a national Data Protection Authority, and that such a 
mandate can only be terminated on the basis of strong legal reasons. Accordingly, changes in the institutional 
structure of an agency need to take due account of such tenure under any transitional measures. 
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number of jurisdictions around the world, the most prominent of which is Germany, where the merger 
ruling of the German Cartel Office can be overridden by the Minister of the Economy & Energy on the 
basis of overtly public policy (i.e., public interest) grounds.140 In so doing, however, the decision to 
override the NCA’s ruling on public interest grounds is exercised in a transparent manner, with the 
rationale being that the voting public is in a position to judge at the ballot box the decisions of 
responsible Ministers who seek to override a purely economic assessment by an NCA by reference to 
various public interest criteria. This regime also explains why, in Germany, it is perfectly reasonable 
for the NCA and the German government to be at odds with one another decisions relating to specific 
cases.141 Comparable rules also foresee the ability of the responsible Government officials in Spain142 
                                                      
 140 According to Section 42 GWB, a merger that is otherwise prohibited by the Bundeskartellamt may be 
authorized by the Minister for the Economy & Energy. The basis for receiving such a Ministerial exemption 
lies in the fact that the competitive restraint identified by the Bundeskartellamt is considered to be outweighed 
by advantages to the economy as a whole, or the merger is justified by an overriding public interest. There is 
a limit to the Minister’s exercise of this discretionary power, insofar as the market economy system must not 
be jeopardised by the Ministerial authorization. In turn, it is subject to an appeal to the courts. The decision 
granting the Ministerial authorization is open to appeal to the Oberlandesgericht Düsseldorf on the basis of 
procedural errors and errors in reasoning. Past practice suggests that maintaining valuable technical know-
how, improving the security of supply, stabilizing agricultural markets, and successful participation in 
international competition have been acknowledged as advantages that can lead to a Ministerial authorization. 
In general, preserving job security is – in and of itself – not a viable advantage. Overriding interest of the 
general public has been found to be the case in the relief provided to the State budget through the privatization 
of a State-owned company and where environmental policy goals can be achieved by an approval of the 
merger. (See Riesenkampff A. & Steinbarth S. in Loewenheim/Meessen/Riesenkampff/Kersting/Meyer-
Lindemann, Kartellrecht [2016] 3rd ed, GWB § 42, paras 2 - 7). 
  In total, 22 applications for Ministerial authorization have been granted since the 1970s. (The full list of 
authorisations is available at: https://www.bmwi.de/Redaktion/DE/Downloads/Wettbewerbspolitik/antraege-
auf-ministererlaubnis.pdf?__blob=publicationFile&v=5). 
  The most recent instance of Ministerial authorization occurred in 2016, which related to a supermarket 
merger, and which was subject to significant controversy. (See Deutsche Welle (www.dw.com) 
https://www.dw.com/en/regulators-overruled-in-supermarket-takeover/a-19122420). Such authorization was 
challenged and suspended by the Düsseldorf Court (See https://www.dw.com/en/germanys-economics-
minister-in-the-firing-line-again/a-19421048). Shortly after this decision, the German Law was amended to 
restrict the possibility of appeals by third parties against the Ministerial authorization, under the Ninth 
Amendment of the Act Against Restraints of Competition. 
 141 As occurred, for example, in the Telefońica/E-Plus Case in 2016 and in the Alstom/Siemens Case in 2019, 
both of which were reviewed by the European Commission under the EU Merger Regulation, but which 
witnessed the adoption of dramatically opposed views by the Bundeskartellamt (which opposed both mergers) 
and the German government (which supported both mergers).  It is highly unlikely that this institutional 
policy of “agreeing to disagree” would be capable of being endorsed in most other political cultures outside 
Germany, whose modern history is characterized by an elaborate set of checks and balances designed to 
promote plurality in all its various forms. 
 142 Spain’s Competition Act enables the Council of Ministers to re-assess any decision of the CNMC that may 
have blocked a merger or subjected it to commitments. The Minister of Economy has 15 days from the 
adoption of the relevant CNMC Decision to raise the issue with the Council of Ministers, which has one 
month in which to adopt a final Decision on the matter (Competition Act, Article 60). When re-assessing the 
concentration, the Council of Ministers can take into account criteria other than competition policy, including 
the maintenance of national security and defence, the protection of public health, the promotion of 
technological investigations and developments, and the maintenance of the objectives of sectoral regulation 
(Competition Act, 10(4)). 
 59  
and France143 to be able to overturn a merger ruling of their respective NCAs. It should also be 
contrasted to the situation which prevails in a number of jurisdictions around the world such as Canada, 
Australia and the United States, which have a separate regime for the review of investments by foreign 
nationals in strategic industries.144 The EU has recently adopted legislation which streamlines such 
foreign direct investment reviews which are based on public policy grounds, in addition to the usual 
review process available for mergers.145 
                                                      
 143 In France, the Minister for the Economy holds residual powers in two circumstances as regards the review by 
the French NCA of “concentrations”, namely: (1) even if the concentration is cleared by the NCA at the end 
of the first phase of review, the Minister has the discretion to request the NCA to open a second phase in-
depth review of the concentration (Code de Commerce, Article L430-7-1 (I)) and within a period of 5 days 
after the Decision is adopted by the French NCA, the Minister of the Economy can request that the NCA 
conduct a thorough examination of the concentration; and (2) irrespective of the final decision adopted by the 
NCA at the end of the second phase, the Minister can substitute his or her decision based on public interest 
grounds (Code de Commerce, Article L430-7-1 (II)). Within a period of 25 days from the moment the 
Minister has received the Decision of the NCA, he or she has the right to evoke the “strategic mergers” 
exception for reasons of general interest other than the maintenance of competition (i.e., mergers raising 
issues of public policy other than competition, such as industrial development, the competitiveness of the 
undertakings concerned with regard to international competition or the creation or maintenance of 
employment). In doing so, the Minister must adopt a reasoned Decision and can only rule on the transaction 
in question after having heard the observations of the parties to the concentration. The Minister’s Decision 
can, in the appropriate circumstances, be made conditional on the effective implementation of commitments. 
Failure of the parties to comply with the commitments prescribed by the Minister can result in a series of 
censures by the Minister (Code de Commerce, Article L430-8, IV). 
  In July 2018, the French Minister of Economy and Finance exercised for the first time the power set forth in 
Article L.430-7-1 of the French Commercial Code, allowing the minister to re-assess a merger on public 
interest grounds. In doing so, the Minister concluded that the acquirer of a “ready-made meals” business did 
not need to divest a certain brand as a pre-condition of merger clearance, which had been deemed necessary 
on competition law grounds as a result of the French NCA’s clearance Decision in June 2018 (Financière 
Cofigeo/Agripole group, Decision No 18-DCC-95, 14 June 2018). The Minister’s concerns were focused on 
the negative impact of the remedy on employment, in a sector which required ‘revitalisation’ that could be 
achieved only through the merger. In return for such Ministerial dispensation, the buyer gave a commitment 
to maintain present employment levels for a period of at least two years post-merger. 
 144 In this regard, refer to: Investment Canada Act [1985] - Canada; Foreign Acquisitions and Takeovers Act 
[1975] and Foreign Acquisitions and Takeovers Fees Imposition Act [2015] - Australia; and The Foreign 
Investment Risk Review Modernization Act of 2018 (CFIUS) – United States. 
 145 Within the EU, a minority of Member States had adopted their own forms of foreign direct investment 
legislation over the years. However, with the adoption of the Foreign Direct Investments Regulation 
(Regulation (EU) 2019/452 of 19 March 2019, the “FDI Regulation”), whose provisions will be fully 
operational by 11 October 2020,  a legal framework for the screening of foreign direct investments by 
Member States on the grounds of either public security or public order has now been established across the 
EU. The regime set forth in the FDI Regulation establishes a cooperation mechanism between Member States 
and the European Commission that is aimed at making the taking of decisions on such grounds both more 
transparent and more analytically coherent (unlike its US counterpart, CFIUS, which establishes a centralized 
– albeit somewhat arbitrary - mechanism  for the review of FDI by the Committee on Foreign Investment in 
the United States).   A non-exhaustive list of public policy/public security grounds has been drawn up under 
the FDI Regulation, based on which investments can be screened in accordance with the following legitimate 
lines of enquiry: critical infrastructure (both actual and virtual); critical technologies; the supply of critical 
inputs; access to sensitive information; and media freedom and pluralism. The regime foresees that the 
European Commission may release opinions to the Member States regarding the appropriateness of their 
interventions under these provisions, although such opinions are, strictly speaking, non-binding as a matter 
of law. However, where the subject-matter in question affects EU interests (e.g., matters relating to the 
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2. Telecommunications Sector 
Given that the liberalisation of the electronic communications sector in the United Kingdom pre-dates 
the broader liberalisation trend in the EU, it is not surprising that the United Kingdom model of an 
“independent regulator” established a benchmark for decision-making independence by the regulatory 
agency in that sector. These requirements at EU level, however, were only formalised to a meaningful 
degree with the adoption of the so-called Framework Directive in 2002.146 
The Framework Directive 2002/21/EC provides a number of references on the importance of Member 
States acting as guarantors of an NRA’s independence. For example, Article 3 requires that Member 
States guarantee the independence of NRAs by ensuring that they are (i) legally distinct from and (ii) 
functionally independent of, all organisations providing electronic communications networks, 
equipment or services. To the degree that Member States retain the ownership of control of an operator 
in the sector, they are required at least to ensure an “effective structural separation of the regulatory 
function from activities associated with ownership or control” (Article 3.2). Moreover, Member States 
are required to ensure that NRAs “exercise their powers impartially and transparently” (Article 3.3). 
To this end, NRAs should be “in possession of all the necessary resources, in terms of staffing, expertise 
and financial means, for the performance of their tasks.”147 
In addition, Article 8 of the Framework Directive establishes that Member States shall ensure that, in 
carrying out their regulatory tasks, their NRAs shall take all reasonable measures in order to: 
i. promote competition in the provision of electronic communications networks, electronic 
communications services and associated facilities and services; 
ii. contribute to the development of the internal market; and 
iii. promote the interests of the citizens of the European Union. 
After a period of time in which it should have been widely understood that Member States need to 
ensure the decision-making independence of their regulatory agencies, even where certain regulatory 
functions (e.g., spectrum allocation) remained with the State, the European Commission escalated its 
scrutiny of certain Member State practices, which culminated in a series of infringement actions being 
launched in the telecommunications sector (summarised in Table 2) against a wide range of Member 
States.148 The challenges included actions based on the following: 
                                                      
aerospace industry, transport networks, energy policy), Member States are bound to “take the utmost account” 
of the Commission’s opinion. While Member States are not obliged to introduce an FDI system into their 
national legal frameworks,  where they elect to do so they must inter alia include some basic screening 
requirements, including the availability of judicial review of FDI decisions, respect for the principle of non-
discrimination among third party States, and transparency in decision-making.  The FDI Regulation also 
opens up the possibility of encouraging international cooperation on FDI screening by expressly stating that 
the Member States and the European Commission may also cooperate with other responsible authorities of 
(like-minded) third countries. 
 146 Directive 2002/21/EC of the European Parliament and the Council of 7 March 2002 on a common regulatory 
framework for electronic communications networks and services (Framework Directive) OJ L.108/33 of 24 
April 2002. 
 147 See Framework Directive, Articles 3(2) and 3(3), Recital 11. 
 148 Actions have been brought against Members States such as Poland, Germany, Italy, Bulgaria, Latvia, 
Lithuania, Slovakia, Slovenia, Romania, Cyprus, Luxembourg, Greece and the Netherlands. 
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• State shareholdings and the maintenance of control relationships in telecommunications 
operators (and business interests more generally in the sector). 
• The lack of objective conditions for the appointment of NRA senior personnel and the lack 
of clarity in terms of appointment directions. 
• Overlaps between the personnel of the telecommunications agency and other regulatory 
bodies.149 
• The lack of structural separation between regulatory functions and the management 
functions in operators. 
• Arbitrariness in appointments or dismissals of Chairmen of the NRA (i.e., excessive 
government discretion). 
• Unnecessary interference of the State in the exercise of an NRA’s discretionary powers of 
economic regulation, whether in terms of the scope of remedies to be mandated by the NRA 
beyond those remedies already expressly set forth in EU legislation, or in terms of the types 
of “markets” which it can subject to regulation.150 
As can be seen from the above list, the tendency within the EU has been to expand the scope of the 
notion of “independence” so that it even embraces actions which might run counter to the furtherance 
of EU mandates. Many outside the EU will feel that such action goes well beyond the idea of traditional 
notions of political and operational independence to avoid conflicts of interest. 
Building on the original requirements of the Framework Directive, the Directive establishing the 
European Electronic Communications Code (Recast) (“EECC”),151 which was adopted in December 
2018, lays down several provisions concerning the degree of independence that a Member State should 
guarantee to its NRAs “to ensure the impartiality of their decisions”. While Article 8 of the EECC also 
maintains that Member States shall guarantee such independence by providing that they are (i) legally 
distinct from, and (ii) functionally independent of, any natural or legal person providing electronic 
communications networks, equipment or services, it additionally provides that NRAs must be “in 
possession of all the necessary resources in terms of staffing, expertise and financial means, for the 
performance of their tasks”. That being said, there is still a certain degree of permissible control over 
NRAs by Member States, given that NRAs report back on an annual basis to their Member State 
governments, inter alia, on: 
                                                      
 149 Clearly, this issue should not be problematic if an integrated “super-regulator” is in place. Personnel overlaps 
do raise issues, however, where the respective agencies in question are supposed to be operating under clear, 
differentiated mandates. In an integrated agency, concerns would more likely arise as to the quality of 
decision-making of certain analytical standards adopted by NCAs and NRAs respectively become ‘blurred’ 
(although refer back to the earlier discussion on ‘regulatory antitrust). 
 150 See, for example, Case C-424/07 Commission v. Germany [2009] E.C.R. I-11431, where a successful 
infringement action was brought by the Commission against Germany because the latter limited inter alia 
the discretion of its NRA in the electronic communications sector by requiring the NRA not to regulate 
those markets considered to be “new” markets.  It was also problematic to have the NRA accord priority to 
a particular regulatory objective among a number of legitimate policy objectives in the analysis of such 
markets (this level of interference was said to be contrary to key policy directions set forth in the 
Framework Directive, the Access Directive and the Universal Service Directive). 
 151 Proposal for a Directive of the European Parliament and of the Council establishing the European Electronic 
Communications Code (Recast), COM/2016/0590 final. 
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i. the state of the electronic communications market; 
ii. the decisions they adopt; 
iii. their human and financial resources; and  
iv. how those resources are attributed, as well as on future plans.  
This level of oversight, however, should not be of such a nature as to influence their decision-making 
(especially as regards access and interconnection issues) and their role in the resolution of disputes. 
These are the types of functions which must be performed independently “both from the sector and 
from any external intervention or political pressure.” Any such external influence renders an NRA 
compromised in its ability “to act as [an NRA] under the regulatory framework.”152 
The EECC therefore reflects a comprehensive set of conditions which need to be satisfied by EU 
Member State NRAs in order not to jeopardise their independence, even when allowing for an 
appropriate degree of oversight by government authorities. The Commission’s track record in bringing 
infringement proceedings (see description above and Table 2 below) also suggests, however, that it is 
willing to take a very broad view of the types of issues that might affect the independence of an NRA 
in the telecommunications sector. Indeed, infringement actions brought against Member States that 
actions which impair the scope of an NRA’s discretion will be interpreted as constituting a challenge 
to that NRA’s independence, at least where that level of discretion has been conferred upon the NRA 
through an EU legal instrument. The breadth of this approach might be seen in many quarters to be too 
far-reaching outside the EU environment; this is because regulatory harmonization measures in the EU 
have the unique goal of creating an internal market, with and the institutional interplay between the 
various EU institutions and the different legal instruments being used to achieve regulatory policy goals. 
3. Energy Sector 
The requirement of independence is no less important in the administration of regulation in the energy 
sector, where national incumbent operators were historically owned and operated by government 
bodies. Having said that, the energy sector operates in a manner which takes into account a wide range 
of public policy concerns, which has a tendency to modify a ‘pure’ economic approach to regulation. 
Thus, where the critical interventions in that sector consist of the structural and functional separation of 
retail and wholesale functions, NRAs in the energy sector arguably have a more limited role to play in 
terms of ‘pure’ economic regulation than their telecommunications NRA counterparts, while at the same 
time intervention occurs in areas which have clear social and environmental implications. In such 
circumstances, the analysis required to determine whether an operational conflict of interest exists 
becomes much more complex. 
At EU level, the prescriptions designed to ensure independence and to avoid NRA conflicts of interest 
in the sector have been strengthened incrementally, largely in response to shifts in economic regulation 
which demanded ever-growing sensitivity to independent decision-making. 
While Regulation No. 1228/2003 in the 2nd Energy Package, for example, did not provide any express 
provisions as regards the need for NRA’s independence, accompanying Directives 2003/54/EC and 
2003/55/EC (covering electricity and gas respectively) establish that Member States shall ensure that 
regulatory authorities shall be wholly independent from the interests of the electricity/gas industries 
(respectively Articles 23 and 25 of those Directives). Thus, the concept of independence under the 2nd 
Energy Package is tackled by reference to concerns stemming from the close ties between the NRA and 
                                                      
 152 See Recital 37, EECC. 
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private operators, rather than with respect to the relationship between the NRA and Member State in 
question. 
The 3rd Energy package adopted in 2009 takes the concept of independence one step further by 
specifying that the NRA must be legally distinct and functionally independent of “any other public or 
private entity”153 and must be responsible for staff and persons responsible for its management. Thus, 
the NRA in the energy sector must: (i) act independently from any market interest; and (ii) must not 
seek or take direct instructions from any government or other public or private entity when carrying out 
the regulatory tasks. 
Furthermore, in order to preserve the independence of the NRA, Member States shall ensure that: 
a) the NRA can take autonomous decisions, independently from any political body, and has 
separate annual budget allocations, with autonomy in the implementation of the allocated 
budget, and adequate human and financial resources to carry out its duties; and 
b) the members of the board of the NRA or, in the absence of a board, the NRA’s top management, 
are appointed for a fixed term of five up to seven years, renewable once. 
Finally, similar to the situation which prevails in the telecommunications sector, the Commission took 
infringement proceedings against Germany with respect to measures that deprived the German NRA of 
full discretion in the setting of network tariffs and other terms and conditions of access to networks and 
the ‘balancing’ of services, given that many of the terms and conditions of tariffs had been to a large 
extent already laid down in detailed regulations adopted by the Federal Government.154 
These requirements are without prejudice to close cooperation, as appropriate, taking place with other 
relevant national authorities or to general policy guidelines issued by the Government that are not 
related to the regulatory powers and duties listed under Article 37 or Article 41 of Directives 
2009/72/EC or 2009/73/EC respectively, namely: (i) fixing or approving transmission or distribution 
tariffs or their methodologies; and (ii) reporting annually on their activity and the fulfilment of their 
duties to the relevant authorities of the Member State in question.155 
Lavrijssen156 contends that, in the field of energy law, Member States have been reluctant to grant the 
adequate discretionary powers and level of independence to NRAs, both of which are necessary for 
them – whether acting individually or through their pan-European representative body, ACER – to 
realise the transition to a low carbon energy system within the EU as part of the recently adopted “clean 
air” initiative at EU level. In a Member State such as the Netherlands, for example, the levels of 
independence and discretion envisaged for an NRA tend to be seen to cut across national constitutional 
principles, including fundamental notions of democracy and legality. Lavrijssen feels, however, that 
such prima facie conflicting principles between the EU and its Member States are reconcilable where 
the exercise of powers is subject to adequate checks and balances at both EU and national levels. 
                                                      
 153 Article 35 of Directive 2009/72/EC (electricity); see also Article 39 of Directive 2009/73/EC (gas). 
 154 Commission v. Germany (Infringement Action No. 20142285 of 28 April 2016). 
 155 The recast Renewable Energy Directive (EU) 2018/2001, the Energy Efficiency Directive 2018/2002 and the 
Energy Union and Climate Action Governance Regulation (EU) 2018/1999 (i.e., the “Renewable Energy 
Package”), do not add anything to the existing specifications ensuring independence. 
 156 See Lavrijssen S., “Independence, Regulatory Competences and the Accountability of National Regulatory 
Authorities in the EU”, TILEC Discussion Paper, November 2018, at pp. 1-16. 
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4. Rail Sector 
Within the EU, the latest phase of rail sector liberalization insists upon the maintenance of independence 
of railway undertakings and of infrastructure managers from Member States (specified in terms of the 
need to control their own assets, budgets and accounts). This independence will, in turn, influence 
whether the railway undertaking can be managed according to the performance parameters which apply 
to commercial companies for the provision of efficient and appropriate service provision.157 
NRAs in the rail sector must thus be in a position to act independently in terms of their organisational, 
functional, hierarchical and decision-making capabilities. To this end, the rail sector NRA must be 
legally distinct and independent from any other public or private entity (as in the case of an NRA in the 
more advanced liberalised sectors such as electronic communications and energy), and must have the 
necessary organizational capacity to fulfil its tasks, both in terms of human and material resources. In 
addition, its decisions are subject to judicial review and need to be published (although the standard of 
judicial review is not specified in EU legislation).158 
5. Airports 
In the aviation sector, the independence of airport coordinators is set forth in Article 4 of Council 
Regulation (EEC) No. 95/93.159 According to the EFTA Court, that requirement of independence is 
framed in terms of the need to ensure that “neither the authorities of the [Member State] concerned nor 
any other party can unduly influence the coordinator before, during and after the allocation process”.160 
One needs to question whether the caveat of “unduly” before the word “influence” is based on the 
common law origins of that adverb (as with the expression “undue discrimination”) or whether it has 
some more profound significance insofar as it considers that independence cannot be absolute given the 
number of checks and balances imposed on the actions of airport coordinators, especially in terms of 
accountability obligations such as respect for the rights of the defence.161 
While there is no equivalent regulation of allocations in the context of ports, competition for maritime 
space has highlighted the need for the management of EU waters to be more coherent.  Accordingly, 
the concept of Maritime Spatial Planning (‘MSP’) works across borders and is designed to ensure that 
human activity at sea (including the regularization of maritime routes and traffic flows) takes place in 
an efficient, safe and sustainable manner. 162   The MSP system is administered by “competent 
authorities” designated by each Member State. 163   Beyond this high level regulatory activity, 
                                                      
 157 Refer to Article 4 of Directive 2012/34/EU of 21 November 2012 establishing a single European railway area 
(“SERA”). See also Article 5 of SERA. 
 158 Refer especially to Articles 55 and 56 of SERA. Refer to Article 56 (10) of SERA as regards the availability 
of judicial review. 
 159 Regulation of 18 January 1993 on common rules for the allocation of slots at Community airports. 
 160 Case E-18/14 Wow air v. Icelandic Competition Authority & Ors., Judgment of 10 December 2014. 
 161 See Wils, op. cit., at p. 11. 
 162 Refer to Directive 2014/89 EU of 23 July 2014 establishing a framework for maritime spatial planning, OJ 
L 257/135 of 28 August 2014.  See Article 4 and Recital 3 of Directive 2014/89 EU.  See also Article 8. 
 163 Refer to Article 13 and the Annex to Directive 2014/89 EU on “Competent Authorities”, which do not refer 
to the concept of “independence” in terms of the legal status or the membership of the relevant competent 
authority. 
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intervention is largely left to NCAs, which have long applied the “essential facilities doctrine” where 
discriminatory access or the denial of access to port facilities has been at issue.164 
6. Data Protection 
European policymakers have taken the view that the importance of achieving independence is at its 
most compelling when the protection of a European citizen’s personal data is at issue. Thus, when 
exercising their powers of overview under the recently implemented General Data Protection 
Regulation (GDPR), 165  the standard that has been satisfied over the years is that of “complete 
independence”.166 Recourse to such a high standard probably reflects the sanctity accorded at EU level 
to data privacy issues, but also their vulnerability to being circumvented by national authorities on the 
basis of politically inspired ‘security’ reasons. In order to implement this absolute standard of 
independence, further details are provided regarding the requirements that affect the various 
organizational, financial and personnel-related issues relevant to the independence of authorities 
responsible for data protection issues.167 
Under Article 28(1) of the former EU Data Protection Directive 95/46/EC, data protection authorities 
were also obliged to act “with complete independence in exercising the functions entrusted to them”. In 
a series of infringement proceedings opened by the European Commission against Germany and Austria 
for the infringement of EU law, the Court of Justice confirmed that the legal requirement of 
“independence” could not be satisfied where, for example: 
• the managing member of the Authority is an official of the administration subject to supervision; 
• where the Authority was integrated with a departments of the administration; and  
• where the Government has an unconditional right to retrieve information covering all aspects of 
the work of the Authority. 
                                                      
 164 Unlike the airport environment, the frequency of arrivals and departures for aircraft is not as high, and the 
implications of cargo vessels being “parked” in areas outside the immediate port facilities are not as critical 
in terms of economic impact. 
 165 See Regulation 2016/679 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 27 April 2016 on the protection 
of natural persons with regard to the processing of personal data and on the free movement of such data. Refer 
especially to Articles 51-54 of the GDPR. 
 166 See Article 52 of the GDPR. 
167  With regards to the independence of data protection NRAs more generally, it is worth considering the 
Brazilian experience. Notwithstanding the existence of an NRA in this sector in Brazil, only two months after 
the enactment of Law n. 13,709/2018 (the Brazilian General Data Protection Law), the legislation was 
changed by a provisional measure (a Presidential Act with the force of law), in order to modify the 
institutional design of the Data Protection Authority. In particular, the Authority lost its formal independence, 
being linked directly to the President and having its senior officers nominated by the President. This model 
was said to have been primarily chosen for budgetary reasons, in order to avoid new public expenditure. 
Although senior civil servants shall continue to retain job stability – there are specific situations in which they 
can be removed – the institutional design is far from that of a truly independent NRA. The provisional 
measure can still be modified by the Brazilian Congress but, as it currently stands, it clearly puts Brazil on a 
very different track to the European Union. See Mari A., ‘Brazilian Government to Create Data Protection 
Authority’ (ZDNet) <https://www.zdnet.com/article/brazilian-government-to-create-data-protection-
authority/>. 
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However, the Court of Justice held that the Authority’s independence was not compromised by the lack 
of a separate budget.168 In another case brought against Hungary, the Court of Justice confirmed that 
the requirement of independence compelled Member States to not terminate prematurely the tenure of 
the data protection supervisor.169 
Under the GDPR, the requirement of independence of data protection authorities has been expanded, 
so that the members of the relevant Authorities “remain free from external influence, whether direct or 
indirect, and shall neither seek nor take instructions from anybody”, while “each supervisory authority 
chooses and has its own staff which shall be subject to the exclusive direction of the member or members 
of the supervisory authority concerned” and will have “separate, public annual budgets, which may be 
part of the overall state or national budget” which will be “provided with the human, technical and 
financial resources, premises and infrastructure necessary for the effective performance of its tasks and 
exercise of its powers”. Court of Justice precedent is also reflected in the GDPR, including the 
observation that financial control of a Data Protection Authority’s actions by the Member State in 
question shall not affect its independence.170  
7. Regional Fora 
Somewhat surprisingly, the “independence” characteristic has also been extended to the respective 
bodies representing all EU-based NRAs in the telecommunications and energy sectors where the NRAs 
act as a collective forum (see discussion in Section VI below). According to Jordana & Triviño-Salazar: 
“the functional and political dynamics that have informed the creation at EU agencies … appear to 
have produced an institutional design that in most cases allow agencies to gain some independence 
from their public stakeholder, but also requires significant levels of accountability of them. In fact, the 
independence and accountability mechanisms have drawn important attention in the study of EU 
agencies. Since their institutional designs vary considerably, we can assume that some agencies 
replicate the design of their national counterparts by enjoying independence from their principals.”171 
Thus, in the field of energy, Regulation (EC) No. 713/2009 currently establishes that:  
i. the Administrative Board (“AB”) of the Agency for the Cooperation of Energy Regulators 
(“ACER”) should act independently and objectively in the public interest and should not seek 
nor follow political instructions (Article 17); and 
ii. ACER should have the necessary powers to perform its regulatory functions in an efficient, 
transparent, reasoned and, above all, independent manner. In particular, the Board of 
Regulators should: 
• avoid conflicts of interests; and  
• not seek or follow instructions or accept recommendations from: (i) the Government of a 
Member State; (ii) the Commission; or (iii) another public or private entity (Article 18). 
                                                      
 168 See Case C-614/10 Commission v Austria ECLI:EU:C:2012:631; Case C-518/07 Commission v Germany 
ECLI:EU:C:2010:125. 
 169 See Case C-288/12 Commission v Hungary ECLI:EU:C:2014:237. 
 170 Refer to Article 52(1) to (6) GDPR. 
 171 Jordana J. & Triviño-Salazar J., European Union Agencies: A transnational logic?, Paper 2017/54, Institut 
Barcelona Estudis Internacionals (IBEI), at p. 10. 
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Under the recently adopted “Renewable Energy Package”, certain changes will align the workings of 
ACER to the more standard agency governance model used for EU Member State NRAs.172 
In the field of electronic communications, the pan-European regulatory body for NRAs in the sector is 
known as BEREC, 173  which was formed in 2010. 174  Its mission is to ensure the independent and 
consistent application of EU harmonisation policies by developing best practices that can be shared 
among its NRA members, in cooperation with the European Commission (upon request or on its own 
initiative.) 
BEREC is mandated to perform its allocated tasks “independently, impartially and transparently”. In 
order to guarantee that independence, members of the Management Board needed to undertake that they 
are not subject to any direct or indirect interest that is capable of prejudicing their independence, and 
need to recuse themselves from taking positions on issues where conflicts of interest arise.175 These 
standards have been reinforced by an assurance that senior positions would be open to a transparent 
hiring procedure. However, the independence of an individual NRA representative turns on their ability 
to represent the “interest of the Union” in parallel to their own NRAs from which they are drawn. 
Moreover, financial independence is based on the existence of the NRA’s own budget. Nevertheless, 
much of BEREC’s budget is drawn from the European Commission. With respect, the links between 
BEREC’s fortunes and European Commission funding and the pursuit of EU (i.e., synonymous with 
the goals pursued by the Commission) somewhat stretches the concept of true “independence” beyond 
its natural meaning.176 The existence of such a pan-European body such as BEREC, which is so closely 
tied to the European Commission in terms of the Commission’s oversight of its deliberations and its 
funding, would almost certainly be seen to be compromising its independence were it not the fact that 
it genesis is designed to facilitate the pursuit of “European” harmonization goals.  The pursuit of these 
goals transcends the idea of national regulatory capture, which will inevitably be seen to be the more 
pernicious public policy failing. 
Some of these excesses have been addressed in the recently adopted EECC, which emphasises the 
importance of maintaining the independence of NRA representations and identifying ‘regulatory 
capture’ as a policy mischief which the concept of “independence” needs to address.177 
8. Conclusions 
The history of liberalization has gone hand in hand with the perceived need to ensure independence in 
agency decision-making and the insulation of that decision-making from actual and potential conflicts 
of interest. As discussed above, the design of regulatory frameworks in which NCAs and NRAs operate 
have incorporated structural and organizational guarantees in order to insulate these agencies from 
                                                      
 172 For example, according to the proposed recast of the Regulation establishing ACER, legislative proposal 
2016/0378(COD), ACER will have regulatory oversight over future “Regional Coordination Centers”, a 
regional cooperation mechanism for Transmission System Operators to remedy the negative effects of 
fragmented and uncoordinated national actions. 
 173 The Body of European Regulators for Electronic Communications (BEREC) was established by Regulation 
(EU) 2018/1971 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 11 December 2018, OJ L.321/11 of 17 
December 2018 (amending Regulation (EU) 2015/2120 and repealing Regulation (EC) No. 1211/2009). 
 174 With Regulation (EC) No. 1211/2009, OJ L 337/1 of 18 December 2009, BEREC replaced the European 
Regulators Group for electronic communications networks and services. 
 175 See Article 42 Regulation (EU) 2018/1971. 
 176 See Article 24 of Regulation (EU) 2018/1971. 
 177 Refer to Article 8 of the EECC, op. cit. 
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undue external influence, thereby allowing them to establish their enforcement priorities and to pursue 
longer term goals with autonomy.  
However, the prevention of conflict of interests and the insulation of NRAs from undue influence does 
not (and cannot) mean a disconnect from constituencies and stakeholders that are involved in the 
regulatory process. 178  Indeed, there is little doubt that the additional policies of participation, 
transparency and accountability – including the possibility for judicial review – have improved the 
legitimacy of the way in which NRAs exercise their competences. Furthermore, as Lavrijssen 
comments: “these elements enhance the base of support among stakeholders about decisions of the 
NRAs. In this light, the NRA’s functioning can be said to be (partially) legitimized through legal and 
traditional democratic accountability mechanisms, but also through other types of control mechanisms, 
such as public participation.”179 It is undeniable that true independence, as perceived by stakeholders 
and citizens alike, has as much to do with whether there exists some mechanism by which those parties 
can challenge and contribute to NRA decision-making, as well as the ultimate accountability of the 
NRA to the independent courts of a country.180 In turn, NRAs are often obliged by law to consult with 
stakeholders and to embark upon appropriate regulatory action where circumstances so justify. In turn, 
this transparency in the context of a stakeholder consultation mechanism means that a regulatory 
Decision is arguably less likely to be challenged before a national court.  Conversely, the merits of an 
NRA Decision are more susceptible to appropriate review by the European Commission, thereby 
improving the effectiveness of EU law.  By being subject to these requirements to take appropriate 
action, NRAs are thereby subject to a series of checks and balances on their behaviour.181 
As is well summarised by Lavrijssen: “The European rules concerning market oversight are 
increasingly moving toward a checks-and-balances approach, in which a mix of political, public and 
judicial accountability mechanisms are put in place to secure that independent regulatory authorities 
exercise their powers in a rightful and reasonable manner.” This effectively means that the European 
requirement of independence of NRAs and NCAs has evolved into a multi-layered system.  That system 
brings together formal guarantees, transparency requirements, openness to participation of different 
stakeholders, and judicial review as part of the full spectrum of accountability measures which, in turn, 
reinforces the importance of the NRA being independent. 
However, as that author also notes: “The influence of European laws has grown far beyond what could 
have been foreseen by many politicians or academics about a decade ago.”182  Accordingly, while many 
of the measures introduced over time might still be coherent in an EU institutional and policy context, 
they have elements which do not lend themselves to ready adoption by nations outside the EU which 
                                                      
178  For a discussion about the independence of NCAs and legitimacy, see Townley, op. cit., Chapter 3.  
 179 See Lavrijssen, TILEC Discussion Paper, op. cit., at p. 15. 
 180 In this regard, the novel introduction (at the time in 2002) of a requirement that NRA decisions in the 
electronic communications sector should be reviewed “on the merits” (rather than a mere standard of 
administrative law review), is a very strong confirmation of this principle. See Article 4 of the Framework 
Directive and Article 31 of the EECC. 
 181 Under Article 56 (7) of SERA, for example, railway sector NRAs within the EU are obliged to consult with 
industry stakeholders (more specifically, user representatives of rail/freight and passenger transport services) 
at least every two years in order to determine the competitive state of the market. This is to be contrasted with 
the mandatory obligations on NRAs under the current regulatory framework in the electronic communication 
sector to conduct market analyses for the purpose of import the ex ante regulation every three years, extended 
to every five years under the new framework due to come into effect in December 2020. Refer to Articles 14 
and 15 of the Framework Directive and to Articles 63 and 64 of the EECC. 
 182 See Lavrijssen, TILEC Discussion Paper, op. cit., at p. 16. 
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do not have comparable market and political integration cultures. Yet, at least at the more fundamental 
level of addressing conflicts of interests and avoiding regulatory capture from both private entities and 
political actors, the discussion on independence within the EU remains relevant to other jurisdictions, 
many of which have been using similar tools to guarantee independence.  
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TABLE 2: CHALLENGES TO LACK OF “INDEPENDENCE” OF NRAS IN THE TELECOMS SECTOR 
Country Citation Date of action Allegations 
Cyprus Infringement No.: 20052079 13 October 2005 Lack of adequate safeguards to ensure that the NRA is legally distinct from and functionally 
independent of all telecoms operators. The Minister of Communications & Works, as well as 
the Council of Ministers, retain regulatory functions and corporate control over the telecoms 
incumbent.  
Germany  Infringement No.: 20062559 02 May 2007  German legislation impaired the independent decision-making of the NRA in the electronic 
communications sector through measures requiring the NRA not to regulate markets 
considered to be “new” markets. In doing so it, limited the NRA’s discretion to regulate such 
markets.  
Bulgaria Infringement No.: 20072428 28 November 2007 Board of telecoms incumbent consists of the Chairperson of another Authority with some 
regulatory competences - the State Agency for Information Technology & Communications. 
This raises a conflict of interest that may jeopardise the independence of the NRA. 
Luxembourg Infringement No.: 20072429 31 January 2008 Public officials exercise both regulatory functions and management functions for an operator. 
(The Commission closed the case following the re-organisation of the Media & 
Communications Department, ensuring the structural separation of regulatory and 
management functions.) 
Poland Infringement No.: 20062505; 
Case C-309/08 Commission v 
Poland 
11 July 2008 The State has extensive shareholdings in numerous telecoms undertakings. Simultaneously, 
the NRA is appointed by the Prime Minister, who is entitled freely to disband it at any time 
without reasons. A lack of provisions defining the duration of the term of the NRA and an 
absence of detailed conditions for its disbandment results in a situation of political 
dependence, leading to a risk that State-owned operators will be treated preferentially. 
Latvia Infringement No.: 20082257 18 September 2008 The Telecoms Ministry performs certain regulatory functions concerning numbering, 
frequency management and universal service while exercising corporate control in state-
owned telecoms companies, thereby potentially undermining the impartiality of their 
regulatory decisions.  
Lithuania Infringement No.: 20082259 18 September 2008 The Telecoms Ministry performs certain regulatory functions concerning numbering, 
frequency management and universal service, while exercising corporate control in State-
owned telecoms companies, thereby potentially undermining the impartiality of regulatory 
decisions.  
Romania Infringement No.: 20082366 29 January 2009 Reorganisation of NRA through emergency legislation in 2006, thereby preventing a Court 
Order to re-install the NRA’s President which had been removed by the Prime Minister in 
2005. 
Slovakia Infringement No.: 20092132 14 May 2009 The Parliament dismissed the NRA Chairman on 4 December 2008. The procedure followed 
was not compatible with the legal requirement of regulatory independence because such 
interference risked undermining the impartiality of the NRA.  
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Country Citation Date of action Allegations 
Romania Infringement No.: 20092288 29 October 2009 Infringement proceedings taken over the independence of the NRA, with a failure to ensure 
that members of the NRA had no business interest in the telecoms market, thereby neglecting 
the effective structural separation of the regulatory function from corporate control. 
Slovenia Infringement No.: 20102026 18 March 2010 Rules that permit the government to remove the Director of the NRA confer too much 
discretion on the government, potentially undermining his/her protection against political 
interference.  
Italy  Infringement No.: 20122138 21 February 2013 Italian legislation reduced its NRA’s independence by imposing on the NRA a duty to impose 
on undertakings with significant market power the provision of “sufficiently unbundled 
offers”. In doing so, the NRA would be deprived of freedom to determine whether or not to 
impose obligations at all, or specifying the content of such obligations.  
Netherlands Infringement No.: 20124144 25 April 2013 Dutch government interferes with NRA’s independent decision-making on remedies by 
obliging NRA to impose prescribed measures without discretion: First, broadcasters subject to 
"must-carry obligations" are forced to offer for resale their television programmes, and the 
transmission service that carries them, at wholesale level at "cost-oriented" prices (to prevent 
undue profits). Second, the NRA must order companies found to have significant market 
power to resell their programmes to competitors at cost-oriented prices.  
Estonia Infringement No.: 20112143 30 May 2013 The Ministry of Economic Affairs & Communications carries out regulatory tasks over the 
allocation of radio frequencies and procedures for granting frequency authorisations. 
Simultaneously, it exercises control over the State-owned incumbent TV and radio broadcast 
network operator, which also provides telecoms services, resulting in a conflict of interest. 
Greece Infringement No.: 20162073 16 January 2016 Greek legislation reduces NRA’s independence and provides disproportionate penalties for the 
non-use of spectrum. 
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VI. Centralised versus localized enforcement 
The means by which ex ante and ex post enforcement regimes operate and interact is subject to a unique 
institutional dynamic in the EU, given the quasi-federal nature of the EU and the jurisdictional power-
sharing which occurs between the European Commission at the centre of a loose “federal” structure 
with the Member States at its periphery. The interaction between centre and periphery within the EU is 
complicated by a number of factors, all of which have some direct or incidental impact in the 
determination of how the agency structures are shaped. For example: 
1. According to the concept of subsidiarity,183 decision-making should occur at the level of authority 
which is most appropriately situated relative to the public policy mischief that needs to be 
addressed. Thus, sector-specific NRAs need to be able to exercise their decision-making at national 
level to take due account of local competitive market conditions.184 Similarly, the resolution of 
competition issues has, since 2003 (i.e., through Regulation 1/2003), been devolved in large 
measure to NCAs, which now account for over 85% of competition law enforcement in the EU. By 
contrast, the European Commission is best equipped to address regulatory issues which affect pan-
European markets, at least where they affect cross-border trade.185 
2. Where the goal of harmonisation is paramount, the overarching role of the Commission is either 
to have veto powers over an NRA’s ex ante decision-making186 or to be able to establish important 
precedents at EU level which will govern the legality of emerging commercial practices. Similarly, 
in the area of remedies, Member States must not enforce laws which have a negative impact on the 
effectiveness of EU law.187 
3. European Commission Decisions are subject to appeals to the European Courts and are 
challengeable under the general administrative law standard of “manifest error”, it being generally 
understood that the Commission is subject to a wide margin of discretion in the interpretation and 
                                                      
 183  Defined in Article 5 TEU. Specifically, it is the principle whereby the EU does not take action (other than 
with respect to those cases falling within its exclusive competence), unless it is more effective than action 
taken at national, regional or local level. It is closely linked to the principle of proportionality, which requires 
that any action taken by the EU should not exceed what is necessary to achieve the objective of the Treaties. 
 184  In telecommunications, NRAs impose asymmetric market obligations respectively under Articles 14 and 15 
of the Framework Directive (now, under Articles 63 and 64 of the EECC) whereas, in the field of energy, 
NRAs act cooperating within the framework provided by the Agency for the Cooperation of Energy 
Regulators (ACER), as laid down by Article 7 of Regulation (EC) No 713/2009 of the European Parliament 
and of the Council (OJ L 211 of 14 August 2009). 
 185  The enforcement of competition rules within the EU occurs under two tiers of enforcement, namely: large 
matters enforced by the Commission where significant trans-border elements are involved; and enforcement 
by NCAs of more localised or national issues. This is a byproduct of the debate that occurred in the 1990s 
that is associated with the enactment of the Maastricht Treaty. 
 186  For example, in the field of electronic communications, refer respectively to Articles 7 of the Framework 
Directive and 32 of the EECC. 
 187  The doctrine of “effectiveness” has been declared by some authors to be a general principle of EU law and 
therefore a part of the primary law of the EU. See Tridimas T., General Principles of EU Law, Oxford 2006, 
at p. 418 ff. Refer also to Stepkowski L., “The notion of effectiveness in the law of the European Union”, 
Studie nad Autorystaryzmen I Totalitayzmen (2016) 38, No. 2, pp. 81-96. 
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application of economic evidence when arriving at its Decision.188 By contrast, the trend has been 
increasing at Member State level for the decisions of NRAs to be reviewed “on the merits”,189 with 
the standard of legal review of competition law Decisions adopted by NCAs turning largely on the 
standards of review developed under the legal traditions of the individual Member States. In 
addition, anything falling short of an exercise of a European Commission veto over an NRA 
decision in the context of a telecommunications ruling is not considered to be a legal “act” under 
the EU legal order, and hence is not susceptible to judicial review.190  These conflicting standards 
of legal review, when combined with the uncertainties created by the centralisation or (as the case 
may be) of decision-making has the potential to create a patchwork of enforcement which varies as 
between sectors, legal instruments and Member States.191 
4. The inherent delays in moving from policy debate on the direction of EU policy to the stage when 
EU law is implemented effectively in the domestic legal orders of the Member States means that 
the adoption of new laws can take years (especially when given effect through a Directive). This 
has resulted in the increasing use of “soft law” legal instruments192 at Community level, pursuant 
to which regulatory policy can be pursued relatively quickly. While the use of such soft law 
instruments allows the Commission to adapt existing legal precedents to technological change more 
                                                      
 188  Refer to discussion of EU case law in Laguna de Paz J.C., “Judicial Review in European Competition Law”, 
see https://www.law.ox.ac.uk/sites/.../judicial_review_in_european_competition_law.pdf. 
 189  Refer respectively to Articles 4 of the Framework Directive and 31 of the EECC. 
 190  Refer to discussion in Kovács A., Táth T. and Forgács A., “The Legal Effects of European Soft Law and their 
Recognition at National Administrative Courts” (2014), ELTE Law Journal, pp. 53-70. 
 191 The standard of judicial review can also have a material impact upon appetite of an NCA to initiate 
infringement proceedings or to block a merger. Thus, in the United States, the full review of the Courts de 
novo of all DoJ or FTC Decisions undoubtedly imposes a severe constraint on enforcement strategies by 
either of those two competition agencies in pursuing novel theories of harm. The natural byproduct of this 
standard of review is that US antitrust authorities are less inclined to risk being overturned by courts on 
appeal.  By contrast, the European Commission feels less constrained in its enforcement policy because it is 
subject to a review by the European Courts on the basis of the standard of ‘manifest error’. In France, for 
example, merger review occurs de novo (on the assumption that engaging in a merger scenario is a ‘neutral’ 
act which carries no presumption or inference of illegality), while infringement decisions of the NCA are 
reviewed on appeal by the Conseil d’Etat under an administrative law standard of review. In Singapore, a 
separate administrative body has jurisdiction to hear appeals from merger decisions of the local NCA de novo. 
 192 Primary legal instruments in the EU legal order consist of the EU Treaties, Regulations and Directives. The 
provisions in such legal instruments have the force of law as a matter of general application, whereas 
Decisions are legally binding only on the addresses of those Decisions. However, in order to address 
regulatory policy initiatives which need to adapt to changes in technology, reflect different enforcement 
strategies, or to illustrate new administrative precedents, it may be important for EU policymakers to act with 
the sort of speed which is not characteristic of the legislative process that produces the instruments of primary 
law. In such situations, “soft law” in the form of Guidelines or Recommendations may be adopted by the 
Commission relatively quickly, usually after some form of stakeholder consultation deemed appropriate for 
the subject-matter. While technically speaking not binding in proceedings before a national court, the 
adoption of such soft law instruments is generally understood to bind the Commission in its decision-making. 
National judges in many Member States (especially those in the Mediterranean Member States) attach 
significant weight to those soft instruments which renders them virtually indistinguishable from primary legal 
instruments in terms of their legal effect. See Chalmers D., Davies G. & Monti G., European Union Law, 3rd 
ed., CUP, 2014. 
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effectively and quickly, they also lack the force of binding law on national judges; this means that 
their persuasiveness in a national EU Member State context can vary significantly.193  
5. The institutional “cocktail” created by the above-listed factors means that there has been a growing 
importance attached to the building of consensus among Member States through the creation of 
pan-European institutions, which bring together the respective sector-specific NRAs into an 
environment where “best practices” can be shared and a common approach can be developed that 
is directed towards the resolution of common analytical problems.194  
The creation of pan-European regulators falling short of formal EU agencies with executive powers 
established under the Treaties (and, by analogy, other regional organizations in other parts of the world), 
raises a series of questions about:  
• whether these bodies can legitimately engage in the making of policy choices rather than merely 
advising on technical issues; 
• whether these bodies are democratically accountable; and  
• the extent to which such bodies are subject to effective judicial review. 
In many instances, pan-European groupings of NRA representatives increasingly play a role which is 
very close to that of an ‘agency’, although not subject to the same level of judicial review that one 
would expect of a true European agency. 
For example, Eberlein & Grande195 identify a dilemma for EU regulatory policy, insofar as despite the 
rising need for uniform EU-level rules in the internal market, the bulk of formal powers and the 
institutional focus of regulatory activities continues to be located at the national level, which results in 
a supranational regulatory “gap”. The authors contend that this gap is partly filled by transnational 
regulatory networks. Under certain conditions, such regulatory networks therefore provide a back route 
to the informal Europeanization of government regulation. 
In the view of Jordana & Triviño-Salazar: “Considering agencies as being embedded in the multi-level 
coordination scheme turns them into actors whose potential is realized depending on their ability to 
interact and develop their own capacities. This position prompts important questions on the role of 
agencies: How do agencies perceive their role in the overall EU governance scheme: as a clear 
mandate to offer technical information and influence decisions on specific policy areas? Or do they see 
themselves as a melting pot of different interests and services that force them to strictly abide by this 
mandate?”196 Given the proliferation of such agencies over the past fifteen years and the different roles 
which they play, the questions posed by those authors remain unanswered, as agencies assume different 
roles in a multi-layered governance system, acting at different intensities in each of these layers, through 
a web of institutional relationships at national, multilateral and supra-national levels.  
                                                      
 193  Thus, at the risk of generalization, a Member State judge is more likely to accord great weight to a “soft law” 
pronouncement by the European Commission than would a UK, Swedish or Dutch judge, which would have 
a tendency to focus on its actual legal effect in the domestic legal order. See also Joined Cases C-392/04 and 
C-422/04 i-21 Germany GmbH and Arcor AG v. Germany (2006), ECLI:EU:C:2006:586. 
 194  The most important of the pan-European institutions that have been established to assist the Commission in 
its role of achieving harmonisation and the creation of an internal market are listed overleaf in Table 3.  
 195 See Eberlein B. & Grande E., “Beyond Delegation: Transnational Regulatory Regimes and the EU Regulatory 
State”, Journal of European Public Policy (2005), Vol. 12(1), at pp. 89-112. 
 196 Jordana & Triviño-Salazar, op. cit., at p. 21. 
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Pan-European sectoral regulators197 
Given the many pan-European agencies that have been formed over the past decade and the many and 
varied roles which they play, some scholars have already sought to classify such agencies by relevance 
to certain analytical categories. Thus, there is much truth to the statement that: “Scholars studying EU 
agencies have explicitly or implicitly followed different approaches, most of which are supported by 
two distinct theoretical backgrounds: either emphasizing the intergovernmental nature of agencies or 
considering the relevance at a supranational logic in their development.”198 
Accordingly, the driving force behind the creation of the pan-European body of NRAs in the electronic 
communications sector, BEREC, is the perceived need for a forum through which common experiences 
can be shared with respect to a wide range of policy issues that are susceptible to rapid technical change 
and that might require potential new directions in enforcement. As such, they require the forging of 
consensus as the driving force behind the creation of a “Europeanization” of regulation which strives 
to achieve workable measures of harmonization. A good example of the harmonization efforts of 
BEREC can be seen in the guidelines for the application of Net Neutrality rules, where the pan-
European body has been deeply involved since 2010, issuing Guidelines in 2016,199 and a report on the 
evaluation of application of these guidelines.200  
Of course, as the Net Neutrality example shows, efforts towards implementation of complex policies at 
national and supranational levels are heavily dependent on the eventual constraints imposed by judicial 
review. Indeed, the debates around net neutrality first started and flourished in the US, but the policy 
was later reversed, with the interplay between the Courts and the telecommunications NRA (the FCC) 
undermining the original rules and ultimately resulting in their abandonment. By contrast, in Europe, 
the doctrine has been held together by the interaction of regulatory and legal review institutions, with 
NRAs, BEREC and the Courts developing and enforcing standards in a mutually supportive way.  
Because of the importance of BEREC in developing “best practices”, it also plays a relatively unique 
role in the shaping of individual NRA Decisions, which are the cornerstone of the EU regulatory 
framework in the electronic communications sector. As has been pointed out elsewhere, the importance 
of the regional role to be played by BEREC in the direction of future economic regulation in the 
electronic communications sector has been increased dramatically under the newly adopted European 
Electronic Communications Code (EECC). Under the EECC, BEREC will be entrusted with a major 
policy development role which goes well beyond its current responsibilities.201 
In the energy sector, the analogous role to BEREC is played by ACER which, while also built upon a 
culture of sharing of best practices among its NRA members, is arguably more necessary in acting to 
                                                      
 197 Refer to list of regulatory bodies in Table 3. 
 198 Jordana & Triviño-Salazar, op. cit., citing Egeberg publications from 2015 and 2017, at p. 2. 
199  See “BEREC Launches Net Neutrality Guidelines”, at 
https://berec.europa.eu/eng/news_and_publications/whats_new/3958-berec-launches-net-neutrality-
guidelines. 
   The guidelines are available at 
https://berec.europa.eu/eng/document_register/subject_matter/berec/regulatory_best_practices/guidelines/6
160-berec-guidelines-on-the-implementation-by-national-regulators-of-european-net-neutrality-rules. 
 200  See Report on the Implementation of Regulation (EU) 2015/2120 and BEREC Net Neutrality Guidelines’, at 
https://berec.europa.eu/eng/document_register/subject_matter/berec/reports/8256-report-on-the-
implementation-of-regulation-eu-20152120-and-berec-net-neutrality-guidelines. The full range of BEREC 
working papers, guidance notes, etc., can be accessed via its website. 
 201 Alexiadis & Shortall, op. cit., at p. 113. 
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perfect a true common market in energy trading. Unlike telecommunications markets, which have 
remained persistently national in scope at both retail and wholesale levels, upstream energy markets 
display real signs of pan-European geographic scope.  
In terms of ensuring the creation of an internal market for electricity, ACER plays an important role. It 
does so by monitoring whether there are sufficient interconnectors and identifying their lack of 
utilization, having developed sophisticated algorithms to ensure that there is sufficient cross-border 
interconnector capacity available on the market. In addition, ACER plays an important role in achieving 
harmonization by ensuring that national rules are compatible with its EU Network Codes. 
ACER’s relatively unique importance in forging an European electricity market is also reflected in its 
institutional design. For example, it is constituted by a Board of Regulators (drawn from the NRAs), an 
Administrative Board (which deals with budgets and related issues), and a Board of Appeals, which 
acts as an arbitrator when the NRAs cannot agree on the application of a particular policy within a 
specified timeframe. 
ACER is thus principally focused on cross-border issues, and has achieved notable successes in terms 
of producing target models for electricity, gas hubs, over a dozen Network Codes, extensive annual 
monitoring of the European market (i.e., the so-called ACER-EEER Market Monitoring Report), and 
REMIT.202 
It is worthwhile noting that, in parallel with their participation in groups such as BEREC and ACER, 
NRAs within the EU also devote significant resources to two parallel organizations which bring together 
their senior decision-makers beyond the influence of the European Commission (i.e., the IRG and the 
CEER, respectively in the fields of electronic communications and energy). Those multi-NRA 
groupings allow the participating NRAs to speak freely and openly about their key common issues, but 
without concerns about reporting back to or consulting with the Commission or their own responsible 
national Ministries. Somewhat counter-intuitively, this very lack of transparency in operating 
                                                      
 202 As noted earlier, REMIT (the EU Regulation on Wholesale Energy Market Integrity and Transparency, 
Regulation No. 1227/2011), which came into effect in 2011 and which was implemented more 
comprehensively in 2014 (REMIT Implementing Regulation No. 1348/2014), establishes common EU-wide 
rules whose aim is to prevent abusive practices in wholesale energy markets and to enhance market 
transparency. The REMIT regime is, however, overseen by ACER, rather than by individual Member State 
NRAs in the energy sector. Under that regime, abusive practices are identified and defined as regards ‘market 
manipulation’ practices and insider trading practices, while a monitoring system is put in place for European 
energy markets.  In turn, NRAs have powers to enforce the rules, investigate problematic conduct and impose 
sanctions for the infringement of the rules. 
  ACER’s role is exemplified in the recent imposition of a fine on Energy Denmark as a result of an 
investigation commenced by Denmark’s Energy Regulatory Authority (the DUR) and referred to the Danish 
State Prosecutor for Serious Economic and International Crime. The case brought by DUR alleged that the 
defendant had hoarded capacity on the interconnectors for electricity by trading with its own affiliates on 10 
separate occasions in 2015. The defendant was charged a fine of approx. 100,000 Euros by the State 
Prosecutor, based on the finding that the capacity hoarding had generated (or had the potential of generating) 
misleading signals or artificial prices on the “intraday wholesale electricity market”. ACER welcomed this 
first decision adopted under the REMIT regulatory framework, given the fact that the efficient use of 
interconnectors across the EU is a critical element in the development of a single European electricity market. 
To this end, ACER has issued a guidance note on cross-zonal transmission capacity hoarding, which provides 
various examples of trading practices that could constitute “market manipulation” under the REMIT regime. 
(Refer to http://www.mondovisione.com/media-and-resources/news/acer-energi-danmark-fined-for-market-
manipulation-on-the-nordic-wholesale-elect/.) Refer also to Guidance Note 1/2018 of 22 March 2018 on the 
Application of Article 5 of REMIT on the Prohibition of Market Manipulation: Transmission Capacity 
Hoarding. 
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procedures arguably lends itself to greater “independence” (at least in one sense), albeit with virtually 
no countervailing responsibilities. 
ERA203 is the EU Agency for railways which is established to provide EU Member States and the 
Commission with sector-specific assistance in the development and implementation of the Single 
European Railway Area (SERA). Its task is to promote a harmonised approach to railway safety. To 
this end, it is responsible for deciding the technical and legal framework in order to enable the removal 
of technical barriers. It is also responsible for acting as the “system authority” for ERTMS 204 and 
telematics applications. It also plays a role in the improved accessibility and use of railway system 
information. Most importantly, however, it acts as a genuine European Authority under the 4th Railway 
Package in issuing vehicle (type) authorisations and simple safety certificates, while also playing a role 
in the improvement of the competitive position of the railway sector. In performing these tasks, ERA’s 
mission statement emphasizes the importance it places on stakeholder focus. 
By contrast, one can imagine that the work of the ERGP,205 the pan-European consultative organ of 
NRA postal regulators, might play an increasingly important role over time in seeking to forge an 
European market for postal services in a commercial environment where the cross-border delivery of 
parcels assumes ever greater importance. Created in 2015, the comparable body for water regulation, 
WAREG,206 is the most recent and informal of these pan-European regulatory bodies, and is essentially 
limited to the sharing of best practices; this function cannot be of as high importance as other sectors in 
achieving the harmonization goal, given the more limited and fragmented levels of competition 
available across the Member States with respect to the provision of water services.  
Other pan-European regulators include ENISA (European Union Agency for Network and Information 
Security)207 and EASA (European Union Aviation Safety Agency).208 These bodies resemble European 
agencies more than networks of NRAs. Their boards are composed of representatives of each Member 
State and other stakeholders, and they rely on professional staff. ENISA plays an advisory role to EU 
institutions and to Member States, with the aim of strengthening cyber-security in Europe. As for the 
agency responsible for civil aviation safety, EASA, besides playing an assistance role to the 
Commission, Member States and NRAs, it also plays the role of an active regulatory body by 
formulating opinions, conducting investigations and by performing tasks on behalf of Member States 
in order to fulfil obligations under international conventions.  
It is therefore clear that the various EU level agencies are characterized by very different characteristics, 
focuses of attention and policy missions. As has been expressed by two noted authors: “the basic 
principle behind the transnational dynamics is that agencies respond to multiple interactions based on 
the mandate, tasks and operations they perform, beyond the hierarchical principle that the 
intergovernmental and supranational perspectives assume. Within these transnational dynamics, the 
transgovernmental character is based on their composition, formed by representatives from EU 
                                                      
 203 See https://www.era.europa.eu. 
 204 The European Rail Traffic Management System (ERTMS) is a simple interoperable train control and 
command system in the EU. It is designed to enhance cross-border interoperability, thereby creating a 
seamless EU-wide railway system. 
205  See http://ec.europa.eu/growth/sectors/postal-services/ergp_en. 
206  See http://www.wareg.org. 
207  See https://www.enisa.europa.eu. 
208  See https://www.easa.europa.eu/. 
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institutions, [Member States] and in some cases, stakeholder related to the policy sector of the 
agency.”209  
While it is clear that the harmonisation goal and the desire to create a common market in the provision 
of certain services is facilitated by the creation of pan-European institutions such as those listed above, 
it is just as clear that the creation of a truly European institution with executive powers needs to satisfy 
the legislative requirements of a Treaty change so that the institution in question is imbued with powers 
comparable, for example, to those of the European Central Bank.210 Insofar as these pan-European 
institutions are created in the absence of a legislative basis that lies in the Treaties, their ability to serve 
as a focal point for EU law enforcement becomes increasingly problematic, especially in the absence 
of any real accountability before the European courts or in terms of appeals available before a national 
or EU court. As has been noted by Eberlein & Grande, this dilution in the formality of governance 
procedures renders the regime of cooperation between so many institutional players vulnerable to 
conflict which, in turn, raises some unresolved problems about democratic legitimacy.211  
Outside the EU 
As regards the extent to which this level of regional cooperation can or should be realised in other parts 
of the world beyond the EU, a heavy dose of scepticism may be required. The relative success of these 
EU-wide organisations is partly due to the unique federal system of law enforcement that exists among 
a group of jurisdictions bound by a common set of legal traditions and a sense of political cohesion 
towards achieving “the European project”. It is difficult to imagine how African, Asian or South 
American nations could combine effectively to achieve comparable results, especially considering the 
differences in the stages of development and institutional maturity of many of the national jurisdictions 
in these other regions of the world. Given the unique levels of political and economic integration within 
the EU, it is thus not surprising that other regions of the world do not sustain the same level of 
cooperation between NRAs associated with organisations such as BEREC and ACER. This, whereas 
telecommunications NRAs in the Middle East region meet regularly, they do so merely to share 
experiences and best practices, but the organisation does not play an integral role in a harmonised rule-
making process along the lines practised by BEREC. 
At the Ministerial level in the Southeast Asian region, meetings occur within the TELMIN group, the 
ASEAN Telecommunications and IT Ministers Meeting212 and AMEN, the ASEAN Energy Ministers 
Meeting,213 both of which provide sectoral fora for regional Ministerial meetings. In the Americas, some 
coordination and harmonization occurs under the umbrella of Inter-American Telecommunications 
                                                      
 209 Jordana J. & Triviño-Salazar J., op. cit., at p. 3. 
 210  In this regard, refer to the old case-law in Meroni v. High Authority [1957/1958) ECR 133, which relates to 
the extent to which EU institutions may delegate their tasks to regulatory agencies. The doctrine is relatively 
controversial insofar as some commentators consider it to be somewhat anachronistic in light of the way in 
which EU competences have developed over time. (See Hatzapoulos V., Regulating Services in the European 
Union (2012), Oxford University Press, at p. 325). Having said that, the Meroni doctrine does have the 
inescapable benefit of limiting the extent to which effective enforcement of Community law would be 
adversely affected because its responsibilities for enforcement would be exempt from effective judicial 
review. 
 211  Refer to Eberlein & Grande, op cit. Although query how much additional democratic legitimacy exists if 
action is pursued through the European Commission rather than through pan-European bodies, which at least 
reflect the participation of national regulatory institutions. 
 212 See https://asean.org/asean-economic-community/asean-telecommunications-and-it-ministers-meeting-
telmin/. 
 213 See https://asean.org/asean-economic-community/asean-ministers-on-energy-meeting-amem/. 
 79  
Commission (CITEL), linked to the Organization of American States (OAS).214 At the global level, a 
degree of sharing of best practices occurs through the regular meetings conducted by the International 
Telecommunications Union (the ITU). 
Outside regulated network sectors, a more formal structure is in place in Australia and New Zealand 
with respect to foodstuffs, which is reminiscent of EU-level structures, in the form of a common Food 
Authority (Australia New Zealand Food Authority (ANZFA).215 
Competition Networks 
European Union 
As opposed to their regulatory counterparts, the level of cooperation between NCAs operating within 
the European Union occurs under two tiers of enforcement, namely: (i) the enforcement by the 
Commission of large matters involving significant trans-border elements; and (ii) the enforcement by 
NCAs with respect to more national or localised issues. This is a by-product of the great ‘subsidiarity’ 
debate that occurred in the early 1990s and which is associated with the enactment of the Maastricht 
Treaty. Cooperation between NCAs in the EU, for example, occurs via the European Competition 
Network (ECN).216 This organisation, while geared to some degree towards developing best practices 
in terms of analytical approaches regarding certain commercial conduct and theories of harm, is 
primarily focused on the most effective means of exercising jurisdictional competence in the 
adjudication of competition disputes or the review of mergers where multiple jurisdictions might be 
affected.  
This cooperation is most evident in the system of decentralised enforcement introduced through 
Regulation 1/2003217 and in the administration of the “one stop shop” rule established under the EU 
Merger Regulation.218 When cooperating under the ECN structure, however, the individual NCAs and 
the European Commission are cooperating in their own capacity as individual entities in relation to a 
very clear set of tasks that are already set forth under primary EU legislation, rather than simply as cogs 
in a larger cohesive institution. Given the general supervisory role conferred upon the European 
Commission by Article 105 (1) TFEU, there is nothing inherently inconsistent in an NCA being 
“independent” in its own right at national level, while at the same time being deferential to the European 
Commission as regards its exercise of jurisdiction in competition matters.219 
                                                      
214  Refer to https://www.citel.oas.org/en/Pages/About-Citel.aspx. There are also some sub-regional efforts at 
coordination, such as a subgroup on communications (SGT.1 – Communications) within Mercosur and the 
Andean Committee of Telecommunications Authorities (CAATEL) within the Andean Community of 
Nations. See Bruszt L. & McDermott G.A., Leveling the Playing Field: Transnational Regulatory Integration 
and Development, Oxford University Press, 2014. 
 215 See https://dfat.gov.au/trade/agreements/in-force/anzcerta/Pages/australia-new-zealand-closer-economic-
relations-trade-agreement.aspx. 
 216  Refer to http://ec.europa.eu/competition/ecn/index_en.html. 
 217  Refer to Recitals 19, 34 and 35. 
 218  Council Regulation 139/2004, at Recitals 8 and 11; Refer also to the Jurisdictional Notice, EC OJ C95-1 of 
16.4.2008. 
 219 In the view of Wils, op. cit., at p.18: “This lack of full independence of NCAs vis a vis the European 
Commission is however unproblematic …. The Commission’s powers vis a vis NCAs do not endanger the 
fulfilment by the NCAs of their task of applying Articles 101 and 102 TFEU effectively and uniformly in the 
general interest, but rather constitute a safeguard to ensure the fulfilment of this task. The Commission’s 
powers vis a vis NCAs, and more generally the close cooperation within the European Competition Network, 
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Aside from the ECN, the recent tendency in Europe has been for certain forms of sub-regional 
cooperation to take place. A good example is the Nordic Cooperation Agreement entered into in 2017 
between Denmark, Iceland, Norway Sweden, and Finland.220 The Agreement envisages a significant 
degree of cooperation at the enforcement level, including the exchange of information about 
investigations and merger control, and mutual assistance in the conduct of dawn raids related to 
allegedly anti-competitive commercial practices under investigation. More importantly, the Nordic 
authorities agreed to request information on behalf of other authorities, thereby effectively expanding 
the reach of their respective national competition laws extraterritorially. This level of cooperation at an 
EU sub-regional level clearly goes beyond the fulfilment of harmonization goals and implementation 
of “best practices” foreseen under Regulation 1/2003, but could arguably not occur in the absence of 
the broader level of cooperation foreseen under that Regulation. 
A similar form of cooperation exists on the continent of Africa, at least as regards merger control review, 
with two organisations providing two different merger notification regimes for mergers whose activities 
affect their territories (i.e., COMESA and CEMAC 221).222 The genesis of those organisations was 
prompted more by the desire of a number of fledgling African merger regimes to be better able to review 
mergers that would often slip under their enforcement radar, rather than smoothing over potential 
jurisdictional disputes.  
In Latin America, there have been some attempts made to structure cooperation among NCAs. At a 
broader level, the OECD and IDB have a common initiative to build cooperation in the region.223 Sub-
regional activity is built around common market initiatives, such as Mercosur and the Andean 
Community, but they have not been successful. Mercosur has never been able to establish substantive 
collaboration and the NCAs have tended to drift apart over the years.224 The members of the Andean 
community have experienced substantial differences in enforcement over the years, despite similarities 
in their laws.225  More recently, they faced a significant political crisis when the regional authority 
decided to fine a company that had been granted immunity in two national jurisdictions, thereby 
jeopardizing their respective national leniency programs.226 Thus, despite some efforts in the past 20 
years, most of the cooperation in the region remains limited to the sharing of best practices and 
implementing specific bilateral cooperation regarding cases that affect more than one jurisdiction. 
Global cooperation 
                                                      
can also help ensuring the NCAs’ independence from their national government and politics, as NCAs may 
be able to call upon the Commission’s authority when put under pressure in their Member State”. 
220 Refer to https://www.kkv.fi/en/facts-and-advice/competition-affairs/international-cooperation-related-to-
competition-affairs/nordic/agreement-on-cooperation-in-competition-cases/. 
 221 The European Community of Central African States, https://www.cemac.int/. The members of CEMAC are 
Cameroon, Central African Republic, Chad, Republic of Congo, Equatorial Guinea and Gabon. The 
organization was formed in 1994, and superseded by another agreement in 1999. 
 222  Refer to https://www.comesa.int (the Common Market for Eastern and Southern Africa), established in 1994. 
223  Refer to http://www.oecd.org/competition/latinamerica/. 
224  See Mota Prado M. and Bertrand V., ‘Regulatory Cooperation in Latin America: The Case of Mercosur’ 78 
Law and Contemporary Problems, 26. 
225  See ‘SICE - Competition Policy - Competition Policy in the Andean Countries’ 
http://www.sice.oas.org/compol/articles/cpandea.asp. 
226  See https://www.competitionpolicyinternational.com/the-end-of-leniency-programs-in-the-andean-region. 
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Irrespective of the shortcomings in regional cooperation discussed above in relation to some parts of 
the world, the discipline of competition law, unlike the many and varied approaches which characterise 
regulatory policy in different sectors of the economy, arguably lends itself to a more consistent approach 
across physical borders and different legal cultures. Accordingly, looser forms of cooperation and 
information sharing (i.e., ‘best practices’) occur at the global level among competition policy 
organisations such as the ICN,227 OECD228 and UNCTAD.229 These organisations, which also work 
closely with regional organisations, operate in a complementary, non-hierarchical manner, and are 
designed to achieve commonly agreed standards and better cooperation in the challenges posed by 
globalisation and digitalisation. Each organisation reflects the needs of their specific memberships, and 
increasing attention is being paid to the coordination of their efforts.230 Efforts have been made in the 
past to include the meaningful codification of cooperative efforts into the WTO regime, but these have 
generally given way to the more flexible approach associated with the workings of the ICN.231 
Indeed, the ICN has been quite active in pushing for best practices not only in relation to substantive 
analysis but also at the procedural level. A good example of this latter activity is the 2019 ICN 
Framework on Competition Agency and Procedures (“ICN Framework”), which details fundamental 
principles of procedural fairness, encouraging their adoption by the members of the network.232 This 
initiative reflects an agenda that has been promoted by the US Department of Justice and Federal Trade 
Commission over a number of years.233  
The 2019 ICN Framework includes recommendations as regards the following aspects of procedural 
fairness: (i) non-discrimination between foreign companies and nationals; (ii) transparency and 
predictability of procedures and regulations; (iii) opportunity to have a meaningful participation in the 
investigative process; (iv) reasonable timing to conclude investigative proceedings; (v) clear policies 
and rules on the confidentiality of information during investigations; (vi) avoiding conflicts of interest; 
(vii) providing formal notice of, and respecting the right of defense in, investigations and enforcement 
procedures; (viii) recognition and discipline of legal representation and privileged information; (ix) 
issuing final decisions in written form when imposing sanctions or remedies; (x) the right to an 
independent review of the final decision by an adjudicative body.  
Even though the ICN does not have powers to enforce the principles and recommendations contained 
in the ICN Framework, their voluntary adoption by the member NCAs is both a powerful tool for 
dissemination and transparency, as well as a way of building commitment around these principles. At 
the level of transparency, the ICN Framework requires those members which adhere to its terms to 
                                                      
 227 Refer to https://www.internationalcompetitionnetwork.org. 
 228 Refer to http://www.oecd.org/. 
 229 Refer to https://unctad.org/en/Pages/Home.aspx. 
 230 Refer to Mundt A., “Development of Multilateral Cooperation from a National Competition Authority’s Point 
of View”, in Liber Amicorum, (Vol. 1) for Frédéric Jenny, op. cit., at pp. 3-17. 
 231 Refer to https://www.internationalcompetitionnetwork.org/. 
232  Refer to https://www.internationalcompetitionnetwork.org/wp-content/uploads/2019/04/ICN_CAP.pdf. 
233  As regards the various examples of how the United States has been promoting its agenda on procedural 
fairness at the international level, refer to: The Antitrust Guidelines for International Enforcement and 
Cooperation (https://www.justice.gov/atr/internationalguidelines/download); and recent speeches delivered 
by DOJ officials, Makan Delrahim (e.g., “International Antitrust Policy: Economic Liberty and the Rule of 
Law”, at https://www.justice.gov/opa/speech/file/1007231/download) and Alford R. (e.g., “Designing a 
System to Secure the Fair Administration of Competition Laws”, at 
https://www.justice.gov/opa/speech/file/1110716/download. 
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provide a “Template with information regarding its Competition Law investigation and enforcement 
procedures”, which is made publicly available on the ICN network website. In addition, given that the 
ICN Framework also encourages member authorities to communicate with each other, it identifies out 
potential procedural concerns and provides clarifications whenever questions arise, thereby exerting 
pressure on those participating authorities that do not comply.  
All in all, at the global level, these multiple cooperation efforts of NCAs have created some convergence 
around the development of best practices in areas as diverse as cartel investigations, leniency 
agreements and merger reviews. Such convergence is usually incorporated in guidelines and 
recommendations issued by international organizations and networks.234 These efforts have also led to 
an increase in direct exchanges among NCAs in multi-jurisdictional cases, especially those concerning 
international cartel investigations and mergers with a global dimension which have been simultaneously 
reviewed by different authorities around the world. 
Despite these potentially positive outcomes, informal webs of cooperation among NCAs may be skewed 
by an imbalance of power between those more structured, resourceful and established NCAs, on the 
one hand, and relative latecomers to the discipline of competition law enforcement, characterized by 
fewer resources and prestige in the international arena, on the other. It may be the case, however, that 
the positions advocated by leading NCAs may not necessarily always produce the best results to all 
agencies involved in the interaction. Different sociopolitical contexts and different policy goals may 
lead to the need for a degree of diversity in enforcement decisions that should arguably not be diluted 
by cooperation efforts. 235 Accordingly, striking the right balance in these cooperation networks is 
anything but an easy task.  
 
                                                      
234  Refer, for example, to the ICN Merger Remedy Guide, published in 2016, available here: 
https://www.internationalcompetitionnetwork.org/wp-content/uploads/2018/05/MWG_RemediesGuide.pdf. 
235  Calling attention to the importance of diversity in enforcement of competition law, see Townley, ‘A 
Framework for European Competition Law: Co-Ordinated Diversity', op.cit. 
 
   
TABLE 3: PAN- EUROPEAN REGULATORY BODIES 
Regulatory Body Appointment Scope of action Remedies 
ACER (Agency for the 
Cooperation of Energy 
Regulators) 
Regulation (EC) 713/2009 establishes ACER, 
consisting of: an Administrative Board of 9 
members and 9 alternatives appointed for 4 year-
periods from Commission, the Council and the 
European Parliament (Article 12, 13) to ensure 
ACER carries out its mission and tasks assigned to 
it; a Board of Regulators, represented primarily by 
1 senior NRA officer and one alternate and 1 non-
voting representative of the Commission (Article 
14, 15); a Director, appointed for 5 years which 
may be extended by a further 3 years, to represent 
and manage the Agency (Article 16, 17); and a 
Board of Appeal (comprising 6 members and 6 
alternates) appeals lodged by any natural or legal 
person, including NRAs, (Article 18). 
ACER focus is on transborder issues within Europe, and 
in putting in place a common framework (e.g., common 
EU-wide network codes). 
ACER has an expanding role, e.g., Third Energy 
Package (2009), REMIT (Regulation 1127/2011), 
Infrastructure (Regulation 347/2013), measures to 
safeguard the security of gas supply (Regulation 
2017/1938). The Clean Energy for All Europeans 
legislative proposals (currently under negotiations) 
proposes a wide range of tasks for ACER. 
ACER can issue Opinions and 
Recommendations to Transmission System 
Operators/ENTSOs, NRAs, the European 
Parliament, the Council and the Commission 
(Article 41).  
In some circumstances, ACER can take 
Individual Decisions on technical issues 
(e.g., on terms and conditions for access to 
and operational security of cross-border 
infrastructure or on TPA/Unbundling 
exemptions) or on Terms and Conditions or 
Methodologies for the implementation of the 
electricity Guidelines or decisions on cross-
border cost allocation for Projects of 
Common Interest (TEN-E Regulation) and 
under the Regulation safeguarding security 
of Gas Supply).  
ACER decides if: (a) the concerned NRA 
fails to reach an agreement within a pre-
specified period; or (b) upon request of the 
concerned NRAs. 
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BEREC (Body of European 
Regulators for Electronic 
Communications) 
Regulation (EC) 1211/2009 establishes BEREC, 
which is constituted by senior representatives of the 
28 NRAs of the EU Member States (Article 4). 
A Chair, chosen among the NRA representatives, 
has tenure for only one year (Article 4)  
BEREC disseminates among the NRAs regulatory best 
practices and, when requested, provides them with 
assistance on regulatory issues (Article 2).  
BEREC delivers Opinions on draft Commission 
documents, issues reports, provides advice and delivers 
Opinions to the European Parliament and Council, on 
any matter regarding electronic communications falling 
within its competence (Article 2).  
When requested, BEREC assists the European 
Parliament, the Council, the Commission and the NRAs 
in exchanges with third parties.  
BEREC has no jurisdiction to interfere with 
the Decisions adopted by NRAs taken under 
the EU Regulatory Framework. It can, 
however, issue a recommendation requiring 
the NRA to amend or withdraw its draft 
measure (Article 7). Under Article 7 of the 
Framework Directive, the NRAs shall take 
the “utmost account” of comments of other 
NRAs and the Commission.  
ERGP (European Regulators’ 
Group for Postal Services) 
Under Commission Decision 2010/C-217/07, the 
ERGP is composed of the postal NRAs of the 28 
Member States, represented by the heads of those 
authorities (Article 3).  
The ERGP advises and assists the Commission :  
- in consolidating the internal market for postal 
services;  
- on any matter related to postal services within 
its competence;  
- on the development of the internal market for 
postal services and the consistent application in 
all Member States of the regulatory framework 
for postal services (Article 2).  
The ERGP can consult with consumers and end-users, if 
this is done with the consent of the Commission (Article 
2).  
The ERGP is a consultative organ which 
advises and assists the Commission. 
Although it is designed to facilitate 
cooperation with the NRAs, it has no power 
to interfere with their Decisions.  
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WAREG (European Water 
Regulators) 
WAREG is composed of 25 entities responsible for 
the regulation of water within European Member 
States, and 5 observers, all of which apply for 
membership. It has been established as an informal 
gathering of regulators based on the fulfilment of 
the policy goals of the Water Directive, taking 
inspiration from the regime used in the energy 
sector. 
The role of WAREG is:  
- to exchange and share common practices;  
- to enhance technical and institutional 
cooperation among WAREG members; 
- to promote capacity building, stable regulation 
and consumer protection;  
- to conduct an open dialogue with EU 
institutions. 
This body has no decision-making powers. 
ECN (European Competition 
Network) 
The ECN is composed of the Commission and the 
National Competition Authorities (NCAs) 
designated by the Member States. Under the 
Commission Notice on Cooperation within the 
Network of Competition Authorities, the Advisory 
Committee of the ECN is composed of experts 
from the various competition authorities (Article 
58). 
The Commission and the NCAs cooperate with each 
other through the ECN when dealing with cases 
involving Articles 101 or 102 of the Treaty on the 
Functioning of the European Union.  
Under some circumstances, the Advisory Committee of 
the ECN shall be consulted by the Commission prior to 
adopting Decision (Articles 59 and 60). NCAs are 
advised to discuss case allocation of important cases 
with the Advisory Committee (Article 61 and 62).  
The Advisory Committee can be consulted on draft 
Commission regulations, notices and guidelines (Article 
63 and 64).  
The ECN has a consultative function. The 
discussion and opinion are neither binding 
upon the Commission nor upon the NCAs. 
The fundamental role of the ECN is to share 
best practices in competition law cases and 
to deal efficiently with jurisdictional 
overlaps in the context of the decentralized 
enforcement regime adopted under 
Regulation 1/2003.  
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EUAR (European Union 
Agency for Railways236)  
Regulation (EU) 2016/796 on the European Union 
Agency for Railways (EUAR) repeals Regulation 
(EC) No 881/2004 which established the European 
Railway Agency (ERA). 
Regulation (EU) 2016/796 provides that the 
Management Board of the EUAR is constituted by 
one (1) representative from each Member State and 
two (2) representatives of the Commission, all with 
a right to vote. The Management Board also includes 
six (6) representatives, without a right to vote, acting 
in the interests of a number of stakeholders such as: 
(a) railway undertakings; (b) infrastructure 
managers; and (c) the railway industry. The term of 
office of the members is four (4) years and is 
renewable. (Article 47)  
The Management Board elects, by a two-thirds 
majority of its members entitled to vote, a 
chairperson from among the representatives of the 
Member States and a Deputy Chairperson from 
among its members. (Article 48)  
EUAR contributes to the development and effective 
functioning of a single European railway area, by 
guaranteeing a high level of railway safety and 
interoperability, while improving the competitive position 
of the railway sector through the monitoring of rules for 
national railways. (Article 2)  
EUAR issues Recommendations and Opinions to the 
European Commission, and addresses Recommendations 
to Member States. It issues Opinions and Guidelines to 
NRAs (and other non-binding documents) facilitating the 
application of railway safety and interoperability 
legislation. (Article 4)  
When required, and without prejudice to Member States’ 
competences, the EU Institutions and the European 
External Action Service, the EUAR can conclude 
agreements, develop contacts and enter into 
administrative arrangements with supervisory authorities, 
international organisations and the administrations of 
third countries. (Article 44)  
EUAR examines the drafts of proposed 
national measures submitted to it. In the case 
of a positive outcome from that examination, 
the EUAR informs the Commission and the 
Member State concerned of its positive 
assessment in order for the Member State to 
introduce the new rule(s). Conversely, in the 
event of a negative assessment, the EUAR 
informs the Commission and the Member 
State in question of the reasons why the 
national rule(s) should not enter into force or 
be applied.  
(Article 25) 
When the Member State concerned adopts 
the national rule(s) in disregard of the 
EUAR’s negative decision without providing 
convincing arguments for having done so, the 
Commission can adopt, by way of 
implementing acts, a Decision addressed to 
such a Member State, requiring it to modify 
or repeal that rule. (Article 25) 
The above procedure does not apply when 
Member States need to issue an urgent 
preventive measure, in particular following 
an accident or an incident.237 (Article 25) 
                                                      
 236 ERA was established in 2004 and commenced operations in 2006. It underwent a name-change in 2016, becoming the European Union Agency for Railways (EUAR). 
 237 Article 8(3) of and point (b) of Article 14(4) of Directive (EU) 2016/797. 
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ENISA (European Union 
Agency for Network and 
Information Security) 
Regulation (EU) No 526/2013 concerning the 
European Union Agency for Network and 
Information Security (ENISA) repeals Regulation 
(EC) No 460/2004 which established the European 
Network and Information Security Agency.  
Regulation (EU) No 526/2013 provides that the 
Management Board of the ENISA is constituted by 
one (1) representative from each Member State and 
two (2) representatives of the Commission, all with 
a right to vote. The term of office of the members is 
four (4) years and can be renewed. (Article 6)  
The Management Board elects a Chairperson and a 
Deputy Chairperson from among its members. The 
term of office of the Chairperson and a Deputy 
Chairperson is three (3) years and can be renewed. 
(Article 7)  
ENISA contributes to a high level of network and 
information security within the Union. (Article 1) 
In particular, ENISA assists: (a) the EU Institutions, 
bodies, offices and agencies in developing and 
implementing policies in network and information 
security; and, when requested, (b) Member States in 
enhancing and strengthening their capability and 
preparedness to prevent, detect and respond to network 
and information security problems and incidents. 
(Articles 2-3) 
ENISA assists: (a) the Commission by means of advice, 
opinions and analyses on all the Union matters related to 
policy development in the area of network and 
information security, including Critical Information 
Infrastructure Protection and resilience (Recital 21); and 
(b) Member States through the facilitation of the 
cooperation (i) among them and (ii) between the 
Commission and other EU Institutions, bodies, offices 
and agencies and Member States. (Recital 23)  
ENISA assists the European Union in its relationships 
with third countries and international organisations in 
order to promote international cooperation on network 
and information security issues, namely: (i) organizing 
international exercises, and analysing and reporting on the 
outcome of such exercises; (ii) facilitating the exchange 
of best practices of relevant organisations; and (iii) 
providing the European Union institutions with expertise. 
(Article 3) 
Decisions taken by the ENISA concerning 
the processing of confirmatory applications 
with reference to public access to European 
Parliament, Council and Commission 
documents 238  can be the subject of a 
complaint to the Ombudsman or an action 
before the Court of Justice of the EU. (Article 
18) 
ENISA’s contracts are governed by the law 
applicable to the contract at issue, and the 
Court of Justice of the EU has jurisdiction: (i) 
to issue judgments with reference to any 
arbitration clause contained in a contract 
concluded by ENISA; and (ii) in any dispute 
relating to compensation of damages caused 
by ENISA’s employers in the performance of 
their duties. (Article 27) 
                                                      
 238 Article 8 of Regulation (EC) No 1049/2001. 
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ENISA welcomes the participation of third countries to its 
work when such third countries have concluded 
agreements with the European Union. (Article 30) 
EASA (European Union 
Aviation Safety Agency) 
Regulation (EU) 2018/1139 of the European 
Parliament and of the Council of 4 July 2018 on 
common rules in the field of civil aviation and 
establishing a European Union Aviation Safety 
Agency, and amending Regulations (EC) No 
2111/2005, (EC) No 1008/2008, (EU) No 996/2010, 
(EU) No 376/2014 and Directives 2014/30/EU and 
2014/53/EU of the European Parliament and of the 
Council, and repealing Regulations (EC) No 
552/2004 and (EC) No 216/2008 of the European 
Parliament and of the Council and Council 
Regulation (EEC) No 3922/91. 
Regulation (EU) 2018/1139 provides that the 
Management Board of the EASA is constituted by 
one (1) representative from each Member State (and 
two (2) alternates) and two (2) representatives of the 
Commission (and their alternates), all with a right to 
vote. The term of office of the members (and their 
alternates) is four (4) years and can be extended. 
(Article 99)  
The Management Board elects a Chairperson and a 
Deputy Chairperson from among those members 
which have voting rights. The term of office of the 
Chairperson and a Deputy Chairperson is four (4) 
EASA contributes to ensuring the proper functioning and 
development of civil aviation in the EU in accordance 
with a number of objectives laid down by Regulation (EU) 
2018/1139 such as: (i) improving the overall performance 
of the civil aviation sector; and (ii) facilitating the free 
movement of goods, persons, services and capital in order 
to provide a level playing field for all actors in the internal 
aviation market and improving the competitiveness of the 
EU's aviation industry. (Articles 1 and 75) 
EASA, inter alia: (i) formulates opinions; (ii) assists the 
Commission through the preparation of measures (Note: 
without prior coordination with EASA, the Commission 
cannot change the content of such measures where they 
comprise technical rules); (iii) conducts inspections, 
investigations and other monitoring activities when 
necessary to fulfil its tasks, or as requested by the 
Commission; (iv) carries out, on behalf of Member States, 
functions and tasks ascribed to them by applicable 
international conventions, in particular the Chicago 
Convention; and (v) assists NRAs in carrying out their 
tasks, in particular by providing a forum for the exchange 
of information and expertise. (Article 75) 
EASA, upon request, assists the Commission in its 
management of relations with third countries and 
Acts of the EASA intended to produce legal 
effects vis-à-vis third parties can be brought 
before the Court of Justice of EU by means 
of actions for: (i) failure to act; (ii) non-
contractual liability; and (iii) contractual 
liability for damages (pursuant to an 
arbitration clause). (Article 114) 
Decisions taken by the EASA (e.g., 
reallocation of responsibility upon request: 
(i) of Member States; and (ii) of organisations 
operating in more than one Member State), 
can be brought before the Court of Justice of 
the EU by means of action for annulment 
only after all appeal procedures 239  within 
EASA have been exhausted. (Article 114) 
EU Institutions and Member States can bring 
actions against decisions of the EASA 
directly before the Court of Justice of the EU, 
without being required to exhaust the appeal 
procedures within the EASA. (Article 114) 
                                                      
 239 Article 105 of Regulation (EU) 2018/1139 provides that the Board of Appeal of the EASA is responsible for deciding against a number of EASA’s Decisions such as 
reallocation of responsibility upon request (i) of Member States; and (ii) of organisations operating in more than one Member State 
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years and is extendable once for a further four (4) 
years. (Article 100) 
international organizations. In particular, such assistance 
contributes to: (i) the harmonisation of rules; (ii) the 
mutual recognition of certificates, in the interest of 
European industry; and (iii) the promotion of European 
aviation safety standards. (Article 90) 
EDPB (European Data 
Protection Board) 
Regulation (EU) 2016/679 on the protection of 
natural persons with regard to the processing of 
personal data and on the free movement of such data, 
established the European Data Protection Board 
(EDPB). (Article 68)  
Regulation (EU) 2016/679 repeals Directive 
95/46/EC on the protection of individuals with 
regard to the processing of personal data and on the 
free movement of such data. 
Regulation (EU) 2016/679 provides that the EDPB 
is composed by the head of: (i) each National Data 
Protection Authorities (DPAs); and (ii) the European 
Data Protection Supervisor (EDPS) or their 
respective representatives (i.e., one (1) person per 
Member State and one (1) person of the EDPS). The 
European Commission takes part in the meetings of 
the EDPB, but without voting rights. (Article 68) 
The EDPB elects one (1) Chair, and two (2) Deputy 
Chairs from amongst its members by simple 
majority. The term of office of the Chair and of the 
Deputy Chairs is five (5) years and is renewable 
once. (Article 73)  
The EDPB ensures the consistent application of 
Regulation (EU) 2016/679. (Article 63) 
To this end, the EDPB performs, on its own initiative or, 
where relevant, at the request of the Commission, a 
number of tasks such as:  
a. monitoring and ensuring the correct application of 
Regulation (EU) 2016/679 through: (i) the issuing 
of opinions when DPAs intend to adopt certain 
relevant measures; and (ii) the adoption of binding 
decisions in specific cases which require dispute 
resolution; 
b. advising the Commission on any issue related to the 
protection of personal data in the EU, including on 
any proposed amendment of Regulation (EU) 
2016/679;  
c. advising the Commission on the format and 
procedures for the exchange of information 
between controllers, processors and DPAs for 
binding corporate rules;  
d. issuing guidelines, recommendations, and best 
practices on procedures for erasing links, copies or 
replications of personal data from publicly 
available communications services. (Article 70) 
Regulation (EU) 2016/679 does not provide 
any appeal procedures as regards the EDPB’s 
binding decisions. However, the EDPB shall 
respect the rule of good administration and 
shall ensure that all persons that might be 
adversely affected by its binding decisions 
have been heard. (EDPB Rules Of Procedure 




   
VII. Conclusions 
This paper has addressed the key recent developments and trends that are shaping the architecture of 
regulatory and competition law governance. Drawing heavily on the European experience, while also 
being mindful of developments in other parts of the world, the authors have sought to assess some of 
the key institutional issues of our time: alternative configurations for the institutional relationship in the 
enforcement of ex ante regulation and ex post competition rules; the contours of independence of NRAs 
and NCAs in the quest for impartiality in decision-making; and the centralization and decentralization 
of regulatory and competition law enforcement.  
Lessons learned 
As regards the essential competences of sectoral regulators and antitrust authorities, the lessons learned 
from around the world suggest that the concentration of regulatory and competition law functions in the 
hands of a smaller number of agencies is something that is increasingly prominent on the political 
agenda. The concentration of expertise in the hands of a single agency seems to make sense when one 
considers the budgetary and human resource constraints that small nations need to address. Those 
pressures are far less pronounced, however, where larger nations in terms of market size, GDP and 
regulatory sophistication are involved. Nevertheless, there are a number of examples of nations not 
being able to resist the urge to merge their traditional regulatory functions across diverse utility sectors. 
Moreover, they are increasingly beginning to graft competition functions onto such agencies and to 
include a consumer protection remit to the combined agency’s competences. The usual rationale for 
such an accumulation of powers revolves around the creation of economies of scale and scope, the 
benefits of utilising multi-disciplined teams, the development of coherent policy approaches across 
sectors and the belief that better working markets may lead to more focused ex ante regulation and a 
broader role for the ex post enforcement of competition law. 
Growing enforcement impetus 
More recently, we have watched a growing interest around a revival of so-called Brandeisian antitrust, 
reframing the goals of competition law to include a greater emphasis on the competitive structure of 
markets, the adoption of a broader public interest standard, and a demand for more active intervention 
from NCAs.240 If successful, this movement could reinforce an approach which encourages the greater 
accumulation of powers under one agency, especially where that agency is no longer bound to follow 
narrow consumer welfare standards as its driving goal. At the very least, Brandeisian reformers might 
ask that broader powers be made available to NCAs, with potentially greater interaction and overlap 
with NRAs in different sectors. What is less clear is whether this new wave of active competition 
enforcement would favor more ex ante regulation or stronger traditional antitrust remedies like ‘old 
style’ break-ups (e.g., Standard Oil and AT&T cases in the United States).241 One way or another, the 
intense debate about the expansion of antitrust goals tends to add more steam to the ongoing discussions 
                                                      
240  Tim Wu has been one of the most active defenders of the expansion of antitrust goals beyond consumer 
welfare. See Wu T., ‘The Curse of Bigness: Antitrust in the New Gilded Age’, Columbia Global Reports, 
2018.  Some NCAs are also considering a reversal in the burden of proof so that certain types of abusive 
practices can be prosecuted more readily: see recommendations of the Digital Competition Expert Panel (UK) 
of 13 March 2019.  Refer also to the European Commission’s Digital Expert Report of 4 April 2019. 
241  Ibid.  
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about the (re)design of competition and regulatory institutions especially at a time when politicians are 
renewing traditional ideas about the break-up of vertically integrated entities.242  
While our initial instincts are to presume that narrowly configured sector-specific regulators are more 
likely to be prone to “capture” by large historical incumbents and more likely to yield to political 
pressure exercised by government, it is by no means clear that a larger agency with a wide portfolio of 
powers will be any more successful in warding off these dangers. Moreover, given that a multi-function 
agency will inevitably need to draw upon resources from central government for its funding, one can 
foresee that this might generate its own dangers of capture from central government and other forms of 
concentrated political pressure. 
Also, as the Australian Competition Policy Review Panel considered after a detailed assessment of two 
decades of experience of the ACCC, the synergies between ex ante access and pricing regulation, on 
the one hand, and ex post competition policy enforcement on the other, may not be so substantial, at 
least for larger jurisdictions. In addition, consolidating powers in a single agency and expanding its 
goals may result in a loss of enforcement focus, possibly leading to less objectivity and transparency in 
enforcement. 243  Such a concentration of powers might also shift the traditional balance in the 
management of the risks by agencies making “Type 1” (false positive) and “Type 2” (false negative) 
errors, given that ex ante regulation is usually more intrusive and therefore more prone to incur in Type 
1 errors that lead to over enforcement. 
Checks and balances 
Given these risks, what is clear is that ever greater concentration between regulatory and competition 
law functions will require a very delicate set of checks and balances to be introduced which is sensitive 
to the legal and political culture of the particular legal system implementing such a change in 
institutional architecture. Indeed, because institutions are not created in a void, but are a product of 
historic socioeconomic and political choices, accumulated experience and the availability of resources, 
any substantial institutional overhaul of institutional structures must take into account the original 
regulatory environment where it will be implemented. 244  While we may be feeling increasingly 
comfortable that ex ante and ex post disciplines in mature liberalized markets bear sufficient similarities 
to one another to facilitate the sort of cross-pollination that makes for a successful blend of powers, 
there is still some analytical distance between competition law functions and consumer protection goals, 
even allowing for the growing role of ‘regulatory antitrust’ measures. 
Even allowing for these analytical differences between ex post and ex ante disciplines, however, it is 
arguable that much more thought should be given to extending the degree of cooperation between NCAs 
and NRAs in terms of operational issues. This is especially the case in the formulation and 
implementation of remedies, which affect the effectiveness of rule-making in regulated network sectors 
(absent a policy decision not to accumulate such tasks in the hands of one super-regulatory agency). 
Within the European Union, it has been commonplace for NCA Decisions adopted in merger reviews 
to rely on the existence of effective regulatory access obligations as the basis upon which potential 
theories of harm can be addressed, without the need for additional merger-specific remedies being 
                                                      
 242 See, for example, New York Times, March 8, 2019; cf Fortune.com, March 8, 2019. See also 
htpps://techcrunch.com/. 
243  Defending the superiority and predictability of the consumer welfare standard, see Wright J.D. & Ginsburg 
D.H., ‘The Goals of Antitrust: Welfare Trumps Choice Symposium: The Goals of Antitrust’ (2012), 81 
Fordham Law Review 2405. 
 244 The accumulation of those factors inevitably leads in many cases to a form of ‘path dependence’. 
 92  
imposed. 245  By the same token, with the exception of one high profile merger decision in the 
broadcasting sector,246 there has been no official mechanism by which a behavioural remedy imposed 
in a merger decision at EU level can be enforced at national level by the relevant NRA. This is despite 
the fact that the enduring Achilles’ heel for those NCAs seeking to impose behavioural (especially 
access-related) remedies is their effective ongoing implementation. 247 The extension of such inter-
agency cooperation to expand the NRA remit to enforce NCA-inspired behavioural remedies has sound 
policy support in the fact that NRAs are best placed to exercise technical expertise in the evaluation of 
remedies over time and in their effective enforcement under national law and before national courts. A 
policy choice to increase the scope of NRA powers in this way could also arguably serve as a 
counterweight to the diminished role of NRAs over time as such agencies are down-sized because the 
relative importance of sector-specific regulation is weakened in the face of markets operating more 
competitively and effectively. 248  In this way, the balance between NRAs and NCAs could be re-
calibrated, with the effectiveness of either set of institutions not being compromised. 
A different model? 
Seen in this light, perhaps the most recent variant in institutional architecture – the United Kingdom 
proposal that regulatory agencies be split along the lines of omnibus consumer-oriented retail services, 
on the one hand, and network can access wholesale services, on the other – might have real merit. Such 
a functional split seems to be sensitive to the twin pressures created by globalisation and digitalisation, 
which is inspiring a new wave of convergent services, while at the same time allowing competition 
rules to play their traditional role. Such a division of competences would at least allow for some residual 
element of “regulatory competition” between agencies while at the same time facilitating a significant 
degree of concentration of powers where policy goals and outlook are more closely aligned. A split 
along such lines would arguably also have the benefit of avoiding the possible tendency of having a 
“super-regulator” orienting its actions to comport with Government economic policy more broadly, 
rather than exercising its powers of economic regulation in an independent way. 
By the same token, the adoption of such an approach is prone to a number of risks, namely: (i) it is 
arguable that those agencies that focus only on infrastructure access (e.g., BNetZa, ACCC) are more 
likely to be captured by pro-investor preference;249 (ii) a consumer-centric agency might tend to be in 
conflict with a rival network access-based agency; (iii) the consumer protection remit will always sit 
uncomfortably against a competition law assessment, unless a more holistic approach towards consumer 
welfare is adopted under competition law analysis; and (iv) confirmation biases and the desire to 
maintain the status quo might continue to be driven by an excessive reliance on outputs rather than 
outcomes.250 How these dangers can be addressed in new institutional designs, whether by embedding 
                                                      
 245 Refer to discussion in Alexiadis P., “Merger control in regulated network sectors: a bridge too far?”, op. 
cit. 
 246 Refer to Case No. COMP/M.2876 – Newscorp/Telepiù, Commission Decision of 2 April 2003. 
 247 The inherent limits of the European Commission’s powers in the enforcement of its behavioural remedies 
imposed under merger control rules are reflected in its recent investigation into Telefónica Deutschland’s 
alleged breach of its merger clearance commitments when securing clearance of its acquisition of fellow 
mobile operator E-Plus in Germany. Refer to EC Press Release of 22 February 2019, IP/19/1371. 
 248 Consistent with the predictions in the Littlechild Report, op. cit., regarding the eventual disappearance of ex 
ante regulation in properly functioning markets.  
 249 In this context, refer to the emphasis in the new EECC on the importance of broadband investment ahead of 
competition between network operators: see Alexiadis & Shortall, op. cit., pp. 111-112. 
 250 See, for example, Cooper J.C. & Kovacic W.E., “Behavioral Economics: Implications for Regulatory 
Behavior” (2012), Journal of Regulatory Economics, Vol. 41, No. 1. See also Cave, Kings College LLM 
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effective internal checks-and-balances and/or establishing external mechanisms to dilute the impact of 
disputes between agencies, is still an open question to be addressed by policymakers. 
Ultimately, each jurisdiction around the world would need to find its own blend of checks and balances 
to ensure that policy goals held in common by all can be fulfilled in different cultural and institutional 
environments. 
Independence 
Beyond the debate around the optimal institutional configuration of ex ante regulation and ex post 
competition enforcement, this paper has also sought to address another important dimension of 
regulatory governance: agency independence. Overall, independence has been considered to be a 
cornerstone of modern regulatory systems, neutralizing potential conflicts of interest and avoiding 
“capture” by key government and industry stakeholders. As noted by the OECD, “although legal 
independence does not automatically bring about de facto independence, it still matters. Aspects of 
legal independence provide … those minimum safeguards which may not prevent all political pressures, 
but nonetheless make it less probable”.251 Institutional guarantees such as transparency in appointments, 
fixed mandates for senior officials, administrative autonomy and financial stability have been 
implemented in most jurisdictions. 
The European Union has taken the independence debate one step further than other jurisdictions, 
considering it to be an essential element in the pursuit of market integration, in order to avoid the pursuit 
of national self-interested policies. As demonstrated above, this has included additional requirements 
regarding how European NRAs and NCAs must be structured and operated, in a complex system that 
blends elements of formal guarantees, transparency requirements, openness to stakeholder participation 
and accountability measured in terms of inter alia the availability of judicial review and respect for the 
rights of the defence). While such a detailed framework for independence is extremely difficult to 
reproduce in other (non-EU) contexts, it nevertheless presents a broad set of tools that can be 
implemented in different institutional settings in accordance with their particular national 
circumstances. 
Cross-border enforcement 
Finally, this paper has also addressed the issue of centralized and decentralized enforcement of 
regulation and competition law. Given the quasi-federal nature of the EU, there is a clear necessity to 
structure a complex system of jurisdictional power-sharing. This institutional framework articulates the 
relationship between the European Commission and the Member States, as well as the horizontal 
relationships among NRAs and NCAs (based on broad legal principles (e.g., subsidiarity), formal 
regulations and ‘soft law’ instruments, subject to some degree of judicial review, although we have 
questioned whether the rise of so many multi-party agencies at EU level turns the risk of undermining 
the value of full legal scrutiny by the courts over agency decision-making. 
In recent years, the emergence and consolidation of pan-European regulatory agencies such as ENISA), 
regulators (e.g. BEREC and ACER) and competition agency networks (e.g., the ECN) has added 
important new actors to this institutional space. Here again, the European experience seems to be 
relatively unique, with an institutional apparatus that is unlikely to be reproduced in totum in other 
contexts. Nevertheless, looser forms of cooperation and truly international networks of cooperation 
(e.g., ITU, ICN, OECD) have emerged and are growing in importance worldwide.  These developments 
                                                      
Lecture, op. cit., who emphasizes the continued potential impact of the “three C’s” – capture, culture and 
cognition. 
 251 Refer to OECD Background Paper, op. cit., at p. 18. 
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are helping to change the institutional landscape and creating momentum towards a ‘soft’ institutional 
framework for power-sharing at a global level. 
 
*     *     * 
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